

SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITING METHODOLOGIES FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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This research examines the Special Forces recruiting methodologies for the twenty-first century. The analysis highlights the origins of the U.S. Army Special Forces from 1952 to the establishment of the Special Forces as a separate combat arms branch of the Army on 9 April 1987. An overview of the force development process conducted at echelons above the United States Army Recruiting Command was presented in order to appreciate the process of setting and adjusting the Special Forces recruiting mission. In greater detail, historical trends, as documented from secondary research, provides the framework of the analysis by examining what occurred in the past in order to preview the relevant effectiveness of recruiting methodologies in practice today. The analysis articulates the importance of mutually supporting relationships, established as early as 1990 and continue to prosper today, between numerous civilian and military agencies involved in the accession of the future Special Forces force structure. The complex realities of recruiting Special Forces, to include the market, internal and external influences that impact the ability to succeed in the conduct of the phenomenon, are addressed as well. Having researched the phenomenon of recruiting and presented the facts and findings that resulted from critical analysis, the recommendations and conclusions are based on secondary and primary research, study, analysis, and logical presentation of the data in order to serve as the vehicle for future research of the phenomenon.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITING METHODOLOGIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, by Major Richard S. Wheeler, U.S. Army, 186 pages.

This research examines the Special Forces recruiting methodologies for the twenty-first century. The analysis highlights the origins of the U.S. Army Special Forces from 1952 to the establishment of the Special Forces as a separate combat arms branch of the Army on 9 April 1987. An overview of the force development process conducted at echelons above the United States Army Recruiting Command was presented in order to appreciate the process of setting and adjusting the Special Forces recruiting mission. In greater detail, historical trends, as documented from secondary research, provides the framework of the analysis by examining what occurred in the past in order to preview the relevant effectiveness of recruiting methodologies in practice today. The analysis articulates the importance of mutually supporting relationships, established as early as 1990 and continue to prosper today, between numerous civilian and military agencies involved in the accession of the future Special Forces force structure. The complex realities of recruiting Special Forces, to include the market, internal and external influences that impact the ability to succeed in the conduct of the phenomenon, are addressed as well. Having researched the phenomenon of recruiting and presented the facts and findings that resulted from critical analysis, the recommendations and conclusions are based on secondary and primary research, study, analysis, and logical presentation of the data in order to serve as the vehicle for future research of the phenomenon.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
AR	Army Regulation
ARI	Army Research Institute
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASVAB	Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
ATRRS	Army Training Requirements and Resource System
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library (Ft. Leavenworth)
CBT	Combating Terrorism
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officers Course
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMF 18	Career Management Field 18

CONUS	Continental United States
CP	Counterproliferation
DA	Direct Action
DA	Department of the Army
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DCSPLANS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
DTI	Defense Technical Institute
FCWG	Future Concepts Working Group
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FY	Fiscal Year
GT	General Technical
HQ	Headquarters
IO	Information Operations
MACOM	Major Command
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
OCONUS	Outside of the Continental United States
OCS	Officer Candidate School
ODA	Operational Detachment-Alpha (A-Team)
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
OSS	Office of Strategic Service
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System

PERSCOM	Personnel Command
PERSINSCOM	Personnel Information Systems Command
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SF	Special Forces
SFAS	Special Forces Assessment and Selection
SFG (A)	Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SFODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (A-Team)
SFQC	Special Forces Qualification Course
SFRD	Special Forces Recruiting Detachment
SMD	Special Missions Division
SMDR	Structural Manning Decision Review
SO	Special Operations
SOAR	Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SOE	Special Operations Executive (British)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOPO	Special Operations Proponency Office
SORC	Special Operations Recruiting Company
SWCS	Special Warfare Center and School
SWTG (A)	Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)
SR	Special Reconnaissance
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TDY	Temporary Duty

THS	Transient, Holdee, and Student
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army Special Warfare Center and School
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command
USASFC (A)	United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USAWC	United States Army War College
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the current methodologies in place to recruit the quality and quantity of United States Army Special Forces soldiers and officers to satisfy the ever-increasing operational tempo and changing mission requirements as the Army Special Forces enters the twenty-first century. In order to support the National Military Strategy and ultimately meet the challenges of an uncertain future, the twenty-first century, the health and status of the Special Forces must be at or near 100 percent strength. This research will determine the challenges of recruiting the sufficient force of the twenty-first century and, more specifically, why recruiting is a challenge. The success, or failure, of past recruitment methodologies or programs were addressed in order to give relevance to current programs instituted. The research examined a number of internal, as well as external factors, which affect the recruiting effort. In consideration of maintaining the health and status of the Special Forces branch, the recruitment of a sufficient and effective quality force directly affects the retention of said force. Thus, retention as it relates to recruitment, was briefly addressed. Finally, the study analyzed, evaluated, and applied current recruiting initiatives (how and why these initiatives are relevant), which aim at solving, either partially or in totality, any barriers which deny the Special Forces to accomplish the mission assigned by the war-fighting commanders in chief (CINC), joint task force commanders, and United States (US) ambassadors. Throughout the research, study, and critical analysis of all material reviewed during the process of articulating and supporting the thesis, new, or a merger of

new and old, ideas and theories of effective recruiting were examined. The secondary goal (an underlying purpose) of researching and developing the thesis was to provide a foundation, a suitable conglomeration of ideas and theories based on sound critical analysis and thorough research. Therefore, this research provides purpose for anyone who seeks resolve in the effective recruiting of Special Forces soldiers and officers in the twenty-first century, and beyond.

As the United States Army Special Forces enter 2000, great concern has risen over whether the current recruiting and retention methodologies in place are sufficient to fill the force in the twenty-first century. Specifically, recent efforts in effective recruiting lend to the assumption that perhaps the “market” may be unable to provide the necessary quality and quantity of personnel to the training base, or pipeline. As the Army draws down because of political, socioeconomic, economic, and other environmental factors, the requirement and necessity for this quality, and defined quantity, of soldiers--Special Forces soldiers--increases. Recent and current conflicts across the spectrum of conflict dictate the need for the Special Forces to be at 100 percent strength in order to satisfy, by design, specific mission profile requirements in support of the war-fighting commanders in chief (CINCs) and national security objectives of the United States. The current status of the Special Forces force structure, at times, places an undue or unrealistic demand on the force, the tactical commanders, and strategic level planners, thereby greatly affecting the retention of quality soldiers currently in the force.

The reasons that drive the “why” of this research are self-evident. Self-evident in the fact that as a nation-state, the United States of America must possess the ability to exercise an undeniable commitment in protecting its vital interests and national security

as a global leader. The soldiers, the warrior diplomats, who assist in protecting the nation's national interests and security objectives, are the United States Army Special Forces. By definition the

Special Forces plans, conducts, and supports special operations activities in all operational environments and across the range of military operations. The U.S. Army organizes, trains, and equips Special Forces to perform seven primary missions: unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), information operations (IO), counterproliferation (CP), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and combating terrorism (CBT). DA, SR, and CBT are direct operations. UW, FID, IO, and CP are indirect operations. Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. Special Forces missions are dynamic because politico-military considerations affect them directly. A change in national security policy or national military strategy may radically alter the nature of a Special Forces mission. A policy or strategy change may actually add or delete a Special Forces mission. All Special Forces missions are interrelated. (FM 31-20 1998, 2-1)

The recruitment of the required caliber of individuals called on to conduct such activities is essential in the support of the core national objectives as well as promoting national security and influencing international events that are favorable to U.S. policies and objectives. The relevance of Special Forces in a world that challenges U.S. security and objectives, in most instances unconventional ways, demands the recruitment of mature, dedicated professionals.

The Special Forces are not considered, by any means, a replacement for conventional forces. They are, however, the force of choice when called on by the National Command Authority (NCA), to foster a calm and stability where anarchy and violence reign by performing as warrior diplomats in high risk and politically sensitive environments across the spectrum of conflict, as well as, in times of order and peace (CGSC DJMO 1999, L-4-E-7). This, again, rests on the premise that recruitment is filling the force required to execute. As a subordinate command, Special Forces must

recruit quality soldiers and officers to fulfill the purpose of the United States Army Special Operations Command's (USASOC) mission statement. The purpose as written in the USASOC *Strategic Planning Guidance Into the 21st Century* is to "successfully conduct worldwide special operations, across the range of military operations, in support of regional combatant commanders, American Ambassadors, and other agencies" (USASOC 1999, 5).

This research and study is to assist in assessing the methodologies of effective recruiting into the twenty-first century in support of the USASOC Commander's Lieutenant General William P. Tangney's vision: "Be the most capable and relevant Special Operations Force in existence-living personal and professional standards of excellence to which others aspire" (Tangney 1999, 6).

Recruitment of "the most capable" and a force that lives by "personal and professional standards of excellence to which others aspire" is the basis for intense research and study and additionally, provides purpose. Likewise, the USASOC board of directors has established seven goals with corresponding objectives for the command, the Special Forces. The second of the seven goals is to "assess, select, train, and retain the very best people" (Tangney 1999, 6). The goal begins and takes form from the onset of recruiting the very best society has to offer into the twenty-first century.

And lastly, as professionals who serve in the United States Armed Forces, and specifically the Special Forces, it is the duty of each and every member to ensure the health and status of the force is maintained as the recognized most capable force, with the very best people in the world. Recruitment is the key and initial element in honoring that duty.

The importance of study and research into the methodologies of recruiting and retaining quality Special Forces soldiers for the twenty-first century can be first addressed as the sole reason for the inception of the Special Forces as a recognized and official branch of the United States Army. The fact is that Special Forces “is a separate combat arms branch of the Army, not just a series of units. It is a force of choice for dynamic, ambiguous, and politically volatile missions that require timely solutions to complex problems” (FM 31-20 1998, 1-1).

In support of this fact, a historical approach that highlights the relevancy of Special Forces, as addressed by President John F. Kennedy, as early as 1961 is, “There is another type of warfare--new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. . . . It preys on unrest” (FM 31-20 1998, 1-1).

Doctrinally, Special Forces is

mature (soldiers) who demonstrate superior performance in small groups or as part of an integrated U.S. response with other military forces as well as non-Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies. Selected small, self-contained units can work swiftly and quietly without the noticeable presence of conventional forces. Even under the most austere conditions, they are able to operate without the infrastructure often needed by a larger force. Thus, they can penetrate enemy territory by various means, sustain themselves in the denied area, and execute various missions ” (FM 100-25 1998, 1-5).

The founding father and authoritative visionary of the United States Army Special Forces, Colonel Aaron Bank (United States Army, retired), cited and still supports the need to “infiltrate by land, sea, or air deep into enemy-occupied territory and organize the

resistance, guerrillas, and indigenous population to conduct Special Forces Operations with emphasis on guerrilla warfare” (Bank 1998).

Colonel Bank’ s perspective on the importance of the Special Forces, supported by President John F. Kennedy in the 1960s and emphasized in current Army Special Operations Forces doctrine, gives meaning and purpose to the importance of continued study and research of innovative methodologies to fill the perhaps most demanded force structure called on to perform across the full range of military operations.

Lastly, the need for the quantity and more importantly, the quality of Special Forces soldiers to accomplish any given mission in the environment aforementioned is of great importance simply because the United States’ national goals and objectives will certainly be challenged into the twenty-first century. The conscious decision, by political and military leaders alike, to remain engaged abroad and serve as an effective leader in the international community, demands effective recruiting.

The current status of all military forces, the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps is at a historical low in terms of personnel strength. All branches of the military services are exhausting an enormous amount of time, money, and effort in recruiting the quality service members who are “fit to fight” and win on today’ s modern battlefield across the spectrum of conflict.

Specifically, the United States Army Special Forces community has undertaken internal studies and research to determine an effective means to recruit, train, and retain quality soldiers in the Special Forces, known as the “Green Berets.” These soldiers, determined as possessing the qualities inherent of the Special Forces, undergo a careful selection process or mission specific training beyond the basic military skills to achieve

entry-level Special Operations skills. Special Forces soldiers must possess the maturity to work in austere environments throughout the world, often as the senior United States representative on the ground, which tests their physical stamina and requires them to be regionally oriented with cross-cultural communications skills. Special Forces soldiers must possess the ability to solve complex, cognitive reasoning problems with little or no doctrine-based or selective command guidance. In addition to the internal studies and research, the Army Special Forces has solicited the assistance of external organizations to address the complexities of recruiting and retaining soldiers who potentially meet the entry level requirements to be members of the United States Army Special Forces.

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, trains more than 9,000 soldiers per year in sixty-eight separate programs of instruction. The command is responsible for the doctrine, training, leader development, soldier systems for Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, the Joint Special Operations Medial Training Center, and for coordinating Ranger and Special Operations Aviation requirements with the Infantry and Aviation Centers.

There are several offices, agencies, and subordinate commands of the Special Warfare Center and School that are of significance and greatly influence the recruiting and retention of the force. The Special Warfare Center and School holds the responsibility of monitoring the overall “health” or the status of the force. This is accomplished through the United States Army Special Warfare Center and School Special Operations Proponency Office (SOPO). The mission of the Proponency Office is to develop and implement career plans, programs, and policies supporting the health of

Special Forces population. A dedicated Special Forces recruiting station, a subordinate command of the United States Army Recruiting Command, is colocated at the Special Warfare Center and School and advises and reports their status to the commanding general regularly. The Special Warfare Center and School is responsible for the conduct of Special Forces Accession and Selection (SFAS) and the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). This is accomplished by the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). Its mission statement, in broadest terms, portrays the complexities and challenges of producing Special Forces soldiers. The training is some of the most rigorous and technical in the world. Special Forces soldiers cannot be mass produced, nor produced on demand. The mission of the 1st Battalion is to assess, select, train, and qualify Special Forces soldiers in order to prepare them for an Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA, SFODA, or A-Team).

The agencies, offices, and subordinate commands under the umbrella of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, as well as outside agencies and institutions, all share common goals and objectives: the recruiting and retention of quality soldiers for the Special Forces in the twenty-first century.

The CINC of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), General Peter J. Schoomaker shares in this commonality and has taken the task of effective recruiting head on with the same commitment and dedication that characterizes any military operation. In an article titled “Operation Leadership” published in *Fast Company* (no. 27, 278), the headline is, “General Peter Schoomaker sees a new world of crisis and conflict that requires ‘creative solutions in ambiguous circumstances.’ His

assignment: the recruitment and training of a new kind of problem-solving, combat ready warrior diplomat.” (Cohen and Tichy 1999, 278).

In the March 1999 edition of *Army*, Lieutenant General William P. Tangney, Commanding General, USASOC, revealed the precedence he places on effective recruiting by acknowledging, “recruiting and retaining soldiers for a quality ARSOF (Army Special Operations Forces) are a challenge” (Tangney 1999, 15). LTG Tangney needs individuals “who can be trusted to do the right thing at the right time in ambiguous situations,” and that “finding (recruiting) people with this trait is essential to the recruiting efforts because deployed ARSOF soldiers usually work in small teams and often as individuals on highly sensitive and stressful missions” (Tangney 1999, 15). The end of this article is dedicated to a three-quarter-page information column titled “Army Special Operations Units Seek Candidates.”

With the level of interest that these general officers have articulated in recruiting within the past year, the time to mobilize and seek solutions or, at a minimum, innovative methodologies, to effectively build the force of the Special Forces for the twenty-first century is now.

The fact that the United States Army Special Forces is the youngest branch of the Army may lend to the thesis and provide insight as to difficulties in recruiting. The assumption is that the Special Forces recruiting effort is aligned with the “Total Army” recruiting effort and follows guidelines outlined in regards to the structure, manpower, and sustainment of the force with limitations and delimitations of specific requirements of recruiting Special Forces soldiers as a smaller, “specialized” percentage of the Army.

Another assumption is that the requirement for Special Forces as an effective and essential force to support the war-fighting CINCs and national security objectives of the United States will remain constant throughout the twenty-first century.

Also, the assumption must be made that study and research will lend to the determination that innovative initiatives to enhance recruiting, as well the possibility of modifying or streamlining assessment, selection, training, and retention programs exists, and that these initiatives have the potential to adequately fill the force of the twenty-first century.

Having stated the purpose and importance of researching recruiting methodologies for the twenty-first century, the premise of research and study is best articulated with the primary question: Are the current recruiting methodologies of the United States Army Special Forces adequate to fill the force structure for the twenty-first century?

Secondary questions are, in part, questions that will assist in the focus or limiting the scope of the research. Subsequently, other secondary questions required an answer in order to analytically reach conclusions based on fact. The secondary questions had the potential and definitively led to tertiary questions. Tertiary questions assisted in deriving better conclusions and denied the ability to simply assume issues and possibilities away. The secondary questions are:

1. Can the training base produce the quality and quantity of Special Forces soldiers necessary to satisfy force structure and mission requirements?

2. Can the Special Forces recruit the quality and quantity of these carefully selected, highly trained and motivated professionals given the state of the economy and other environmental factors?

3. Can the “market” provide the required number of candidates to enter the Special Forces training pipeline due to demographics and differences in the behavioral, cultural, and generation beliefs and values systems?

4. What is the relationship between the programs that recruit and the programs that assesses and selects candidates for Special Forces training?

5. Should the standards by which candidates are recruited be amended to fill the current force structure or should the force structure be tailored to fit the capabilities of recruiting efforts?

Defining the following terms will assist in comprehending the material presented throughout the thesis. Most are approved Department of the Army terms as defined in Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Army field manual (FMs) or U.S. military joint publications (JPs). Other terms are defined by the Special Warfare Center and School’s Proponency Office (SOPO), Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), or by recruiters who have coined terms and phrases for the purpose of practicality.

Special Forces (SF): Special Forces plans, conducts, and supports special operations activities in all operational environments and across the range of military operations. The U.S. Army organizes, trains, and equips Special Forces to perform seven primary missions: unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), information operations (IO), counterproliferation (CP), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and combating terrorism (CBT). DA, SR, and CBT are direct

operations. UW, FID, IO, and CP are indirect operations. Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. Special Forces missions are dynamic because political-military considerations affect them directly. A change in national security policy or national military strategy may radically alter the nature of a Special Forces mission. A policy or strategy change may actually add or delete a Special Forces mission. All Special Forces missions are interrelated (FM 31-20, Initial Draft 1998, 2-1).

Special Operations Forces (SOF): Those active and reserve component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations (FM 101-5-1 1997, 1-142).

Special Operations (SO): Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently, or in coordination with operations of conventional and nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets (Joint Special Operations Forces Institute 1998, A-13).

Unconventional Warfare (UW): A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or

surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (FM 100-25 1998, 2-2).

Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS): A twenty-one day event in which Special Forces candidates participate in a variety of activities and formal tests designed to place them under various forms of physical and mental stress. The program assesses individuals for physical fitness, effort, ability to cope with stress, leadership qualities, and the ability to work in teams. This assessment and selection process evaluates potential, intelligence, skills, and qualifications through behavioral observation and analysis, via performance measuring. Tasks are performed and observed with limited information and zero performance feedback. Successful completion does not in all cases mean selection to proceed with Special Forces qualification training. Attendance in SFAS is restricted to male, active duty, enlisted high school graduates in the pay grades E-4 through E-6, or O-2 promotable to O-3, who have scores of at least 100 on the General Technical (GT) composite of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). These rank, education, and GT score restrictions reflect the basic SF prerequisites outlined in AR 614-200 and USAREC Pamphlet 601-25. Attendance for SFAS also requires receipt of orders assigning the candidate to the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) (SWTG) for temporary duty (TDY). The SFAS program began operation at Camp MacKall, North Carolina, in 1988.

Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC): The qualification course is designed to train and qualify selected candidates in the basic skills and knowledge required to perform the duties and responsibilities as a member of an Operational Detachment-Alpha (A-Team). Course varies in length based on the area of expertise in which each candidate is to qualify, with a minimum of six months projected to complete the training.

Training Pipeline: The time projected for Special Forces candidates to enter assessment and selection, complete the qualification course and any other formal training prior to entering service with an operational Special Forces unit. The pipeline is a “journey” which, without failure to meet the standards the first time through, typically takes twelve to nineteen months to complete. This term is coined at the Special Warfare Center and School and no official Department of the Army definition exists.

Market: The number of SF eligible soldiers in a geographic area that a recruiting station covers. The size of the market is weighted by the market’s propensity factor (or likelihood that soldiers located in the market will apply for SF) because some locations produce few SF applicants. From 1991 to the present, the market is characterized by the following: an increasing recruiting mission with a decreasing market, command competition within the Army, an increasing operational tempo (OPTEMPO) within the Army, and civilian or corporate competition.

This prospective research covered the recruiting methodologies from the inception of the Special Forces as a recognized branch of the United States Army in October of 1987 to the present. Throughout all phases of the research, clearly definable and achievable research criteria were identified to limit the scope of the research. The

determination of suitable and valid information, among countless sources was examined to reach sound conclusions. The establishment of definable research criteria was based on primary and secondary research methods. Secondary research methods provided study, facts, findings, and evidence through analysis of published works from which conclusions were based on “the direct study of the phenomena.” Primary research, in the form of correspondence, compilation of existing data, and observation of the recruiting and retention methodologies in the field further assisted in supporting the thesis on the premise that, in great detail, interpretation and presentation of all the knowledge gained from the research was articulated in the most logical manner possible (Hubbuck 1996, 10).

The scope of the research critically analyzed the current United States Army Special Forces recruiting and retention methodologies for the twenty-first century. The expanded view of this research examined the early origins of recruiting the Special Forces soldier, to include the guidelines and conceptual ideas on which the recruiters based the focus of their efforts. For the purpose of this research, the “early origins” of recruiting was limited to the time of inception of the Special Forces as an official and recognized branch of the Army in October of 1987 to the present. However, the research included a brief overview of the recruiting methods from a historical perspective in which soldiers trained to earn the distinction of becoming Green Berets prior to the formal SFAS becoming a part of the curriculum at the Special Warfare Center and School. This, in contrast with traditional and current recruiting and retention initiatives provided the foundation of the research.

In addition, the importance and validity (the task and purpose) of the mission statement for the Special Forces Proponency Office and the Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) directly influenced and shaped critical reasoning and analysis when analyzing the recruiting methodologies of the twenty-first century.

This study did not formally, in writing, survey members of recruiting commands, the leadership of Special Operations Forces, or any other established group or agency that are considered to be resident subject matter experts. The theory is that effective recruiting methodologies are purely subjective and that the versatility of soliciting a response for the “best” recruiting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) would simply hinder the critical analysis of methodologies in place (past and / or present). All professionals have a view, or an opinion, as to the best way to attack an objective. Therefore, there are no wrong answers to recruiting, if the “commander’s intent” is achieved.

During the conduct of the research, the inability to travel to recruiting stations and observe recruiters as they strived to accomplish the mission was a constraint.

There is no substitute to immersing oneself in the environment, the focal point of the research. Just as it is less practical to read doctrine than to apply the principles of doctrine in a combat environment, so to was the fact that the challenges of effective recruiting cannot be fully understood from the library.

Time was a key limitation during the conduct of this research. Time, not as defined as the time allotted to research, study, and analyze the material; but, defined as the period of time which recruiting methodologies proved or disproved their measure of effectiveness. As stated, recruiting involves a myriad of intangible, often indirect and

collaterally subjective time-proven theories and initiatives. Time did not permit many of these theories and initiatives to mature to the expected potential. Recruiting methodology, in and of itself, is not a short-term fix for a long-term solution. It is, shall remain, an ongoing effort.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this study is to examine the current methodologies in place to recruit the quality and quantity of United States Army Special Forces soldiers and officers to satisfy the ever-increasing operational tempo and changing mission requirements as the Army Special Forces enters the twenty-first century. If a military organization is to fight and win wars on the modern battlefield, the force of the future must be carefully tailored to do so. Simply, today's modern battlefield is a battlefield of the past tomorrow. Tomorrow's battlefield requires defining the organization's capabilities of future combat-ready units and translating ideas into tangibles based on a balanced merger of education, doctrine, history, theory, technology, and most importantly, manpower. More often than not, creative solutions for uncertain, undefined threats of the future are required to "win." Creative solutions to problems or challenges such as recruiting often stem from the ability of an organization to adapt to change and overcome unforeseen, ambiguous circumstances. The most enabling quality that allows military organizations to "master and control change" or to "leap ahead" (Reimer 1999, 47) of an adversary is the congruent relationships shared by soldiers, strategists, historians, theorists, researchers, and scientists. Congruence is not often achieved

without friction; however, the successful masters of change and unforeseen conditions are those who refuted the idea that change was too hard and rejected new, innovative ideas. The free flow of information and exchange of innovative ideas shapes the future.

Much of this information is available in the form of unpublished works. In the field or science of recruiting, unpublished works resemble the efforts of those most concerned over the health and welfare of the SF force structure of the future. One such organization is the team assembled by the commanding general of USSOCOM. The Future Concepts Working Group's (FCWG) recruiting and leader development staff hone in on achieving the

capability to selectively recruit, assess, and retain SOF leaders with strong legal, moral, and ethical foundations, and focus education programs to train for certainty while educating for uncertainty. We must ensure we are training and educating our people how to think not just what to think; addressing the mindset of change to ensure SOF is fully functional and capable of operating in the Information Age. We should focus on improving recruiting, education, training, mobility, and developmental opportunities as a foundation to create institutional commitment and to foster innovative thinking. (FCWG, 1999)

The efforts of the FCWG's unpublished research and study provided the underlying theme and set the tone to educate the author (and the reader) in such a way as to educate for uncertainty. The FCWG believes that recruiting deserves a proactive campaign plan in recruiting the right people and "preserving the trust, customizing agreements, and investing in our most precious resource--our people (FCWG 1999). The campaign's purpose is to ensure the SOF continuum of excellence, recruit with realistic expectations, engage special operators in meaningful activities, and achieving the desired result of recruiting, leading, and retaining the best warriors available worldwide. Recruiting concepts that are working documents and viable products of the FCWG Concept

Development Sessions, and could be implemented at any time (after possible changes to Title 10), include: high-fidelity marketing, recruit the recruiter, SOF recruiting force, funding SO-peculiar recruiting, SOF outreach, SOF tryouts, contingency hires, restoring mystique, targeting recruiting, SOF Summer Camp, SOF aptitude screening, and kindergarten SOF. Many of these concepts are addressed in likeness when applied to SF specific recruiting within this study and analysis. The resemblance of the current and future recruiting methodologies as articulated within chapter four of the study portrays the FCWG's mind-set that turbulence inspires mastering and controlling change. The ability to overcome unforeseen conditions and train for certainty, while educating for uncertainty, will create an institutional commitment in fostering innovative thinking in the field of recruiting.

Innovative thinkers in the field of recruiting, associated with the accession of the force structure of the future, are another source of valuable unpublished works. The institutional commitment to assist the author in innovative thinking while researching the phenomenon of recruiting proved to be the foundation of all primary research conducted. Personal communication with the Special Operations Recruiting Company's (SORC) company commander, Major Ray Salmon; the director of SOPO at SWCS, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein (and others within SOPO); and SF Command's (USASFC) assistant chief of staff, G7, Sheri Taylor provided enormous support in the education process of the author and subsequent development of the thesis. These individuals and agencies are the subject matter experts that are actively engaged, directly and indirectly, in the science of recruiting. Personal communication via the phone, correspondence (electronic or otherwise) was continually the source of pertinent information, research,

study, data, theory, analysis, personal perspectives, and experienced-based knowledge. The Information Age, all the technology that accompanies, made it possible to review, analyze, and document relevant facts and findings in literally days, weeks, or months after their formulation. Off-the-shelf command and information briefs prepared by the subject matter experts were in the author's possession in a remarkably timely manner and proved to be invaluable sources of primary research material instrumental in the development of the thesis.

An understanding of the mission statement (the task and purpose) of these individuals and agencies led to the formulation of an effective review of literature concept adopted by the author. The concept of the literature review was designed to assist the author in objectively studying and evaluating the effectiveness of current, and the potential effectiveness of projected, Special Forces recruiting methodologies. In order to present the facts, observations and findings, progress, analysis, validation, and conclusions from the research, knowledge of recruiting in general (recruiting the armed forces) and the force development process for all military services was a must. "Simple" everyday, common language used by those in the field of accessions demanded an education process in order to communicate effectively with the experts. Once comfortable with a broad and basic knowledge of the phenomenon of recruiting, the thesis was narrowed and focused on the recruitment of Special Forces. Prior to narrowing the focus on the recruitment of SF, the author, with the assistance of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), conducted secondary research of recruiting the Army via the Rand Arroyo Center, Army Research Division. Research of such gave the author an appreciation and understanding of the phenomenon and educated the

otherwise benighted beginner researcher as to the issues and related topics of discussion. Rand Arroyo's published *Issue Papers*, *RAND Research Briefs*, and other publications were instrumental in the education process. The CALL advised on the method of attack, simply because of the broad nature of the topic to be developed. The list of accessible resources available from the Rand Arroyo is extensive. For the purpose of advising the reader on a method to obtain published works from the Rand Arroyo Center, Army Research Division, the following Internet addresses are provided:

<http://www.rand.org/organization/ard/research/.sums/recruiting.html>

<http://www.rand.org/publications/IP>; and <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB>. In the event these Internet addresses become inaccessible, the CALL staff will undoubtedly assist a researcher in contacting the Rand Arroyo Center.

Revision of bibliographical indexes in published books, journals, periodicals, and government-sponsored research projects and reports assisted in the collection of pertinent information in which development of the thesis was highly dependent. The reference list grew exponentially and in turn assisted in the timely identification of published works that showed promise in remaining focused on the problem statement. As an end to the means, the concept of the literature review provided the way to logically articulate and present the introductory information in chapter 1, the research approach and procedures for chapter 3, the vehicle to present the analysis in chapter 4, and the knowledge based recommendations and conclusions in chapter 5.

Published books referenced in the thesis or read during the research did not specifically address the effectiveness of current or projected recruiting methodologies for the twenty-first century. They did, however, broaden the understanding and necessity of

recruiting the Special Forces for the future by review of the historical origins of SF. Colonel (retired) Aaron Bank's book *From OSS to the Green Berets* gave a first-hand appreciation of the origins of SF from World War II to Vietnam. As the father of Special Forces, Colonel Bank's book highlighted the relevance of Special Forces as a forward-thinking visionary and portrayed the ability to adapt to change and overcome unforeseen, ambiguous circumstances, even before the threat presented itself. *From OSS to the Green Berets* articulates the challenges of building a force to meet the threat of an emerging adversary. Many of the principles, theories, and methods of recruiting, assessing, selecting, and qualifying SF implemented during his time are still prevalent today.

Other books written in the early to-mid-1980s that lent to a deeper appreciation and understating of the origins and development of the Special Forces are: *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952* by A.H. Paddock; *Army Special Forces: From Boot Camp to the Battle Zones* by Ian Padden; and *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years: A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces* by C. M. Simpson. A. H. Paddock provided superb insight as to the relevance of a force that possesses capabilities beyond those of a conventional force. Padden covers the increasing role of SF by documenting the challenges associated with recruiting, selecting, and training SF. Simpson supports the theory that the face of warfare is changing and will continue to change, and therefore requires an SF force structure capable of meeting and defeating emerging threats of the future. President Kennedy's vision of a new kind of warfare is masterfully presented in order to portray SF as the force of choice in the conduct of unconventional and guerrilla warfare.

As the first Special Forces recipient of the Medal of Honor for valor in Vietnam, Colonel Roger H. C. Donlon's book *Beyond Nam Dong* stresses the importance of teamwork on and off the battlefield. Teamwork on the battlefield enabled Donlon and his twelve-man team to overcome adversity and prove victorious at Camp Nam Dong on 6 July 1964. Donlon's personal account of the battle at Nam Dong and his life as an SF officer provides the paradigm that all members of the SF community should strive to emulate. Colonel Donlon is a charismatic, dynamic, and genuinely sincere man (American hero) who makes time to speak with, mentor, and educate those who aspire to accomplish even a fraction of what he has offered this country and the Army. The author will value the time spent with Colonel Donlon while at Leavenworth and will certainly hold true to the perspectives, beliefs, and values so eloquently communicated and portrayed as the U.S. Army Special Forces icon. For some, there are few true American heroes left in the world. Colonel Donlon is the very essence of what heroes are made of. When signing a personal copy of his book, Colonel Donlon always inscribes the word "TEAMWORK" just below his name. Teamwork will be addressed again throughout and in the final chapter of this study.

Government documents, publications, and research and study projects determined the framework of the analysis. The framework of the analysis took form of SF recruiting historical trends that developed as early 1990. Analysis of such facilitated the analysis and validation of current recruiting methodologies and enabled the author to formulate educated hypotheses as to the effectiveness of future SF recruiting initiatives and concepts.

Without question, the authority or subject matter experts with regard to the study, research, and analysis of SF force development is the Army Research Institute (ARI). Without ARI's commitment to excellence and dedicated professionalism, the field of SF recruiting (and all associated tasks of generating, developing, and sustaining a combat ready force) would certainly not reflect its current posture. ARI embarked on a mutually supportive partnership with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWCS) in the early 1980s. This congruent relationship continues to mature and prosper today. The efforts and contributions of ARI to the SF community are empirically immeasurable. Names, such as Herd, Teplitzky, Brooks, Brady, Evans, Kilcullen, Sanders, and Zazanis, are at the forefront of any effective research. As a norm, such research is followed by documented facts, findings, recommendations, and conclusions that enable Special Forces to prosper as a branch. Edgar M. Johnson, the director of ARI, reveals that:

[a] 1991 Memorandum of Agreement of between ARI and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command established an ARI Scientific Research Office at Fort Bragg, NC and a formal program of cooperative research. Over the years, ARI has worked in partnership with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and others to define issues and develop useful products. The result of our combined research efforts has been a large body of findings and practical tools for enhancing SF recruitment, selection, assessment, training, and field performance (Brooks and Zazanis 1997, v).

Of the research material relied on most for the development of the thesis, *Research Report 1626: Special Forces Recruiting: An Overview of Current Procedures and Issues* by Ann M. Herd and Martha L. Teplitzky assisted the researcher in determining the research approach and procedures and provided the framework of the analysis. The report examined the Special Forces recruiting process in depth and offered

a productive vision for the SF community. Included in the research was the process of allocating, setting, and adjusting the mission to processing and scheduling candidates for SFAS, with emphasis on the streamlining the entire process or system. Herd and Teplitzky conducted surveys with SF recruiters. Analysis of the recruiters' surveyed responses allowed the author to "get to know" the recruiters of 1990-1992 and made it possible to identify with them and their job. *Research Report 1626* also provided substantial amounts of data obtained through the conduct of interviews with key personnel at USAJFKSWCS and Personnel Command (PERSCOM).

As value added to the above research published in September of 1992 was the *ARI Special Report 33: Enhancing U.S. Army Special Forces: Research and Applications* by Judith E. Brooks and Michelle M. Zazanis (notable mention to the "SF Team" assembled for the project goes to: Chen, Diana, Goodwin, Kaplan, Kilcullen, and, Simsarian). *Special Report 33* summarizes manpower, personnel, and training research conducted since 1990, thereby following up on the progress or lack of progress, of the SF community to mature in the above noted areas of research conducted by Herd and Teplitzky documented in 1992. Of particular importance in this report, is the emphasis placed on the importance offering "a broader interpretation of the research in terms of its application and meaningfulness for the rest of the Army" (Brooks and Zazanis 1997, iii). The congruent relationships that are required in order to succeed in the accession of the Special Forces, to include the rest of the Army, was discussed in detail in this study. Of equal importance, Zazanis looks ahead and offers valuable insight with the discussion of future research directions.

Other published ARI documents worthy of notable mention are: Research Report 1699, “Evaluation of a Realistic Job Preview for U.S. Army Special Forces” by Judith E. Brooks and Wayne E. Evans; Research Report 1646, “Prior Service Soldiers in the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Program: Recruitment Issues” by Elizabeth J. Brady and Judith E. Brooks; and Research Report 1648: “Information Needs of Enlisted Soldiers When Making a Special Forces Career Decision” by Herd and Brooks. As was apparent in the study of all ARI reports, the wealth of research information, data, historical reference, theory, and perspectives presented are mutually supportive. The accomplishments of ARI invaluable lent to the ability of any researcher to formulate sound, informed, and educated recommendations and conclusions once linked to primary research and study of the phenomenon of recruiting.

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC), in the form of Strategy or Study Projects, provided yet another source of secondary research. Several, more senior members of the Army conducted research that influenced the development of the thesis. The projects listed below were instrumental in educating the author on several of the external factors that impact the Army. As will be discussed at length in this study, the influence of cultural trends, beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes of the American society as they relate to the U.S. Army have a substantial impact on the methods of accessing and recruiting said society into the Armed Forces. Of notable mention, USAWC strategy and and study projects reviewed and analyzed were: “The People and the Army: Different Cultures, Same Beliefs” by Colonel Mary M. Peck; “The Future of the Reserve Component (RC) Special Forces (SF) Individual Training Program” by Lieutenant Colonel (P) James D. Moore; “Societal Values and Their Effect on the Militar” by

Colonel James J. Bahr; “The Impact of Leaders on Organizational Culture: A 75th Ranger Regiment Case Study” by Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Kearney III; and, “A Widening Values Gap Between the U.S. Military and American Society: Are the Alarmist Right?” by Colonel Mary L. Torgersen.

In the process of conducting primary research, the researcher took advantage of what was classified as “opportunity information,” or recently released public mediums of information, such as television advertisements, newspaper, and magazine articles. To this end, the author’s family, friends, superiors, peers, and instructors at the Command and General Staff College assisted in the collection of published articles in newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and journals. Their commitment to assist in the development of the thesis provided a wealth of information, insight, and understanding of recruiting. In general, military information bytes published on the military leave and earnings statements, appearances of guest speakers at CGSC, and editorial reviews on recruiting from military sources via electronic mail and the Internet proved valuable in the development of the topic.

In concluding the review of literature, it is necessary to comment on one perceived attribute of the adopted concept as articulated previously in this chapter. In an attempt to remain objective and develop not only the thesis, but also the abilities and skills of the researcher-author, the comments of noted author Sir Michael Howard offered assistance in the labor of researching and drafting this study. He said,

I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. (Howard 1974, 3-4)

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH APPROACH AND PROCEDURES

The purpose of this study is to examine the methodologies to recruit the quality and quantity of United States Army Special Forces soldiers and officers to satisfy the ever-increasing operational tempo and changing mission requirements as the Army Special Forces enters the twenty-first century. In order to support the National Military Strategy and ultimately meet the challenges of an uncertain future, the twenty-first century, the health and status of the Special Forces branch must be at or near 100 percent strength.

By design, this is a prospective study due to the research and analysis of current and future recruiting methodologies. In order to better understand the recruiting methodologies of today and the future, analysis of Total Army and SF recruiting trends of the past provided the framework for the research. Secondary research provided the author with the facts, observations and findings, data, evidence of progress in the field, and information through the study of published works from which assumptions and conclusions were drawn based on prior “direct study of the phenomena” (Hubbuch 1996, 10).

Secondary research was divided into two categories. The first was Total Army recruiting and the second was Special Forces recruiting. Additionally, under the umbrella of Special Operations Forces (SOF), including Navy Seals and Air Force SOF recruiting, the USSOCOM Future Concepts Working Group (FCWG) provided insight for several ideas and concepts that are on the shelf and may have some merit. Primary research

consisted of compilation, analysis, and validation of data, facts, observations, and findings from the USAREC, USAJFKSWCS-SOPO, PERSCOM-DSCPER, and informal correspondence with members of the SF community. All primary research supported and complemented the secondary research. The culmination of primary and secondary research provided the framework for evaluating and analyzing the effectiveness of recruiting Special Forces soldiers and officers for the twenty-first century. Simply stated, it is the presentation of validated results to portray the effectiveness of SF recruiters to attract qualified potential candidates to the Special Forces as a career.

This study evaluates the effectiveness of current, and the potential effectiveness of projected, Special Forces recruiting methodologies. Chapter 1 addressed the demands of the Special Forces command structure and mission profiles to be accomplished throughout the world. Chapter 4 presented the analysis of USAREC, the market, internal and external factors, societal trends and cultural effects, the media's impact, and the role of advertising in direct relation to recruiting for the Special Forces. Chapter 5 summarizes the observations and findings, formulates conclusions based on fact, provides recommendations, and highlights areas of future research and study that should prove beneficial.

In order to present the facts, observation and findings, progress, analysis, validation, and conclusions from the research, it is of notable importance to present the information in a sequentially logical manner. Therefore, the study procedure established definable research criteria based on secondary research initially and then primary research. The sequential or prioritized order of data collection lent to a logical presentation of the research material.

The study began with collection and review of secondary research at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). The automated periodicals index provided numerous articles published on recruiting, recruiters, and the complex realities of the internal and external factors that affect recruiting the Total Army. This information served as the foundation for understanding the differences and complexities, as well as the internal and external factors, of specifically recruiting SF as part of the Army. The CARL provided several links to agencies such as the Army Research Institute (ARI), the Defense Technical Institute (DTI), the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Rand Arroyo Center, and the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. Additionally, the CARL's automated card catalogue provided several books, references, and associated links required to research the background and historical accounts of the origination of the Special Forces as a separate combat arms branch of the Army with recruiting goals and objectives.

Phase two of the thesis development began with the primary research and analysis of the United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC), and the Special Operations Recruiting Company's (SORC), structure, policies, guidelines, and procedures. Specifically, study and research of the SORC's mission, goals, and objectives provided the framework in order to analyze the recruiting methodologies the SORC implements, in conjunction with other agencies (civil and military), to attract the required quality and quantity of men to Special Forces. Research revealed a coordinated effort among CALL, USAREC, and the USAJFKSWCS to document and publish the study of technological advancements in the tracking and reporting methods of recruiting,

and assisted the author in articulating the USAREC's vision, goals, and objectives for the twenty-first century.

As stated in chapter 1, recruiting for Special Forces is inextricably linked to the assessment and selection of Special Forces soldiers and officers. Therefore, the next step was to analyze the congruent relationship between USAREC and USAJFKSWCS in order to validate recruiting initiatives, concepts, and programs. The mission of recruiting proves to be comparable to the conduct of a joint operation. Specifically, chapter 4 highlights the concerted efforts of USAREC, USAJFKSWCS, and the office of the deputy chief of staff for personnel (DCSPER) to meet the demands of filling the Special Forces force structure for the twenty-first century. Each entity has an equally important and integral part in meeting the demand.

In the process of conducting primary research, the researcher took advantage of what was classified as "opportunity information," or recently released public mediums of information, such as television advertisements and newspaper and magazine articles. Military information bytes published on the military leave and earnings statements, appearances of guest speakers at the Command and General Staff College, and editorial reviews on recruiting from military sources via electronicmail and the Internet proved valuable in the development of the topic.

The final phase of the thesis development was the presentation of results as analyzed, calculated, and documented as to their measure of effectiveness to recruit potential SF soldiers and officers. The effectiveness of current Special Forces recruiting initiatives and methodologies for the twenty-first century were supported by numerical

data; however, the effectiveness of projected methodologies were measured with the potential impact they may have in the future based on the author's research.

Analysis of current recruiting methods was based on the techniques and procedures of the SORC only and not the potential number of candidates that are recruited from other, non-SF specific, recruiting stations or sources. The application of the measure of effectiveness was based on the projected and required number of SF candidates as dictated by DA, PERSCOM, USSOCOM, USASOC, USAJFKSWCS, and SF Command versus the SORC's ability to meet the demands.

The study, research, and analysis of future recruiting methodologies, or theories, were based on the progress of SORC, SWCS, and SF Command to recruit the future force. USSOCOM's Future Concepts Working Group (FCWG) recruiting and leader development programs were addressed in order to provide methodologies and theories that require research and study in the future should they be developed and implemented. The detailed analysis of such, to include historical perspectives, the external and internal factors, intangible influences, and command emphasis placed on recruiting added to the framework of the research for the formulation of conclusions drawn from the study and the recommendations articulated in chapter 5.

In summary, this prospective study was designed to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of the recruiting methodologies of the United States Army Special Forces and to determine if these methods are adequate to fill the force structure for the twenty-first century. The research approach was a prioritized method of data collection and review through secondary and primary research methods respectively. Secondly, the analysis of the methodologies was conducted by the calculation of data in relation to

success measured by the accomplishment of meeting recruiting goals and objectives.

Next was the validation of such measures of effectiveness in relation to the needs and requirements of the SF community. And finally, presentation of the results brought the research, analysis, and validation of the methodologies into perspective as they relate to the potential effectiveness of future recruiting methodologies. Research that the author believes should be conducted in the near- or long-term future of the Special Forces was also presented.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Webster's New World Dictionary defines the phenomenon of recruiting, the methodology that recruiters initiate to recruit, as the ability:

vt. 1 to raise or strengthen (an army, navy, etc.) by enlisting personnel *2* to enlist (personnel) into an army or navy *3* a) to enlist (new members), as for a party or organization b) to hire or engage the services of *4* [Rare] a) to increase or maintain by supplying anew; replenish b) to revive or restore (health, strength, etc.). (3d College ed. 1988, 1123)

The author's referral to recruiting as a phenomenon is based on the premise that recruiting is an event, circumstance, or experience that can be scientifically appraised. Like other fields of science, recruiting is composed of many detailed complexities and methodologies that do not fall into absolutes or exact sciences. Special Forces recruiters have the task of making the "science" of recruiting, undeniably an extremely extraordinary thing or occurrence, more exact. These men are officers and soldiers who must possess the extraordinary qualities and aptitude to accomplish the assigned mission of effectively and sufficiently filling the force structure for the twenty-first century.

The analysis of recruiting the Special Forces force structure involved gaining and maintenance of knowledge and comprehending the complexities, intricacies, challenges, and successes that recruiters plan, implement, and evaluate daily. Recruiting is a living, evolving profession that demands the ability to manage change, shape the force structure of the twenty-first century, and meet the demands of a new world of crisis and conflict that requires "creative solutions in ambiguous circumstances" (Cohen and Tichy 1998, 278).

As mentioned in chapters one and three, the complexities of recruiting are the demands of the force structure, external and internal factors, societal and cultural trends, the market, the media and advertising, and the congruent relationship of those who define the requirement with those who fulfill the requirement. These complexities are the reality of recruiting, which determines that the act of recruiting is not an exact science. The absolute of the science is in the numbers. Can the recruiter meet the mission requirement as directed by the Department of the Army? These influential and impacting factors are the reason that recruiting “isn’t about pretty recruiting posters and fancy stripes down your pants. (Recruiting) is about being able to do what we (Special Operations Forces) say we can do. If you’re the Special Operations Forces and you say that you have people who can carry out complex missions that no one else can carry out, then you had better have those people” (Cohen and Tichy 1999, 280).

Special Forces recruiters and the SF community remain true to four basic principles when building the force. These principles are the SOF truths: Humans are more important than hardware. Quality is better than quantity. SOF cannot be mass produced. SOF cannot be created after a crisis occurs.

Before examining the “how” of SF recruiting for the twenty-first century, it is necessary to present the historical origins of Special Forces and add validity to the analysis by revealing why and “who” SF is recruiting. Who are the Special Forces recruiting as members of a separate combat arms branch of the Army? Why are these men the force of choice for dynamic, ambiguous, and politically volatile missions that require timely solutions to complex problems?

The origin of Special Forces began with the conduct of special operations during the French and Indian War. Major Robert Rogers led Rogers' Rangers in pursuit of the enemy in the woods and swamps and became America's first unconventional force. The conduct of unconventional warfare continued during the American Revolution under the leadership of the Swamp Fox, Francis Marion, and then was further developed by Colonel John Singleton Mosby during the Civil War. It was Mosby and his men that documented a set model for guerrilla warfare that would prevail over time and be improved and implemented in World War II. The model was to weaken the enemy's front line, weaken the enemy's infrastructure, and win the support of the people (USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office 1990, 2-3).

One would be remiss not to include mention of the spectacular accomplishments of the Devil's Brigade (formally the 1st Special Service Force), Darby's Rangers commanded by Major William O. Darby, Colonel Frank D. Merrill's namesake, Merrill's Marauders, and Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Alamo Scouts as the elite units that successfully conducted unconventional warfare during World War II. World War II brought about a new kind of unconventional warfare that even the Devil's Brigade and Darby's Rangers did not undertake. There were small teams of men playing by a different set of rules. These men would parachute in behind enemy lines, develop an underground network of contacts, give instructions to local fighters, and wage guerrilla warfare on an unsuspecting enemy (USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office 1990, 4-6).

These men were the product of William Donovan and the organization was later known as the Office of Strategic Service, the OSS. Some OSS operators, including Americans, were products of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), working in

conjunction with the OSS, conducting UW and clandestine operations schools and training programs. The result of training a combined force of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch officers and NCOs led to the development of Jedburgh Teams, who in late 1943 conducted the “Jedburgh Mission.” The Jedburgh Mission was comprised of several three-to-four-man teams that infiltrated by airborne operations (parachutes) into occupied France, Belgium, and Holland prior to D day in order to organize the assembled guerilla forces and conduct unconventional warfare with emphasis on guerilla warfare. The Jedburgh’s conducted enormously successful large-scale offensive operations, far behind enemy lines, against the Germans by disrupting communications, ambushing convoys, destroying rail and road networks, bridging and trestle assets, and delaying reinforcements (Bank 1986, 25).

At the close of World War II, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS and its closure gave birth to two organizations that remain an integral part of U.S. national security. The first was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on 18 September 1947. The CIA was formed from the intelligence division of the OSS and would prosper from the experience and techniques of such men in the future. From the OSS’s guerrilla operations came the birth of Special Forces. In June 1952, two former and accomplished OSS operators, Colonel Aaron Bank and Colonel Russell Volckmann had remained in the military after the war. These two visionary pioneers, with the assistance of Brigadier General Robert McClure, head of the Army’s psychological warfare staff at the Pentagon, were responsible for institutionalizing the Army’s acceptance of a new era of unconventional warfare.

Colonel Bank envisioned small bands of operators who could survive and accomplish the mission in areas of the world that were not susceptible to conventional warfare. He saw these operators as force multipliers who, through the conduct of guerrilla warfare, could conduct other offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations with an unparalleled economy of force. This organization was to be called Special Forces. The name Special Forces was a designation derived from the OSS operational teams in the field eight years prior in 1944.

As a result of Colonel Bank's tireless commitment, the Army authorized 2,300 personnel slots for the unit and assigned it to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In the spring of 1952, Colonel Bank went to Fort Bragg and chose a suitable location for the headquarters and training areas for the new unit. The area, still known as Smoke Bomb Hill today, became home of the Psychological Warfar, Special Forces Center. Once the facilities were in place, Colonel Bank assembled a reputable cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) to begin training and to assess new members into the unit. Bank wanted only the best, not new recruits off the street. His staff consisted of only the best as well. The majority were former OSS officers, ex-Rangers, airborne troops, and combat veterans of World War II and Korea. They spoke at least two languages, held at a minimum the rank of sergeant, and were willing to work behind enemy lines. The men who volunteered came from within the Army, and only those who were already trained in infantry and parachuting skill sets would be accepted.

Colonel Bank organized the first operational Special Forces group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 19 June 1952. The 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) consisted of the commander, Colonel Bank, one warrant officer, and eight enlisted men. Smoke Bomb

Hill soon became Fort Bragg's center of activity as hundreds reported to the 10th SFG after completing the initial phase of Special Forces training, undoubtedly modeled in likeness of the OSS and SOE Jedburgh Team training programs. The 10th SFG was assembled to conduct Special Forces operations with emphasis on guerrilla warfare; however, the men were called on to perform secondary missions as well. In addition to guerrilla warfare, these men would conduct deep-penetration raids, intelligence missions, and counterinsurgency operations. The mission profiles demanded a commitment to excellence and professionalism. The recruitment of these professionals required them to understand that Special Forces was different and that Special Forces training "included more complex subjects and was geared to entirely different, more difficult, comprehensive missions and complex operations" (USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office 1990, 12). Remarkably, the mission profiles of today greatly resemble those of Colonel Bank's era as he began building the force. The seven primary missions of the Special Forces today still demand committed professionals who fully understand the difference between conventional forces and the Special Forces.

The lineage of the Special Forces continued to thrive throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. By January of 1961, during the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy, three Special Forces groups had emerged and proven themselves a worthy force in the Army. The author deems the force a worthy one based on the historical accounts of success that these units had in the conduct of special operations to date. The author also notes that an accomplished historian believed that SOF,

Prior to 1960--when President John F. Kennedy expanded U.S. Special Forces and made counterinsurgency the cornerstone of his Flexible Response Doctrine--the lot of special operations soldiers was far from satisfactory. Few in number,

they were criticized as elitist and were considered suitable only for behind-the-lines operations in a major East-West conflict.” (Spiller 1991, Foreword)

With the support of President Kennedy, four more Special Forces groups were activated between September of 1961 and December of 1965, and for good reason, as the Vietnam War grew larger. Special Forces troops honorably distinguished themselves during their fourteen-year tenure in South Vietnam. Men like Captain Roger H. C. Donlon, the first Medal of Honor recipient for his actions on 5 July 1964, proved their level of commitment and dedication as professionals. By the end of 1972, the role of Special Forces in Vietnam was over, and the years following marked a general de-emphasis of special operations and the force structure resembled such. It was not until 1981, under direction from President Ronald Reagan, that the Special Forces would benefit from an emerging defense policy that outlined a renewed emphasis for special operations. The Army had to meet the challenges of a changing world. A world that resembled President Kennedy’s vision of the threat twenty years earlier was presenting itself.

An abridged chronology of the origin and history of Special Operations Forces is located in appendix A. A historical perspective of the Special Forces, the why and who SF recruited in the past, lends support to the analysis of how SF recruiters attract potential careerist professionals to Special Forces today.

In June 1983, the Department of the Army authorized wear of the Special Forces tab by Special Forces qualified officers and NCOs. Following the authorization of the SF tab, the Army established a separate Army Career Field, or Career Management Field (CMF 18), for enlisted soldiers on 1 October 1984 and then the warrant officer career

field. On 9 April 1987 the Army Chief of Staff established a separate branch of the Army for Special Forces officers. With these milestones came the need to fill the force.

The requirement to effectively fill the force has proven to require, as in Total Army recruiting, the need for a systematic means to track and validate the force structure. The author addressed the issue of Special Forces as being the youngest branch of the Army and what impact this fact had on recruiting the force. According to the director of SOPO, being the youngest branch of the Army has not affected the recruiting effort. The Army and USAREC have been very supportive of the (Special Forces) recruiting needs (Adelstein 1999). Having dispelled the theory that SF recruiting suffers simply because it is the youngest branch of the Army, research focused on institutional problems related to building the force as early as 1990.

An analysis of SF recruiting trends from 1990 lent validity to current recruiting methodologies. As early as 1990, the needs assessment and USAJFKSWCS staff identified SF recruiting as “an area where the application of systematic research methods could provide decision makers with particularly useful information” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 1). At a time when the rest of the Army was downsizing, SF was in the process of manning the recently activated (29 June 1990) 3rd Special Forces Group, the fifth of five active Special Forces Groups in service today. As a nonaccession branch, the impact of a downsizing Army equated to a smaller pool of eligible candidates to select and process for SFAS. The question at hand was who, how, and by what process and practices should recruiters attract the eligible candidates to the Special Forces?

The team assembled to apply this systematic personnel development process was the Special Missions Division (SMD) within the Recruiting Operations Division at

USAREC. From 1987 to 1990, SMD shared the responsibility of recruiting the force with retention NCOs assigned to PERSCOM. Prior to 1987, USAJFKSWCS managed SF-enlisted recruiting and continues to manage officer and warrant officer manning requirements and recruiting today. Research indicates that there were approximately twenty carefully selected and of the highest caliber recruiters assigned to meet the challenges of ever-increasing SF manpower requirements. Their recruiting ability was time tested with proven records of mission accomplishment in Total Army recruiting. The recruiting team's focus was twofold: generate interest in SF and assist applicants in completing the SF application process. In addition to recruiting, the Special Missions Division was and remains responsible for several other functions and special programs. One officer, a senior NCO, and an operations sergeant staffed SF recruiting, or Career Management Field (CMF) 18. SMD moved from USAREC headquarters located at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, to Fort Knox, Kentucky, in late fiscal year (FY) 1992. The organizational chart for the Special Missions Division as of October 1990 is shown in figure 1.

To reemphasize the impact of the Army's large-scale downsizing on a non-accession branch (the recruitment from within the active duty service), in a relatively short time period, consider the following facts. Active Army end-strength has been reduced from 770 thousand in FY 1989 to a projected 480,000 in FY2001. This dramatically impacts the CMF 18 recruitment base or market. The Total Army's plan to reduce its active structure by 290,000 spaces has double the impact on CMF 18 as a non-accession branch (Taylor, 2000). Figure 2 depicts the downsizing of the Total Army force structure from FY 1989 to FY 2001. The downsizing equates to a reduction from

eighteen combat divisions in FY 1989 to the current force structure of ten combat divisions today. Also noteworthy is that the Active Army has changed from a forward-deployed force to a Continental United State-based, power-projection force. Figure 2 depicts the Total Army team to include the active component, which forms the nucleus of initial combat forces and the reserve component, which reinforces or augments the active component and comprises 54 percent of the Total Army team. The bottom line is that the Total Army is getting smaller thereby making the pool of eligible SF candidates smaller and more difficult to recruit into the Special Forces. The specific challenges of recruiting from a dramatically smaller recruiting market will be addressed later in this chapter.

The end of FY 1989 marked a dramatic decrease in the Total Army force structure; yet, as stated earlier, on 29 June 1990, the Department of the Army activated the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Nearly thirty years earlier, President John F. Kennedy envisioned “another type of warfare--new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat.” How true his vision had come to fruition in 1990! The unprecedented activation of a fifth active duty Special Forces Group during the initial phases of a large-scale downsizing of the Army critically demanded the efficient, effective recruitment of SF quality manpower requirements.

The SOPO director’s assessment that USAREC has always been very supportive of Special Forces recruiting requirements is supported by factual research. In 1990, undoubtedly in response to the activation of the 3rd SFG (A), the size of the SF recruiting team doubled and recruiting stations were established in six locations. As early as 1991, two additional stations began recruiting at Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Drum, New York.

The already established recruiting station in Korea redistributed the market. As of 1991, the seven recruiting stations were located at Heidelberg, Germany; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Bragg; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Drum, New York; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Lewis, Washington. The total number of recruiters at each station averaged from one to five recruiters. The task organization of the 1990 “In-Service Recruiting Team” is shown in figure 3.

By design, recruiting stations reported directly to SMD at USAREC; however, each station was attached to a Total Army recruiting brigade and supported by a Total Army recruiting battalion. Likewise, SF recruiters were formally assigned to USAREC; however, they were actually performing duties as prescribed by and in service to USAJFKSWCS. The congruent relationship shared between USAREC and SWCS today evolves from the relationship shared between the two in 1990. An ARI research project resulting in an extensive, comprehensive, and published review of the findings in 1992, provided “the background and context for further recruiting related research and highlights (ed) procedures and structural issues USAREC and USAJFKSWCS may want to examine” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 1). As addressed in chapter 1, the importance of a productive relationship between USAREC and SWCS is the key to success. The evolution of such a relationship, and the adherence of proposals as presented by ARI as early as 1992 will be addressed later in the chapter. With the establishment of a new recruiting force, the focus remained essentially the same. Recruiters had to generate an interest in SF and assist applicants in completing the SF application process. Restated, the recruiters’ task and purpose was to identify, prescreen, and process active duty candidates who met prerequisite requirements, with the objective of filling each of the

eight or nine SFAS classes conducted each year. As defined in chapter one, the recruiters' goal was to meet the mission, or the number of new candidates he must recruit. The market for each recruiter or recruiting station was based on geographical boundaries of the recruiting brigade to which it was attached. In 1990, the evolving theory was that a decentralized structure would provide greater opportunities for recruiters to develop close relationships with the soldiers, units, and chains of command in their area of responsibility (AOR). Likewise, the role of the SOPO within SWCS, played an important role in recruiting, providing guidance on manpower requirements, desired and required attributes for SF applicants, and program feedback from the beginning. There were two SF liaison NCOs who served as the important link between USAREC and SWCS. Key responsibilities of the liaisons were to work closely with SOPO in tracking SFAS candidates and participating on panels that assign SF military occupational specialties (MOS) to SFAS graduates. This theory has evolved and been improved on as will be noted later in the analysis.

The onset of 1990 and the establishment of the In-Service Recruiting Team called for additional teamwork of several different agencies for yet another task, determining the SF recruiting mission, which ultimately determined the required number of SF soldiers. Chapter one defined SFAS. As part of this definition, the author highlighted that attendance in SFAS is restricted to male, active duty, enlisted high school graduates in the pay grades E-4 through E-6, or O-2 promotable to O-3, who have scores of at least 100 on the general technical (GT) composite of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB); and that, these rank, education, and GT score restrictions reflect the basic SF prerequisites outlined in AR 614-200 and USAREC Pamphlet 601-25. This

information is obtainable from the LEADS database. This database is the listing which essentially defines the market, the “who’s available,” in each recruiter’s area of responsibility. The Information Management Directorate at USAREC receives the LEADS database one to four times a year by the Army’s Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM).

The task of setting the SF recruiting mission requirement is a multistage process that takes form with the critical analysis and input of all agencies involved. The author possesses, at best, a broad and very limited knowledge of the mechanics that drive either both the force development and the management process as well as the total army analysis (TAA) process. The author’s limited knowledge of force development and TAA stems from attendance at the resident Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSC) core curriculum, specifically, C400 Resource Planning and Management. A requirement for course completion was the composition of an essay on the five phases of the force development process. The essay included an explanation on how each phase enables the Army to adapt its future force structure to address political and technological change. Another essay addressed the processes used in each TAA phase and stage, and how TAA links the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System’s (PPBES) planning and programming phases. At the time C400 was in progress, the author could only speculate the added value of Resource Planning and Management as it applied to researching the thesis topic. Enclosed at appendices B and C are the essays written for C400 course completion. Also a pictorial of the force development process is included in appendix B.

The intent of providing a broad overview of force development and TAA within this document is to give an appreciation for the “several stages and required coordination of several different agencies” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 6) involved in determining the ‘who and how many’ for the Special Forces branch.

The objective of determining the SF recruiting mission, as a nonaccession branch, is to determine the quantity of SFAS candidates required each year to reach and maintain the authorized strength level of five active duty and two National Guard SF groups. Prior to an introduction of the technical mechanics of the force development and TAA processes, the author was offered a simplistic view of how the number of required SF soldiers is determined.

The Department of the Army (DA) determines the required number of SF soldiers for a SF MOS in the form of program guidance. The program guidance of all CMF 18 MOSs is termed the “operating inventory.” This means for every authorized slot there is to be a soldier on the ground in that slot assigned to an SF Group. The operating inventory does not include soldiers in the transient, holdee, and student (THS) accounts. For CMF 18, the THS consists of mainly soldiers in that are enrolled in permanent change of station (PCS) schools including basic military language courses (BMLC) or in transit to Fort Bragg for SF training. The total inventory is comprised of the operating inventory plus the THS. This is of important significance when addressing the issue of authorized end strengths. The operating inventory signifies completion (and acceptance) of SFAS and assignment to an SF group after graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).

Returning to the objective of determining the SF recruiting mission, it was stated that the goal is to determine the number of SFAS candidates required each year to reach and maintain the authorized strength level of five active and two National Guard SF groups. Key to this statement is the understating that in determining a recruiting mission or number of SFAS candidates required to reach or maintain the authorized strength (operating inventory) of the SF groups is, in part, only a projection of the number required (number of accessions required to meet projected manpower requirements) to fill the groups. This projection of the required number is influenced by the projected select rate of SFAS candidates, the attrition rate of SFQC, and the norm or average annual turnover rate of the active duty force. For example, data from the March 1992 CMF 18 Laydown (an analysis of the health and status of the force conducted quarterly) revealed that PERSCOM's manpower projection requirements of future operating strengths in SF were based on a 50 percent SFAS select rate and an overall projected SFQC attrition rate of approximately 20 percent (factoring in recycle and retraining rates into the course attrition rates. Students who are recycled or require retraining are held in holdee status of the THS account).

Chapter 1 revealed that there are several factors that impact recruiting SF. One of several internal factors that drive setting the SF recruiting mission is the accession process, or specifically, select (success) rates and attrition rates. A secondary question addressed in the research was, What is the relationship between the programs that recruit and the programs that assess and select candidates for Special Forces training? When setting the SF recruiting mission, the relationship is essentially mathematical in nature, or "numbers crunching." As early as 1991, USAREC and USAJFKSWCS had devised a

CMF18 accessions model for SF candidates. The recruiters' mission was set at 2,035 (significantly higher than the 1400 for FY88) qualified recruits to report to SFAS. The 2,035 mission was decreased from an earlier requirement of 2,264 based on the actual FY 1991 active duty enlisted select rate of 47 percent. In theory, or mathematically, the recruiters' mission was to yield 958 SFAS graduates in order to provide 712 SF qualified soldiers to the SF Groups. Again, this equation takes in to account the projected SFAS select rates as well as the SFQC attrition rates.

Figure 4 is the FY91 CMF 18 accession model used by USAREC and SWCS. The model assumed a 25 percent SFQC attrition rate. Another compounding factor in setting the mission, the accessions process, is that the attrition rate is substantially different across the SF MOSs and, therefore, more difficult to set one conclusive attrition rate. For example, as shown in figure 4, the attrition rate projected for 18Ds (medical sergeant) was approximately 52 percent while the 18B (weapons sergeant) was projected to be only about 10 percent. By comparison, the PERSCOM projected attrition rates were lower than those stipulated in the model from USAREC and SWCS. The difference stemmed from another factor that influences manpower projections. The comparison of SFQC class attrition rates and individual attrition rates or, more specifically, tracking soldiers who frequently recycle (repeat a certain portion of the training as a result of failing to achieve the standard) or those who are not permitted to continue training affected attrition rates as well. Candidates who recycle make it difficult to project how long each of them in the different MOSs will take to complete the training. By design, each MOS training period is different in duration and in difficulty. As indicated by the projected 52 percent attrition rate for 18Ds and the 10 percent for 18Bs, it is clear that the

18D course is longer in duration and more difficult. The post SFAS portion of the training pipeline for each of the SF MOSs is depicted in figure 5. Within a fiscal year, some candidates can graduate in as little as four months while others may recycle, sometimes more than once, and take almost a year to graduate and be counted against the operating inventory. Additionally, it is possible for candidates to begin training in one MOS and graduate in another.

Research findings of SF recruiting trends at the close of FY 1991 (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 7) revealed that the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS), as the primary source of SFQC attrition data, was insufficient or not designed to track individual attrition or long term training outcomes of the SF training pipeline. Other than the impact of recycles, the ATRRS attrition rates were computed by dividing the number of SFQC graduates in a quarter by the number of accessions (candidates in the class for the first time, not recycles) in that quarter and subtracting from one. According to ARI researchers, this resulted in “quarterly attrition estimates that rise and fall as a function of recycle rates and the number of classes that start and end in a particular quarter” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 7). In September of 1992, they presented this example:

If five classes start but only four classes end in a particular quarter, there will be few graduates relative to the number of new students and it will appear that attrition for that quarter is very high. On the other hand, attrition rates will look very low if there are a large number of recycles in a quarter, because these students will inflate the number of graduates, but not the number of new inputs. (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 7)

Herd and Teplitzky, in the same report, summarized that accurately projecting manpower requirements and optimal SF recruiting missions for a particular fiscal year

was very difficult. Chiefs reasons cited were the unavailable, productive estimates of SFQC attrition rates for individuals across all SF MOSs and that the methodology used in making projections could not be tracked (with the current data bases available) for several years. They also reported that “it is widely assumed (among USAREC, SWCS and PERSCOM) that it is better to overestimate than underestimate the number of accessions needed because these estimates are used to calculate SFAS and SFQC training budgets” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 9).

Of note, and something not clearly articulated in the FY 1991 accession model (figure 4), are two points. First, the mission for FY 1991 was 2,035, yet the recruiters’ input was 2,519. Secondly, although the input was 2,519, the number of candidates reporting to Fort Bragg for SFAS was 2,292. These points link themselves to additional factors that affect setting the recruiting mission. ARI researchers’ identity of the “wide assumption” that it was better to overestimate than to underestimate the number of accessions, due to the fact that these estimates were used in determining SFAS and SFQC training budgets, was a valid point when number crunching; however, ARI continued by stating that such practice proves that this methodology was perhaps counterproductive and unsupportable. Again, in response to the secondary question of the relationship between the programs that recruit and the programs that assess and select candidates for Special Forces training, there are yet more factors that influence setting the recruiting mission. Returning to the FY 1991 Accession Model, the mission was set, then adjusted to 2,035. If this was an overestimation, then compounded by highly productive and successful mission accomplishment, what is the impact of overproduction of SFAS candidates? Linking the programs that recruit to the programs that assess and select, one

issue that was becoming prevalent in FY 1991 was, can SFAS and the SFQC cadre and staff handle the number of recruits being produced by the recruiters? The development of “the application of systematic research method (that) could provide decision makers with particularly useful information” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 1) was proving its merit.

A critical factor in setting the SF recruiting mission was adjusting the mission prior to giving it to the Special Missions Division Headquarters at USAREC. To recap, the process of setting the SF mission was based on mathematical data derived from estimates of past select rates in SFAS and attrition rates from SFQC. A lot of time, money, and personnel resources are dedicated to this initial process. Next in the process is determining the number of SFQC training slots that are authorized by the Structural Manning Decision Review (SMDR). Reemphasizing the number of “several stages and required coordination of several different agencies” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 6) involved and the amount of time dedicated to the process, the effort is revealed again in determining the number of SFQC training slots to be available in a given fiscal year. This process involves the SMDR, represented by the Training Plans Branch at PERSCOM. PERSCOM and agencies from the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provide input and influence the decision. The key player setting and adjusting the mission is the SMDR, simply because it regulates the budget and training resources to be allocated for training. It is also of notable mention that the set mission may be adjusted again after it is allocated to the recruiting station. The station commanders could formally, or informally, adjust the mission upward in order to compensate for a projected number of “no shows” to SFAS. No-shows are those candidates who complete an SFAS application packet and never report to Fort Bragg.

This is of notable importance because this action compounded the associated problems of overestimation. Systematic research methods applied in FY 1991 provided decision makers with the following useful information. Overestimation in setting the mission, followed by a robust production of candidates for SFAS from the recruiters proved unsupportable. The required numbers of SFQC training slots and resources to train the candidates were not available. Although the math had been done, other factors overshadowed the overwhelming success of the recruiters.

By early FY 1992, the recruiters had done so well that a backlog of candidates who completed SFAS was waiting to start the SFQC. Figure 6 depicts the number of SFAS graduates, by MOS, in the queue waiting to begin SFQC training. As shown, some students had waited as long as ten months. This extended period proved to be yet another factor that influenced the journey through the training pipeline and ultimate production of SF soldiers assigned to the SF Groups. Time is always a key factor in any military operation. For the recruiters, and ultimately the force, time in this case was the enemy. Backlogging SFAS graduates in the SFQC queue as early as FY 1992 was considered to be setting the conditions for failure in the future. If the queue continued to grow, the wait for training could possibly exceed one year in the immediate future. This was problematic because, by regulation, SFAS selection criteria only stipulated a one-year validation period prior to reporting for the SFQC. Extended periods of time were also problematic because candidates were exposed to undue external pressures, such as command resistance that could influence their decision to go SF.

Higher authorized strength levels in SF demanded increased recruiting missions in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Remembering that in June 1990 the 3rd SFG (A) was activated,

the group required manning. The March 1992 CMF 18 Laydown indicated that as of December 1991, 239 of the 2,345 authorized enlisted slots had not been filled. Increased missions (increase by comparison to the FY 1888 mission of less than 1400) and successful recruiting efforts in FY 1991 would in theory reduce the shortfall in 3rd SFG by the end of FY 1992, call for a decrease in recruiting missions by FY 1993 end, and meet the expectation that sustainment levels in the SF groups would be met. That was the theory. In short, the reality of determining, adjusting, and then reevaluating the process as revealed by ARI in September 1992 was this. If USAREC were to accomplish the increased recruiting mission of FY 1992 (2,264) the SFQC backlog would be problematic. Continued success on behalf of the recruiters would continue the overproduction of SFAS graduates. Therefore, the systematic approach to solving an overproduction problem was to evaluate and adjust the SF mission again. PERSCOM's Training Plans Branch evaluated then recommended a substantial reduction in the FY 1992 and FY 1993 SF recruiting mission. Setting a new mission would address overproduction of SFAS graduates; however, it may not formally solve and desist the problem. ARI research reported that in order to arrive at the new mission,

The average mission to SMDR training seats ratio for FY91 through FY93 was calculated. This average ratio was of 2.24 was then multiplied by the number of training seats available in FY92 (878) and FY93 (933) to produce the revised missions of 1,966 new recruits for FY92 and 2,089 for FY93. (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 11)

Figure 7 depicts the recruiting missions, training slots, and authorized strength levels for CMF 18 as provided by PERSCOM DCSPLANS in February of 1992. The author modified the chart to depict the adjusted recruiting missions, which are enclosed in parentheses. At the end of FY92, ARI research indicated that the adjustments to the

mission would continue. USAJFKSWCS had proposed a further reduction in the FY 1993 mission to 1,900. FY 1994 and FY 1995 mission reduction proposals were reduced to 1,600. The reason cited was that even with reduction in the FY 1992 mission, the queue (wait time to report to the SFQC) was growing. Further research revealed that ARI's predictions for FY 1993 materialized. In fact, the trend of a reduced recruiting mission would continue. FY 1993 recruiting mission was set at 1,900. Even more remarkable was that the missions for FY 1994 and FY 1995, proposed at 1,600 were reduced to a historical low of 661 and 752, respectively.

Another secondary question posed in chapter 1 was, Should the standards by which candidates are recruited be amended to fill the current force structure or should the force structure be tailored to fit the capabilities of recruiting efforts? The question at the onset of the research was valid and remains valid; however, having conducted extensive research (and gained the required knowledge that accompanies such research) of the process of setting the SF mission, tertiary questions became more applicable. Should the standards or methods by which the SF recruiting mission is set be amended to fill the current force structure (base it on the ability of SFAS and SFQC to support the mission), or should the force structure be tailored to fit the capabilities of SFAS and the SFQC output capabilities (driven by budget and training resource constraints as set by the SMDR)? Another tertiary question that presented itself was, If the process of setting the mission, throughout all stages of development and the coordinated efforts of several agencies is in place and deemed effective, isn't the number of accessions set for the mission the requirement? Otherwise stated, simply because an agency (SFAS and SFQC)

is not resourced to train the determined accession requirement does not negate the force structure's demand for the quantity of new SF qualified soldiers.

Adjustment of the SF recruiting mission reflects more than the SF recruiters' ability to meet the objective. It involves a lengthy, thoroughly evaluated process that is influenced, for better or worse, by multiple internal and external factors beyond the control of the recruiters. Just a few of these impacting factors were presented in the proceeding paragraphs. Highlighted was the process of setting the SF mission as early as 1990 and some SF recruiting trends that developed and were addressed in hopes of meeting the objective of the accession of SF qualified soldiers to the Special Forces groups. Although the number of required accessions can be mathematically determined, or at best, estimated, the less than absolute, or given part of the equation, presents the greater challenge. These variables are graduation / select rates of SFAS candidates, and the attrition rates of SFQC. This research demanded further study and research, and in part contributed to the author's secondary question pertaining to the relationship of the programs that recruit and the programs that assess and select. Therefore, having highlighted the dynamics of the relationship between the two, it is necessary to proceed and focus on the recruiter. Who is he and how is he equipped to accomplish his mission? Who or what inhibits him from being successful and meeting his goal and objective?

Generally, or in terms of recruiting for either the Total Army or recruiting for the Special Forces, those charged with the responsibility of filling the force have two primary functions of prospecting and processing. The differences in the two recruiters (Total Army recruiters vice SF recruiters) are in the processing, or the responsibilities involved in processing the recruit into the force. Total Army recruiters prospect potential recruits

from American society, or “off the street.” SF recruiters’ prospects are from within the Army, hence recruiting as a non-accession branch, recruiting from within the ranks. Successful prospecting for SF recruiters entails the signature of a volunteer statement to attend SFAS. Total Army recruiters’ mission essentially ends with the signature of a volunteer statement to attend Basic Training. Essentially, signature of a volunteer statement for an SF recruiter marks just the beginning of his mission. There are several internal and external factors that inhibit or, at times assist, the SF recruiter in reaching his objective. Again, the objective is to generate interest in SF (prospecting from the regular Army), prescreen and assist SF recruits in completing the SF application (which is a process within itself), and process active duty candidates who met prerequisite requirements with the ultimate objective of successful admission to an SFAS class within a reasonable amount of time.

Prior to examining the internal and external factors that influence the SF recruiter, presentation of the prospecting and processing techniques implemented as early as 1991, are beneficial in the analysis of current recruiting methodologies. Historical trends, research resulting in the valid and productive recommendations for future implementation, and lessons learned from the recruiters are largely responsible for the methodologies in place today.

The notion of prospecting serves the purpose of generating interest in Special Forces. As stated, once a potential prospect signs a volunteer statement, the SF recruiter’s job begins; he must assist the candidate in the processing stage. Generally speaking, the prospecting stage consists of the following:

1. *Conducting presentations about SF and the application process for SFAS*

Presentations consisted of video clips and slide shows of about forty-nine minutes long followed by a question and answer period. The number of presentations given per week varied with the recruiting stations and undoubtedly the market demographics in the area of responsibility.

2. Sending letters to prospects within the market area, as identified from the LEADS database.

Recruiters generated and mailed hundreds of letters. With the assistance of the LEADS database, station recruiters were provided with addresses of potential candidates within their AOR; nonetheless, it was a time-consuming process. Of the recruiters surveyed by ARI in 1992, 58 percent claimed initiating mass mail outs quarterly or even monthly. Forty-two percent reported mass mail outs more often (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 16). Enclosed in appendix F is a typical prospecting letter sent to potential candidates in a recruiter's market area in 1991.

3. Planning and conducting recruiting temporary duty trips (TDY) within the market area.

In addition to prospecting from the station, the necessity to get out of the office and reach potential candidates within the immediate and entire area of responsibility was a must. Recruiting trips' duration averaged between two days and two weeks depending on the geographical size and propensity of the market. For example, Fort Bragg was, and remains a high-propensity, high-production-level market; therefore, very little off-site prospecting was required. The author was recruited in Erlangen, German, in 1991 and recalls that the recruiter, then Captain Rick Matthews, had been on the road recruiting for quite some time due to the geographic size of his market area and the number of Army

posts in his AOR. In 1992, recruiters reported that 52 percent traveled monthly or quarterly. Forty-seven percent traveled even more frequently (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 16).

Recruiters contacted the installations' reenlistment NCOs and post sergeants major for assistance while in the area. SF recruiters actions extended beyond giving presentations. Other activities included administration of the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and prerequisite swim test. This enabled the recruiter to assist the candidate in beginning the processing stage while still in the area as opposed to relying on the unit or others to accomplish prerequisite processing requirements for SFAS after the recruiter's departure. SF recruiters were not accepted or warmly welcomed and willingly assisted by all units and installations. As stated in the definition of the recruiting *market* in chapter 1, the market is characterized by command competition within the Army. The leadership of some units and installations was not receptive to the idea of SF recruiters potentially taking their best and brightest soldiers from the ranks.

Within a preceding paragraph (page 11), the author highlighted an evolving theory (since 1990) of a decentralized structure that would provide greater opportunities for recruiters to develop close relationships with the soldiers, units, and chains of command. The theory was proving effective in that recruiters were realizing some success under the decentralized structure, yet experiencing some resistance from the field. As will be discussed, this attitude is even more prevalent today due to the massive downsizing and other factors articulated in the preceding paragraphs.

The frequency and duration of TDY trips taken today by SF recruiters, the Special Operations Recruiting Company (SORC), will be examined in this chapter. In

comparison of 1991 to the present, it is evident that the time dedicated to getting out into the AOR and prospecting potential candidates was, and remains, a critically essential part of the recruiters' job. The premise of aggressive prospecting, as opposed to waiting for candidates to seek information about SF on a "walk-in" basis, is a key to successful recruiting.

4. *Meeting, talking, and educating prospective candidates about SFAS and Special Forces.* Recruiters spend a majority of their time simply meeting and talking to potential candidates. Recruiters made the effort to meet and talk about SF at any opportune time, whether it is in the office, at the Post Exchange, or anywhere that soldiers tend to converge. Research indicated that soldier knowledge of SFAS and SF, in general, was problematic. Potential candidates simply did not have enough or even the correct information when making a career decision. To compound this problem, it became apparent that some SF recruiters, most of whom were not SF qualified, did not possess the level of detailed knowledge to educate, direct, and mentor potential candidates into Special Forces. Some SF recruiters were merely salesman, selling the product, Special Forces, with the same approach as that of used a car salesman as opposed to assisting candidates in making informed career decisions. It was not uncommon for SF recruiters to know actually very little about SF, or even know an SF soldier, beyond completion of SFAS. ARI reported that in 1992 a mere 37 percent of the recruiters polled said that they frequently spoke with SF soldiers to find out about their jobs or about the life of an SF soldier. Only 21 percent of the recruiters said they talked with the SFAS staff or sought information on the assessment and selection process (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 20). Recruiters themselves openly addressed the proceeding issues

and thought it best to receive assistance or training on how get pertinent information in order to assist candidates in making informed career decisions. Neglecting to get “educated” on SF and life as an SF soldier beyond SFAS simply facilitated making the mission at all cost thereby sacrificing quality for quantity.

Taking a moment to expound, or develop the concept of the SF recruiters’ ability to meet, converse with, and educate the potential candidates about SF, consider the following. Recruiters were polled (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, A-1 thru A-15) and requested to respond to questions pertaining to their job as a recruiter, their perceptions of SF, their main objective as recruiters, the amount of job pressure experienced, what motivates potential candidates, and other direct questions. The findings were at times quite alarming if compared to standards by which recruiters are held to today. Summarizing and perhaps generalizing statements from some SF recruiters, as polled by ARI’s Herd and Teplitzky, responses to the questions or issues stated above were that there was less pressure involved in SF recruiting than Total Army recruiting due to the fact that SF was the “elite of the Army” (as a noted perception among recruiters), and that SF “sold itself.” Recruiters revealed that their job was to “sell SFAS” and that they do less “selling of the product” and more processing and assisting the candidates in completing the application process. An attitude often held by some recruiters was that candidates needed to possess elite qualities if they were to become part of the “Army’s Elite,” and therefore required less ‘handholding’ than Army entry-level recruits. Other typical SF recruiter responses were, “You don’t have to use the product to sell it,” and, “You don’t have to live in the 18th Century to teach it,” as well as, “You don’t have to be an SF soldier to sell SF.” Some perhaps more misguided or ill-received responses were,

“the divorce rate is no higher in SF, it is just sped up,” and questions like “who runs your life?” referring to objections from home over the amount of time the candidate may be separated from his family (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, A-1 thru A-15).

ARI researchers Herd and Teplitzky revealed these findings in 1992 and their efforts, and others, to solve such shortcomings within the recruiting community led to additional research and analysis that highly benefited the SF community in the short-term future. These findings will be examined as part of the current recruiting initiatives and methodologies later in the analysis. Again, systemic research by ARI and USAJFKSWCS, having bonded into a productive team, that indeed provided decision makers with particularly useful information concerning the health and status of the force was documented and implemented.

And lastly, during the prospecting of potential candidates, SF recruiters *advertised*. In retrospect, the author remembers SF specific advertising as a first lieutenant, field artillery officer serving in the Federal Republic of Germany. The advertisements were motivating, exciting, and sparked one’s imagination about the endless possibilities of opportunities that lay ahead with the caption, “most have a job, some have a commitment.” Eager, potential candidates were advised on “what it takes to try for a Green Beret,” and that it was “a great challenge with great benefits” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, D-6). The poster that had the greatest impact on the author is still displayed as a reminder of the wonderment and nervous energy experienced as men who stood before the poster asked, ‘Can I make it?’ Do I have the “courage, the dedication, and the determination to make in the Special Forces?” (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, D-2). It was estimated that 75 to 80 percent of those potential candidates that attended a SF

recruiter presentation had already decided to go the distance and join SF, no matter the circumstances (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 22). Undoubtedly, advertising had a certain motivational impact on potential candidates as they made career decisions.

By 1992, the most common form of SF recruiting advertising consisted of posters strategically placed on Army installations advising when and where the next SF recruiter presentation was to be held. Although limited in its capacity to reach the desired number of potential candidates, the recruiting pamphlet titled *What Makes Special Forces So Special?* was another means of advertisement. Also limited, by cost comparative analysis and budgeting constraints, were announcements in local newspapers and by local television broadcasts announcing the details of upcoming SF recruiter presentations. There were also, at times in 1992, a limited number of advertisements paid for by the U.S. Army publicizing the Special Forces in military magazines. Appendix D portrays typical SF In-service Recruiting Team advertising circa 1990.

Chapter 1 indicated the impact of advertising through various mediums today as an effective means to promote SF or entice potential candidates from within the Army to apply for Special Forces training as well. There has been a remarkable amount of research conducted on the impact that advertising has on the Armed Forces; therefore, the author thought it prudent to dedicate some time to this aspect of the research. Advertising and the impact of advertising on the Armed Forces, specifically the influence on the recruiting effort of the Armed Forces, will be addressed later in the analysis.

On introduction of the two primary functions of the SF recruiter, the prospecting and the processing of recruits, the point was made that there are differences between the Total Army and SF recruiters' processing stages. The main difference lies in the

responsibilities involved in processing the potential SF candidates for SFAS. There is a myriad of tasks that require the SF recruiter to assist the recruit in processing and preparing for SFAS vice merely signing the recruit up for basic training. Most of the assistance offered, or required, to ensure success by SF recruiters as early as 1991 remain the same today; however, as will be addressed, the methods recruiters implement today are greatly enhanced by technology and a few years of documented lessons learned. The capabilities and level of computer technology that existed in 1991 throughout SF recruiting stations in 1991 are enclosed in appendix E. Appendix E is the SF recruiting procedures manual for Office Automation Capabilities. By comparison to today's standards, these automation capabilities were quite rudimentary. It must also be pointed out that not all recruiters were computer literate and, at times, there was perhaps only one recruiter in the station who had the know-how to exercise the automated systems.

The processing stage involved for getting recruits to SFAS in 1991 was a time and resource intensive process. The many external and internal factors that influenced the process were enormous and impacted the mission. It is requested that the reader make an effort to be cognizant of the internal and external factors that impact the efforts of the recruiter while processing recruits for SFAS. Processing required a certain degree of discipline and perseverance to track and communicate with the candidate, ensure all prerequisite requirements were met, and that the candidate displayed a willingness to accomplish his part of the required processing as well. As can be imagined, it could be quite frustrating for recruiters to make a concerted effort to set a candidate up for success, only to be stalled by a lack of commitment from the individual. An individual's lack of commitment could stem from either or both peer and family pressure, chain-of-command

influence, lack of support or knowledge in obtaining required medical and other administrative records, operational tempo, or simply finding that the process is too difficult. Time, again, is a factor.

Recruiters spent an enormous amount of time motivating candidates in order to keep their interest in SF high throughout processing for SFAS. At the close of a recruiter presentation, the optimal procedure, after signature of the volunteer statement, was for the recruiter to administer the APFT and swim test, if possible. Due to time constraints while on the road, and limited facilities in some areas, the recruiter was not always afforded this timesaving luxury. He then had to count on the soldier to accomplish these critical acceptance tasks. Recruiters assisted candidates by reviewing a recommended preparatory five-week physical training regime. The *Pre-SFAS Physical Training Handbook* was available for distribution for a trial period in early FY 1992; however, most recruiters chose to mail the handbook only after the candidate had completed his SFAS packet and was scheduled for an upcoming SFAS class.

It was also noted that administration of the APFT and swim test by other personnel (the individual's chain of command) proved to be a less than satisfactory alternative due to the percentage of candidates who failed the prerequisite testing *after* reporting to SFAS. Soldiers failing prerequisite testing after reporting to SFAS proved, after further research and analysis, to be very costly.

Recruiters also attempted to keep candidates' interest in SF through consistent and follow-up correspondence. Normally within a week of a candidate formally volunteering for SF, recruiters sent an "application received letter" to the soldier and the soldier's unit. This procedure ensured that SF was indeed interested in him and sought

the support of the soldier's unit while he prepared for SFAS. Other correspondence recruiters typically sent were reminder letters detailing where the candidate stood in the process or required documents that the candidate still needed to submit. Samples of typical correspondence are found in appendix F. After reviewing the correspondence, one can appreciate the task at hand. Tracking candidates and remaining abreast of where each individual candidate stood in the processing stage was a time-consuming task requiring superb organizational and communication skills. At times, recruiters would also speak directly by phone with candidates in order to motivate, encourage, coach, mentor, field questions, or offer any assistance that the candidate may require.

As stated in previous paragraphs, the most important aspect of the SF recruiters' job was processing. The level of commitment and perseverance required was high, and the numerous external and influences on the recruiter and the candidate dictated effective communication skills. Databases, although infantile in their development, were depended upon, and office automation procedures, as seen in appendix E, were instituted in order to optimize tracking the candidates' progress in the SFAS processing stage. Table 1 summarizes the recruiting process methodologies of 1991.

TABLE 1.
TYPICAL STEPS IN THE RECRUITING PROCESS (1991)

STEP 1	Candidate receives USAREC Pamphlet 601-25 and/or "What Makes Special Forces So Special?" pamphlet	-Next SF Briefing and Presentations details -Initial question and answer period
STEP 2	SF Briefing and Presentations at designated time and place. *Objective: signature of Volunteer Statement	-40-to-90-minute structured brief -Video and slide show -Question and answer period

Step 3	<p>Review of USAREC Pamphlet 601-25 Requirements</p> <p>(*) Administration of APFT and Swim Test if time and facilities permits</p>	<p>-Focus on application procedures</p> <p>-Statistical data on SFAS prerequisite and requisite requirements</p> <p>-Physical Training recommendations</p> <p>-Advise as to location/ time of recruiter administered APFT and Swim Test (*). Instructions for chain of command or others to administer. Total score of 206, minimum 60 points per event, on the 17-21 olds standard, strict adherence to proper form.</p>
STEP 4	<p>Assistance in obtaining required forms and records to obtain orders for SFAS.</p> <p>*Recruiter sends SF physical to SWCS Surgeon and USAREC immediately upon receipt to expedite the process.</p>	<p>-DA Form 2A (GT score, diploma)</p> <p>-DA Form 2-1 (rank /work record)</p> <p>-DA Form 873 (Security Clearance)</p> <p>-SF 88 (Medical Examination)*</p> <p>-SF 93 (Medical History)</p>
STEP 5	<p>Creating / Maintaining database files</p> <p>Input candidate's information into Recruiting Station's database (LEADS).</p>	<p>-Pertinent information: name, rank, location, correspondence logs, suspense(s) logs, tracking info.</p>
STEP 6	<p>Receipt of Application Letter</p>	<p>-Information related to projected SFAS class date; processing requirements still due; emphasis on physical fitness preparations</p>
STEP 7	<p>Completed packets sent to USAREC</p>	<p>-Packet contains all required documentation: Volunteer Statement or DA Form 4187, DA 2A and 2-1 Forms (with waivers if required), security verification, PT data card 705, swim test statement, and approved SF physical</p>
STEP 8	<p>Individual and Unit Correspondence</p>	<p>-Motivational mentoring, any reminders of required actions; information to unit chain of command, soliciting support for the applicant in preparing for SFAS.</p>
STEP 9	<p>Formal scheduling for SFAS</p>	<p>-SFAS class date entered in to the ATRRS.</p> <p>-Request for Orders (RFO) form soldier's Personnel Service Center.</p> <p>-Class date sent to Ft. Bragg and originating recruiter.</p>
STEP 10	<p>Data base updates (continual and simultaneous requirement)</p>	<p>-Continually updating the database, (obtained and missing documents) logging calls, motivational letters to complete SFAS packets</p>

Derived from Herd and Teplitzky, Septmeber1992

Table 1 depicts the typical steps taken by a SF recruiter in the processing stage. This list is not, by any means, all-inclusive nor does it justly articulate the time and energy recruiters of 1991 dedicated to meeting their mission. Given a summary snapshot of the dedication and perseverance required to meet such a mission, while factoring in the internal and external factors that impact the ability to accomplish the set mission, one would assume that recruiters would benefit from knowing the results of meeting their objective. As a reminder, the SF recruiter's objective was to generate interest in SF, prescreen and assist SF recruits in completing the SF application, process candidates who met the prerequisite requirements, and ultimately see to it that he was successfully admitted into an SFAS class within a reasonable amount of time. A reasonable amount of time to receive orders for SFAS, as reported by ARI in September 1992, averaged about forty-eight days after the candidate signed a volunteer statement. Processing times varied from station to station and ranged from fourteen to seventy days depending on the responsiveness of the candidate and the aggressive perseverance of the recruiter (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 19).

Recruiters who took the processing stage of their job one step further and sought to benefit from the knowledge (job or personal satisfaction, or to build a mental profile of the "type" of candidate that succeeded in SFAS and what type of candidate did not) of which candidates successfully made it through SFAS totaled 74 percent of those polled. This percentage revealed that they only "occasionally" found out which of their candidates were selected. Only 26 percent claimed that they "frequently or always" followed through and obtained the stats on their candidates who were selected (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 20). One would assume that the time and energy invested in getting a

candidate to SFAS would certainly entail a substantial payoff or reward, either personally or professionally. The reward would stem from the satisfaction of knowing that they were directly responsible for prospecting and processing the future of the Special Forces; that they had succeeded by every measure, in producing the caliber of recruit who could continue on to the SFQC and ultimately to the active SF groups. This was not always the case.

SF recruiters were only responsible for meeting the set mission in terms of the number of candidates who simply reported to SFAS. There was no stipulation that they had to be successfully admitted into the program. Otherwise stated, recruiting stations were successful in meeting the set mission even if a large percentage of the candidates failed to meet prerequisite standards *after* reporting to SFAS (the APFT, swim test, or medical disqualification for example). This was in contrast to the USAREC mission. USAREC only received credit towards mission accomplishment if the candidates passed all prerequisite requirements for entry into SFAS after signing in. Likewise, recruiters received credit twice, for the same candidate, who failed to meet prerequisite standards after reporting to SFAS, were sent away, and then returned to SFAS for a later class.

This disconnect between USAREC and the recruiting stations and the further disconnects between SF recruiters and SWCS (SFAS cadre and staff), emphasized that that the relationship between the agencies required attention. ARI and SWCS coordinated, planned, and began the process of systematic research and development of future, more productive relationships shared between all agencies involved in the process of building the force. As suspected, the key to success was education. Educating the candidates, the recruiters, and the decision makers was identified as the road to future

success. The process of building the force was dependent on effective communication and mutual support from all the agencies. Although SF recruiters were viewed as being highly successful in accomplishing difficult missions, the emphasis was to be redirected. Quantity, albeit an important, and at times the defining element of the job profile, was perhaps second to the quality of candidates being processed for SFAS. Programmed guidance was to be more than raw numbers, in terms of accessions. It was considered essential that SWCS provide more specific guidance on how many, and more importantly what they look like. A factor that often troubled the SF recruiting teams, and of a lesser degree still does today, is the failure to identify the requirement (an ideal candidate with the desired attributes) before the recruiters go to work as opposed to turning away less than qualified candidates at the SFAS admission door. SF recruiters recognized that quality candidates reporting to SFAS could not be delivered based on a perceived notion of what they *thought* SFAS was looking for and how many of these candidates they *speculated* SFAS wanted.

The preceding has provided an in depth analysis of the establishment of the SF recruiting organization, to include all agencies the SF recruiting stations shared ties, the procedures in setting the mission, the prospecting and processing of recruits for SFAS, and most importantly, the plethora of internal and external factors that challenged the SF recruiter in accomplishing his task. The importance of establishing productive relationships between the numerous agencies involved in recruiting the future force and the equal need for systematic research and development of the methods, practices and procedures of all agencies was also analyzed.

September 1992 is earmarked as the beginning of growth and development for the SF recruiting effort. Under direction, and in coordination with SWCS and USAREC, ARI provided documented research and analysis of the evolving relationship between agencies within DA, PERSCOM, USAREC, SWCS and others who were involved in the recruiting process. ARI's research and findings of the SF recruiting process provided highly useful information to the recruiters and decision makers tasked with building the SF force structure of the future. The author placed ARI's documented facts, findings and recommendations into two categories. This was due to the inextricable link between all agencies that influence the SF recruiting process. The first category is characterized by findings with respect to the system, or specifically, a combination of all agencies involved that influence the recruiting process (internal and external influences). The second is characterized by findings with respect to SF recruiters. Table depicts a historical trends analysis chart derived from secondary research by the author. The information is arranged and presented based on primary research conducted by ARI and published in September 1992.

ARI researchers Herd and Teplitzky concluded their assessment of Special Forces recruiting in September 1992 with the following:

Both USAREC and USAJFKSWCS have taken the important first steps toward resolving these issues by encouraging research and open discussion. In the broader arena of SF personnel development, recruiting is inextricably linked to assessment and training outcomes, and ultimately the quality of the force. Changing personnel demands, both in terms of numbers and desired attributes, will in turn, affect recruiting goals and methods. Continued efforts to examine and improve the present systems will ensure that feedback loops and the personnel development system as a whole will continue to function effectively. (Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 37)

TABLE 2

SF RECRUITING HISTORICAL TRENDS ANALYSIS CHART

Systems and Agencies in the Recruiting Process	
Issue Addressed: Overproduction of SFAS graduates	Recommended Action: Continuance of research and development of linkage between USAREC Mission and SMDR authorized training seats. Overestimation accession requirements deemed as counterproductive. Further development of longitudinal database by ARI and SWCS.
Issue Addressed: Select and attrition /select rates in SFAS and SFQC	Recommended Action: Development / enhancement of ATRRS database to track, document, and build historical data to reliably track individual attrition and long term training outcomes. Factor into setting the mission to ensure effective flow of personnel.
Issue Addressed: Overproduction / overfilling SFAS class	Recommended Action: Strict enforcement cap on reserved training slots available in SFAS classes. Eliminate derogatory actions against recruiters who do not make mission for a specific class; example, once a class is full, work to fill next/future class if mission isn't met for the filled class
Issue addressed: LEADS database.	Recommended Action: Development / improvement of LEADS database. Identified as problematic due to downsizing, correctness of information, candidate-tracking procedures. Continually update recruit stats, thereby ensuring it accurately reflects current SF eligible market in AOR.
Issue Addressed: Organizational/ structural design and reporting procedures .	Recommended Action: Review USAREC organization and structure. Recruiters must answer/report, shares ties with USAREC HQ, recruiting brigade, SF Liaison at Bragg, and SWCS (in service to "too many chiefs"). Streamline redundancy in reporting procedures, message routing, etc. Explore moving USAREC HQ functions; co-locate at Ft Bragg.
SF Recruiters	
Issue Addressed: SFAS prerequisite failures.	Recommended Action: Recruiter emphasis on prerequisite testing and preparation (APFT, Swim test, medical exam) will assist in upward trend in SFAS select rates.
Issue Addressed: Information needs and training requirements for recruiters/ candidates.	Recommended Action: Solve perceived conflicts between USAREC recruiters and SWCS (quality vs. quantity). Communication and information exchanges, candidate information pamphlets, recruiter information/training programs, continuance of productive recruiting conferences. Goal: improve informed / elite group model decision making/ mentorship.

Derived from ARI facts and findings, Herd and Teplitzky, September 1992

As stated earlier, September 1992 is earmarked as the beginning of growth and development for the SF recruiting effort. By design, and a tremendous amount of dedication, commitment, cooperation, and professionalism, the study of the SF recruiting phenomenon continued. Not only did the research continue on already published aspects of SF recruiting and manpower planning, but tangible results were being observed due to the aggressiveness of recruiters and all other agencies involved to act on the findings and recommendations set forth. Teamwork and the efforts of the team to systematically research, develop, evaluate, and implement acquired tools (knowledge and understanding) greatly enhanced SF recruiting and continued to prove invaluable. ARI researchers Brooks and Zazanis published an ARI Special Report in October 1997 and reported the quantifiable results of the congruent, productive relationship shared by ARI, USAJFKSWCS and USAREC over a seven-year period. Essentially, this report highlighted progress in acting on the recommendations proposed by Herd and Teplitzky in 1992. Efforts of monitoring and managing the personnel flow through the training pipeline (recruitment to assignment) were monumentally improved upon. Success was due to the development of databases to effectively track individual attrition over time as soldiers progressed through the pipeline to include SFAS and SFQC specific training outcomes, administrative, and recycle data. In conjunction with the development of these databases, parallel research continued to develop information models that articulated the desired attributes of SF candidates.

Improvements in monitoring and managing the personnel flow through the training pipeline result from the efforts of SOPO to address ARI's findings that the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS), as the primary source of SFQC

attrition data, was insufficient or not designed to track individual attrition or long term training outcomes of the SF training pipeline. SOPO accession models are based on an overall success rate of 27 percent for enlisted personnel and 37 percent for officers based on historical attrition factors for the FY 1996 recruiting cohort, the only mature profile available to date. An additional factor that impacts the attrition data remains the percentage of candidates who terminate prior to training or simply never show up. With the leadership of an (one) assigned, bona fide statistician, SOPO predicts long term training outcomes based on the historical attrition rates computed. This data is generated from a by name scrub of an entire recruiting cohort (the FY 1996 recruiting cohort). One question drives the study of attrition rates, “If one hundred personnel in a given category begin the SF training pipeline today, how many from this sample populace will successfully complete each phase of training pipeline someday?” (SOPO director 2000). Figure 8 (presented in three parts) articulates the SOPO accession model and presents data from the study of the FY 1996 recruiting cohort.

Of the research projects launched since 1990, perhaps the most measurable success was the commitment to address information needs of the candidates, and the SF recruiters as well. The physical demands of SFAS were outlined in a physical training handbook. This handbook had a substantial impact in reducing the number of candidates who failed SFAS prerequisite requirements or performed poorly during SFAS with the causal affect of finishing the program as “non-select.” The timely distribution of the handbook, coupled with the candidates pinpoint SFAS class date, attributed to a marked advantage for success. SF recruiters adhered to the sound advice and took the lead in ensuring candidates were well prepared for the challenges that lay ahead.

Another means to ensure that the information needs of candidates or, at times more importantly, the recruiters' information needs were met, was the development and distribution of an information pamphlet titled, *Thinking About Special Forces? Answers to Your Most Often-Asked Questions*. The pamphlet was, and remains, highly advantageous for two reasons. Candidates receive information that assist them making informed career decisions and provides information that is particularly helpful to the candidates' family as well. Recruiters benefit from the pamphlet, simply because any information that better educates them on the Special Forces community and life as an SF soldier aided in their mission. By virtue of being more comfortable (knowledgeable) in their role as a mentor who facilitates making informed career decisions, he in turn could become a better recruiter with an emphasis on quality over quantity. SWCS has since revised the pamphlet and recruiters continue to distribute to potential candidates.

ARI, within the *Special Report 33* published in October 1997, shows promise in that they, in coordination with SWCS and USAREC, are not only building historical databases to assist in the "now" of SF recruiting, but are looking to the future. Managing change, for the development of the force in the future, is a must. ARI researchers said it best in the "Future Directions" section of the October 1997 special report.

Both narrow and broad-based efforts are necessary for identifying research needs and designing interventions to maximize the effectiveness of SF personnel and organizations." (Sanders, Zazanis, and Diana 1997, 67).

Before analyzing the potential effectiveness of the future directions or methodologies SF recruiters may implement, it is necessary to review the current organization tasked with building the SF force structure. The Special Operations Recruiting Company (SORC) was organized in 1995 and remains the lead agency in

prospecting and processing the future of the U.S. Army Special Forces. Analysis of the Special Operations Recruiting Company's operational organization, practiced methodologies, and challenges that impact the unit today is essential in applying the framework of SF recruiting, as revealed in the preceding analysis, to the current recruiting methodologies in practice today. Comparative analysis, fueled by extensive research of secondary and tertiary questions and issues, of the SF In-Service Recruiting Team since its inception and the SORC provided the quantitative data in answering the primary question. The following analysis is provided in order to parallel the lessons learned from the past and apply it to the potential effectiveness of current and future recruiting methodologies.

The SORC consists of nine CONUS and two outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) locations. The SORC commander, an accomplished SF-qualified major (O-4), is based at Fort Knox, Kentucky, while the unit's first sergeant is stationed at Fort Bragg. The SORC is comprised of five officers and thirty-two NCOs who conduct in-service, worldwide recruiting. The current SORC task organization is provided in figure 9. Like the In-Service Recruiting Team of 1990, the SORC falls under the USAREC headquarters, the subordinate brigades for support, and has the responsibility for filling the directed manning requirements for United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Today, the SORC also shoulders the responsibility of recruiting aviators for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), formally activated at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, on 16 May 1990.

In general, the SORC's mission remains the same since 1990; provide officer and enlisted candidates for SF. The SORC's formal mission statement reads, "During FY00,

the Special Operations Recruiting Company conducts worldwide U.S. Army in-service recruiting in order to provide the manpower requirements for the United States Special Operations Command (Airborne)” (SORC Command Brief, 29 November 1999).

Undoubtedly, the results of extensive research and analysis by ARI and the development of ongoing congruent relationships between the multiple agencies involved in SF recruiting, progress has been made in the field. Based on the current SORC commander’s intent, as briefed to the CG, USAJFKSWCS, it is evident that lessons learned from the past assist the commander in effectively prospecting and processing candidates for the future. The content of the commander’s intent (the message to be received) indicates that the methods used to process candidates for SFAS, and ultimately for active duty on an SFODA, are based on past experiences in terms of success and failures of the recruiting organization as a whole. The commander’s intent is formatted to articulate the purpose, method, campaign, and end state of successful SF recruiting. The purpose is to provide the desired volume of *acceptable* candidates/packets to USASOC. The implemented methodology is to identify the worldwide market by using PERSCOM databases, thereby contacting candidates through effective advertisements and briefings. The SORC is engaged in a worldwide campaign based on recruiting with integrity in accordance with *USAREC Pamphlet 601-25*. SF recruiters strive to assist candidates in processing and *preparing* for SFAS, and beyond, to the appropriate termination point. Success is defined in the commander’s end state. He, having considered the numerous internal and external influences that impact the prospecting, processing, and preparation of candidates for SF, must define success in numerical terms. For FY00, successful SF recruiting was defined as,

- 1,800 enlisted SF candidates' successful admission to SFAS
 - 344 officer SF packets
 - 200 SOAR packets
 - 150 Privates First Class (PFC's) SF candidates (*)
- (*) Current SF recruiting initiative in progress.

As revealed previously in the analysis, the SF recruiters' market or, specifically, knowledge of the demographics and number of available candidates in the market, is an integral part of their job. To recap, the market is defined as the number of SF eligible soldiers in a geographic area that a recruiting station covers. The size of the market is weighted by the market's propensity factor (or likelihood that soldiers located in the market will apply for SF) because some locations produce fewer SF applicants than others. The market is characterized by an increasing recruiting mission with a decreasing market, command competition within the Army, an increasing operational tempo (OPTEMPO) within the Army, and civilian or corporate competition. Remembering that the massive downsizing of the Army has double the impact on SF recruiting as a non-accession branch, the ability to know and understand the market is of paramount importance. The SORC continually studies, updates, and redefines the market as required. Part of this process is using the SIDPERS 3 and all other available PERSCOM databases. Research reveals that an enormous amount of time and resources has gone into enabling a better understanding and productive application of the recruiting market. Developing effective, up to date databases that define the market has become the crucial step in effectively prospecting and processing candidates for SFAS (refer to TYPICAL STEPS IN THE RECRUITING PROCESS, 1991, page thirty-two of this document). More than ever, due to the in-service recruiting pool getting smaller, effective recruiting from that pool requires valid data and timely access to the data.

The market, and what characterizes the market, is essentially incorporated into the processing stage as an underlying theme, as opposed to simply a step in the multistep process. Figure 10 portrays the Army market and depicts its influence on the SF recruiter processing stage. Likewise, the graphic representation of the market presented in figure 10 highlights the SORC's recruiting process. Simplified, the process is to identify, contact, recruit, assist, and process. The SORC's ability to access and use all available PERSCOM databases is accomplished with relative ease due to technological advancements in database tracking. One such advancement is that the SORC no longer has to rely on receiving the LEADS database one to four times a year; with no guarantee the data is up to date or correct. The SORC has a direct "channel" to the PERSCOM database "frequency" and essentially manages an independent SF recruiting LEADS database. This means immediate access to all information when required. This timely access allows to the recruiter to begin prospecting immediately. This database, when used in conjunction with a toll free phone number, signifies remarkable progress in the SF recruiters' ability to manage information and the market. The toll free number will be addressed later in the analysis. As of November 1999, SORC had identified 112,000 potential enlisted candidates and 9,500 potential officer candidates eligible for Special Forces.

The next step in the recruiting process is to contact the identified eligible candidates. Research findings revealed that the In-Service Recruiting Team of the early 1990s depended on strategically placed posters and announcements on installations. The SORC also relies heavily on advertising in order to attract potential candidates. Posters and announcements on Army installations are still used to direct interested soldiers to the

next SF recruiting presentation and briefing; however, technology, innovation, and creative educational tools have greatly enhanced the recruiters' ability to prospect. The SORC applies this technology, innovation, and creative thinking in order to contact potential candidates by multiple means. Contacting candidates is synonymous with attracting candidates. Like the In-Service Recruiting Teams, the SORC's intermediate objective is to have as many qualified (emphasis on the *quality* in qualified) candidates sign a volunteer statement and begin processing their packet for SFAS. As stated earlier in the analysis, recruiters advertise. Modern technology and the cultural trends that accompany, and seemingly personify generations past, present and future, inordinately impact the SORC's ability to advertise. Today SORC advertises in two ways, direct and indirect advertisements.

Indirect advertising consists of multiple sources of information age technology and use of more traditional assets such as the newspapers, magazines, local/cable television commercials, and advertisements that prelude video rental tapes. On the average, the SORC runs 125,000 advertisements in the *Army Times*, local and Army installation newspapers. The target audience in the AOR, or distribution and media coverage area, is the eligible candidates with emphasis on the market's propensity factor, or likelihood that soldiers located in the market will apply for SF.

As a result of research and study, it is clearly understood that the SORC is not recruiting the same type or profile of potential candidates today that were being recruited ten years ago. Cultural diversity in American society, and the Army as well, continues to develop, change, and impact the recruiting process. The market today is characterized, in addition to the characterizations presented in the formal definition, by the Information

Age. Computers and digitized information bytes influence and affect all members of society by one medium or another daily. With the influence of computers and digitized information technology, comes more diversity and an enhanced ability to influence the very fabric of society. The SORC has aggressively monopolized on this opportunity to contact and attract candidates. The Information Age has provided the SORC with an operational recruiting tool, “a common denominator that knows no intellectual, political, or bureaucratic bounds” (Stoll 1996, 329).

The operational recruiting tool of the ‘now’ and the future is the Internet. The SORC maintains a home page on the Internet as part of the Army and USAREC’s campaign to attract and recruit the future force. The Army’s program to educate, inform, and appeal to society to give of themselves in service to the Nation is, in part, accomplished without face-to-face contact. It is accomplished from the home, the library, high schools, and college campuses across the country. With access to the Internet, interested persons simply type in the Army’s address of www.goarmy.com and easily navigate their way to an icon titled *Special Operations Recruiting*. The SORC’s homepage provides a wealth of information including video clips, recruiting station locations, electronic-mail addresses, and telephone numbers. This power pack of information is not limited to the procedures of signing up for Special Forces. The SORC homepage has multiple links to provide one with information on, simply put, everything and anything you ever wanted to know about SF. The site is detailed with action photos of SF and SOF in action. A value added attribute is the motivating audio that accompanies the web page. One can opt to read the history of Special Forces or browse through the information topic links while listening to the theme song from *Mission*

Impossible. From there, the options are unlimited. The task organization of an A-Team is viewable, one can read the SF prayer, or listen to the *Ballad of the Green Berets* while reviewing other tutorial links. The crisp, clear images of SF in action are powerfully appealing, spark the imagination and senses, and compel the reviewer to seek more information. Creativity and innovation is one method by which the SORC is motivating and attracting candidates to SF via the Internet. The Internet site is exciting and the potential effectiveness for success is immeasurable.

Interested soldiers have the ability to contact recruiters via the Internet by e-mail in order to seek additional assistance or simply want to interact with a person rather than a computer, a more “personalized” contact. Those candidates who do not need assistance in making an informed career decision and have committed to join SF have the ability to download a complete SF application packet for SFAS and, if desired, submit the packet electronically.

The SORC homepage is in a continual state of enhancement and upgrade in order to appeal to and ultimately attract the market to SF. The author monitored the progress and development of such enhancements for over six months while drafting this analysis. The level of commitment and dedication as witnessed by the enhancements of this invaluable tool, articulates the importance of knowing your audience and how to attract that audience to SF. There is no empirical evidence to measure the effectiveness of the Internet site; however, there are thousands of interested soldiers who have navigated their way through the SORC homepage. If only a small percentage of those who seek knowledge with the intent of making an informed career decision to join SF actually follow through, this can only reflect a positive step in the right direction. The image

portrayed in figure 11 presents a graphic representation of the Special Operations home page. Appendix G depicts SORC's homepage, other links, and valuable information accessible to those who navigate the Special Operations Forces web pages.

Error! Not a valid link.

Figure 11. Special Operations Home Page

Candidates also have the option of contacting a recruiter directly by phone with the toll free number 1-800-USA-ARMY. This option signifies the integration of advanced computer technologies with traditional resources, the telephone. As highlighted in a preceding paragraph, this toll free number significantly enhances the SORC's ability to contact a candidate who has shown an interest in SF in a timely, if not an immediate, manner. From any phone, interested candidates may call the toll free number and follow simple instructions in order to have an SF recruiter contact him. The

candidate's information (standard LEADS data) is then electronically forwarded to the SORC to action the request for information on SF career opportunities. This progress reflects the change required to solve LEADS database tracking information as identified by ARI almost eight years ago. Again, technology merges two agencies with a common goal of recruiting for the future by effective management of change.

Direct advertising methods practiced today include the more traditional, yet effective, method of massive quarterly mail outs. In addition to letters, postcards have recently been added to the mail-out venue. The postcard (see figure 12A and B) is more cost effective and allows the potential candidate to review, in color, SF action photos on the front. On the reverse side, SF briefly details who they are looking for, a snapshot of available job opportunities, and a motivational caption that reads,

If you have what it takes to be one of the best trained soldiers
in the world and become a member of an Operational Detachment
A-Team, you owe it to yourself to step up to the challenge.
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

In the age of information, perceptions equate to success. As perceived by candidates who receive this postcard, images of SF conducting real world missions or challenging training encourages candidates to step up to the challenge, mail the postcard in, and begin their journey. As noted by the SORC commander, candidates often bring this postcard to SF recruiting briefs as if its "required to get in the door" (SORC commander, personal communication, 16 March 2000).

Another form of direct advertising is face-to-face to recruiting. The SORC takes advantage of every possible opportunity to reach potential candidates by getting out of the office and meeting, mentoring, and answering questions. More so than the In-Service

Recruiting Teams of the early 90's, the SORC spends a great deal of time TDY in the conduct of worldwide installation visits (see appendix H, SFRD-02 TDY Schedule). The presentations are multi-media, action packed information briefs in which candidates are exposed to the life of an SF soldier. The objective remains the same in that recruiters are attempting to spark an interest in SF and ultimately looking for a volunteer statement signature. Although the objectives of SF presentations and briefings have not changed, the methods have. Current and future operations of a typical detachment in the SORC (in addition to the formal presentation and briefing) include frequent high-tech, exciting demonstrations throughout the AOR. Candidates worldwide are exposed to SF in action by static weapons displays, simulated enemy ambush demonstrations, rock wall climbing, and SF unit coverage of actual or training missions. Recruiters are spending more time on the ground in the conduct of such recruiting methods, and therefore the ground truth of Special Forces is more accessible. The recruiter presentations and demonstrations of today need no car salesman approach, they stand alone. The recruiters are the motivational facilitators of information and they ensure that informed career decisions are possible.

Within this stage of the recruiting process, SORC recruits in accordance with USAREC PAM 601-25; however, they additionally make a concerted effort progress by assisting candidates in the initial preparation of the SF packet. In doing so, recruiters de-conflict command resistance issues, advise on physical training programs, assist in land navigation training, Red Cross swim training, medical exam support, and preship inspections and briefs. As revealed in appendix H, SORC is on the road a great deal. It is believed that candidates must be aggressively sought out rather than the recruiters

waiting to be contacted. The SORC commander provides guidance on the optimal time for each Special Forces Recruiting Detachment (SFRD) to go TDY to a particular location in their respective AOR. Based on the market's propensity, recruiters travel to the location once a year, semiannually, or quarterly or low-, medium-, and high-propensity locations respectively. As stated, one of the major characteristics of the market is the OPTEMPO that the average soldier maintains throughout the year. To alleviate the impact of soldiers not spending time sufficient time in the AOR, and thus not available to be prospected, the recruiters deploy to them no matter the location. Case in point, recruiters have deployed to Bosnia and other areas in the Balkans to recruit. Due to the duration of the mission and the consistency in which units are rotating in and out of the area, recruiters could not afford to wait for the market to return to their AOR.

Although recruiters are out of the office for long periods of time, progress continues. Computer advancements and other technologies allow office automation procedures to continue while traveling. Essentially, the SORC never closes shop. Candidates are tracked via PERSCOM databases through remote access using a laptop computer. Answering received inquiries via electronic mail is possible and correspondence can be generated immediately if required. Recruiters are accessible twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week via worldwide pagers and other telecommunications equipment, if necessary.

While in the office, SORC continues the recruiting process by maintaining a vested interest the candidate. SORC views the process as complete once the candidate has reached an acceptable termination point. Candidates are assisted with TDY orders to Fort Bragg, assisted in the coordination of travel arrangements, and the support of select

agencies on the candidates' installation are arranged. Acceptable termination points do not preclude the SORC from monitoring candidates' success in SFAS, as in the past. It is believed that it is advantageous for the SORC to monopolize on the success of candidates who complete and are selected in SFAS. Those who are selected are sought out in order for them to recruit their peers. The candidates' success speaks loud and clear over the television and radio airwaves within their AOR. The message is equally loud and clear, "If he can do it, so can I" (Salmon 2000). The success of peers significantly contributes to the increased level of interest in SF, as noted by recruiters.

As in any profession, resource and budget constraints may limit or hamper the unit's ability to accomplish the mission to their full potential. The SORC's potential is not excessively limited by funding and budgetary constraints. Depending on the AOR, and the propensity of the market, each SORC detachment is appropriated sufficient funds to accomplish their mission. The Special Forces Recruiting Detachment 02 (SFRD-02), for example, was allocated an annual budget of \$68,000 for FY 2000. The SORC commander believes this is sufficient to recruit effectively in the AOR that covers seven states within CONUS, nine Army installations, and a market that makes up approximately 22.1 and 26 percent, for enlisted and officer candidates respectively, of the entire worldwide SF recruiting market. (SORC, Detachment 1999). In an era where the Army is doing more with less, creativity and innovation lend itself to the success of SORC as the recruiting mission increases and the available candidates within the market decreases. The SORC calculates that it costs the unit \$308 to prospect and process a candidate for SFAS (from within in the Army) and nearly \$11,000 per soldier that is recruited "off the street" by the regular Army recruiters (SORC Commander 2000).

Success for the SORC is stated in terms of the number of quality recruits that are processed for SFAS. Despite the complexities of several, coordinating agencies involved in setting and adjusting the mission, the myriad of internal and external factors that impact the recruiting process, and the relative characteristics of the market as previously analyzed, success is measured in the numbers. As stated early in the analysis, the aforementioned complexities are the reality of recruiting, which dictates that the act of recruiting is not an exact science. The absolute of the science is in the numbers. Can the recruiter meet the mission requirement as directed by the Department of the Army? As of 29 November 1999, the SORC was well on its way to meeting success fulfilling twenty-eight and thirty-four percent of the requirement for enlisted and officer candidates, respectively. The SF enlisted personnel mission for FY 2000 is set at 1,800, the highest it has been since 1992, and officer accessions is set at 344. Appendix I portrays the hard data, the numbers, that the SORC will maintain the initiative in aggressively working to accomplish their mission. Also included in appendix I is the mission history of SF recruiting since FY 1994 and an FY 2000 SFAS production model for active duty SF enlisted volunteers. If success is measured in the raw number of candidates produced for SFAS, the SF recruiters have historically maintained a standard of excellence. The preceding analysis leads one to presume that more than raw numbers must measure the success of the Special Operations Recruiting Company. The future of the Special Forces force structure depends on the ability of all associated civilian agencies and military leaders to collectively manage change and the emergence of new technologies and cultural beliefs and attitudes, and to overcome the barriers that inhibit effective, quality recruiting.

The following details some recommendations that the author believes to be relevant in assisting the SF community in addressing and adopting (in part or totality based on secondary and primary research presented here) current and future recruiting methodologies that would enhance the ability to recruit effectively for the twenty-first century.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has highlighted the origins the of the U.S. Army Special Forces from 1952 to the establishment of the Special Forces as a separate combat arms branch of the Army on 9 April 1987. In greater detail, analysis of the force development process conducted at echelons above the United States Army Recruiting Command was presented in order to appreciate the process of setting and adjusting the SF mission. Historical trends, as documented from secondary research, provided the framework of the analysis by examining what occurred in the past in order to preview the relevant effectiveness of recruiting methodologies in practice today. The analysis articulated the importance of mutually supporting relationships, established as early as 1990 and continue to prosper today, between numerous civilian and military agencies involved in the accession of the future SF force structure. The complex realities of recruiting SF, to include the market, internal and external influences that impact the ability to succeed in the conduct of the phenomenon, have been addressed as well. Having researched the phenomenon of recruiting, and presented the facts and findings that resulted from critical analysis, recommendations and conclusions are based on secondary and primary research, study, analysis, and logical presentation of the data in order to serve as the vehicle for future research.

Initial recommendations are based on secondary questions as presented in chapter one. Throughout the study and research of the phenomenon, secondary questions one and three remained closely linked yet proved to be of value based on the complex issues

that were addressed in regard to the market. One important factor in the analysis of any course of action (COA) is that it differs from the other COAs in its methodology of accomplishing the task. Secondary question one was, can the training base produce the quality and quantity of SF soldiers necessary to satisfy force structure and mission requirements? Question three was, can the market provide the required number of candidates to enter the SF training pipeline due to demographics and differences in the behavioral, cultural, and generation beliefs and values systems?

Research has proven that the market (and the training base), the pool from which recruiters attract potential candidates, is increasingly getting smaller as the demand for SF accessions has steadily gotten larger. This linkage of secondary questions one and three presents perhaps the greatest barrier to effective recruiting. The thought process behind both questions remains relevant. The difference lies in that the training base further exacerbates the current market, with all its influential and impacting aspects. The training base, SFAS and SFQC, as an entity of itself may perhaps be unable to produce the quality and quantity of assessed, selected, and trained SF recruits. It is the influence of the market, all the characteristics of the modern market, and the current table of distribution and allowances (TDA) of SFAS and SFQC that inhibit effective recruiting.

Of the market characteristics that plague the processing of potential candidates, command resistance from within the Army hinders progress most. For instance, in March 2000, the SORC reported that a general-purpose force brigade commander deferred eight of seventeen soldiers recruited from an infantry division from attending an established SFAS class date. The commander deferred the eight non-commissioned officers (that is over half of an Operational Detachment-A, or ODA) due to an upcoming

brigade level training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Not only is this problematic for those who aspire to progress in their career, it potentially denies SF eight combat arms soldiers who are typically associated with a higher select rate and lower voluntary withdrawal rate from SFAS by comparison to noncombat arms soldiers. Second and third order affects of this type of command resistance to SF recruiting promotes poor performance in the candidates' current duty position, creates animosity directed at their chain of command, severely damages the credibility of the SORC, and sets the conditions for failure if the candidates are forced to report to a later SFAS class date unprepared. In 1996, ARI estimated that typically ten percent of all applicants who apply for SF met with substantial resistance from their chain of command (Sanders 1996, 2). In light of the drawdown since 1996, it can only be assumed that such resistance has increased. The author assumes that the more talented an individual (i.e., displays the desired attributes to succeed in SFAS) the more resistance encountered. Although it may be human nature to preserve an individual unit's (or an individual's) chance to be successful, success of the total force structure, and specifically Special Forces as a relevant force within that structure, is the greater cause.

As there are several coordinating agencies involved in the phenomenon of recruiting, the Total Army must be incorporated into the equation. Although the above is but one example of command resistance, it is characteristic of perhaps a challenge that should not be permitted to hinder the success of SF recruiters. The recommendation is nested in the process of educating the Total Army to the difficulties in building the SF force structure. Commanders at all levels must realize the importance of building a force that possesses inherent capabilities that the conventional army does not possess. As

stated in the introduction, the phenomenon of recruiting has received DA command level attention and scrutiny. The key to abolishing command resistance as a characteristic of an increasingly volatile market, is addressing such resistance in the same aggressive and passionate nature that DA and major command (MACOM) level commanders have taken in building the Total Army force structure. The future of SF, as a nonaccession branch, may depend on it.

Another secondary question that must be addressed was presented as, should the standards by which candidates are recruited be amended to fill the current force structure or should the force structure be tailored to fit the capabilities of recruiting efforts? The analysis proved that the phenomenon of recruiting is not an exact science. Success of the SORC, although measured mathematically, or in numbers, ultimately hinges on the success of candidates who are assessed, selected, and then deemed trained and qualified to serve on an SFODA. In direct response to the question, the SORC has amended the standards by which candidates are recruited, for the betterment of the force. However, the requirement to fill the current force structure remains a necessity. Special Forces, as one of the more relevant and called-on forces on the modern battlefield, must continue to thrive on the accession of quality soldiers. The methods of recruiting said quality soldiers has been enhanced and met with success, yet obtaining the quantity of *quality* soldiers for SF remains a challenge. In broad terms, the force structure cannot feasibly be tailored to fit the recruiters' recruiting capabilities. The National Command Authority depends too heavily on the Special Forces' ability to be trained and ready to provide creative solutions in the ambiguous circumstances of war, operations short of war, intervention and even peacekeeping and stability operations. Simply put, although all

military services are doing more with less, the national interests and security policy of United States would not benefit from fewer SF groups. In this instance, the standards by which candidates are held to in SFAS/ SFQC in order to perform as warrior diplomats and global scouts in an operational SFG cannot be altered just to fill the current force structure. Special Forces must leverage time and resources, with a knowledge-based understanding of the recruiting phenomenon, and perform to standard with the current force structure (or variation thereof) as an intermediate short-term compromise that requires a long-term solution.

A current initiative to leverage time and resources and tailor the current force structure is in progress in order to remain a viable force. Special Forces Command is in the progress of answering identified manpower shortages at company, battalion and SF group level. In October of 1998, the SF Commanding General tasked all SF group commanders to provide force structure redesign recommendations to the board of directors. The concept is the *USASFC (A) Tiger Team ODA Organizational Design* and is researched, developed, managed, and documented by the assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G7, Force Integration office within SF Command. Appendix J details the *Tiger Team* concept to include the background, milestones, courses of action, attrition, retention, and SFAS graduation studies and statistics. The concept has also incorporated a doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, and a leader and soldier development (DTLOMs) analysis. Although the concept is to be implemented on a temporary basis (three years), it is perhaps a short-term manpower or force development vehicle vice a long-term solution. The initiative will undoubtedly benefit SF recruiting and the SF community as a whole. Including this material was necessary in order to give future

researchers a foundation on which to base their research as this concept matures in its development.

Another current initiative staffed by the G7, Force Integration Office at USASFC that impacts the phenomenon of recruiting is the *SF Concept Plan to Increase CMF 18 Inventory*. The concept is a three-part strategic concept designed to increase the production of CMF 18 personnel. The concept is strategic in that it addresses recruiting, a re-design of SFAS, and augmentation of the USAJFKSWCS. The concept directly applies and adds to the author's analysis of the secondary question of the relationship between the programs that recruit and the programs that assess and select candidates for SF. It reflects months of analysis and consideration of several courses of action to address the chronic shortage of CMF18 personnel. As highlighted earlier in the analysis, the historical and projected CMF18 production rates will not man the force due to a steady attrition rate of approximately 10 percent. Currently, SF attrition rates are much greater than the production. This equation must change so that production is greater than attrition. For example, if SF begins with a population of 4000 and the SFAS and SFQC produce 430, the end state is a population of 4,430. However, when a steady 10 percent attrition (retirements, voluntary separation, etc.) is applied to the population, SF loses 443 soldiers (thirteen more than gained) (*SF Concept Plan to Increase CMF 18 Inventory* briefing, November 1999). Several factors called for a CMF 18 "get well plan." First, training requirements and recruitment goals continue to increase. As a reminder, a significant characteristic of the market is that the recruiting mission increases and the eligible pool of candidates is decreasing. Secondly, USAJFKSWCS's table of distribution and allowances (TDA) was reduced in FY 1998 and thereby significantly impacted the

SFAS and SFQC staff's ability to produce CMF 18. This is yet another factor, as detailed in the preceding analysis, that directly influences the phenomenon of recruiting despite recruiters' ability to send quality candidates to SFAS. And lastly, a plan to increase the CMF 18 is required because SF groups are currently using ODA personnel to augment, or fill, the company, battalion and SF group headquarters in an effort to support all the requirements.

Although the plan details three parts to the whole concept, emphasis on Part I, increasing the recruiting mission, led to additional information that was highlighted in chapter 4 and assisted the author in supporting recommendations that will be presented in this chapter. A recent innovative initiative that impacts the SORC is the recruitment of 150 Privates First Class (PFC). The recruitment of such placed another measurable criteria for success on the SORC. Emphasis need be directed to the fact that the FY00 recruiting mission was increased from 1,500 to 1,800. The approval of a pilot program to recruit 150 qualified E3s sets the recruiting mission to 1,950 soldiers. As programmed guidance, the PFC must meet the following criteria:

1. Army Research Institute (ARI) Biodata SF Delinquency (SFDEL) Score of less than 2. (Historically, personnel scoring 2 or above have an eighty percent plus likelihood of failure in SFAS.)
2. TABE grade level scores of Math, Reading, Vocabulary & Writing of 12.0 or better.
3. If airborne qualified, must have GT score of 112 or higher and APFT score of 228 or higher.

4. If nonairborne must have a GT score of 120 or higher and a APFT score of 245 or higher.

5. Must have minimum time in service of one year.

If the 150 PFCs make it through SFAS, they return to their unit until they are promoted to the rank of specialist (E4). Currently, PFCs who do not make it through SFAS get a certificate of attendance worth zero promotion points. If assessed and selected to continue training in the SFQC, they receive a certificate of graduation worth six points. Under SFAS redesign (part II of the concept), PFCs have the potential to receive a minimum of six points or a maximum of sixteen points towards promotion to E4 delineated in the following manner:

1. Certificate of Achievement for Patrolling (five points)
2. Certificate of Achievement for Land Navigation (five points)
3. Certificate of SFAS Completion (six points)

By regulation, the promotion points worksheet only allows for two certificates of achievement; therefore, if the candidate already has two prior to SFAS, then he would only receive the six-point minimum. When promoted to E4, the candidate would return to USAJFKSWCS and be sent PLDC and SFQC.

The *SF Concept Plan to Increase CMF 18 Inventory*, in its entirety, is enclosed in Appendix K. This strategic concept plan is required and designed to increase the SF personnel inventory and ultimately fill all fifty-four essential ODAs. This is necessary in order to prevent potential force structure reductions (i.e., the number of active SF groups). If SF, the SORC, SWCS and all associated agencies, cannot fill the currently authorized force structure, there exist a force that perhaps cannot accomplish the mission

profiles as directed by the National Command Authority. SF's "get well" plan to correct the current structural shortfalls reduces the risk of unit inactivations. SF Command, on behalf of the entire SF community, must assist SWCS, and indirectly SORC, "get well" and invest in the future now in order to ensure the maintenance of five active SF groups tomorrow.

Through primary study and research of the phenomenon of recruiting, a recurring theme has presented itself and assisted in making recommendations to benefit future research in the field and the SF force structure. The recurring theme is the premise of required coordination and mutually supportive relationships of several different agencies in order to reach productive conclusions that benefit the force. Productive relationships between all agencies have evolved in the past ten years. However, research indicates the level of coordination, and more specifically the level of communication, between those who research and design mechanisms to recruit effectively and those who execute said methodologies remains an area that must be closely considered when assessing their effectiveness for the future. Although these agencies attend annual recruiting conferences, the voice of the SORC goes unheard or perhaps unheeded at times in regards to setting realistic recruiting missions that reflect the recruitment of quality over quantity. It is believed that formal SORC representation in determining realistic recruiting missions is essential to the force development process. The theory stems from the study and research of recruiting, not as an exact science, but as a complex reality that is critically impacted by truths that reveal themselves as virtually uncontrollable and often unforeseeable intangible circumstances. The process of recruiting, the inclusion of all agencies and the complex assortment of influential internal and external factors,

depends on the teamwork of all parts working in unison toward a common goal. The education of all parties involved has in large part, been rewarded with success in the field of recruiting. As a recommendation, research and development of a mechanism to formally include and incorporate SORC (as the executors) into the formal force development process and the accession of new SF soldiers would certainly benefit the force in the needed timely manner. The exchange of ideas, information, research, on-the-job experiences, historical trends and analysis, success, and failures in the non-absolute field of recruiting as presented by all parties in such a formal setting would facilitate a deeper understanding and knowledge based realization of a means to an effective end.

This recommendation is made due to the fact that those charged with recruiting the force for the twenty-first century believe that there is a right answer or solution to recruiting the force of the future. Perhaps SORC has an angle or methodology gone unnoticed by other parties involved in the formal process that would highlight shortfalls as well enhancers to the science. Again, the exchange of valuable resources as stated in the last paragraph in a formal setting could only set the conditions for success in the future.

In March of 2000, the SORC was preparing to present the believed solution to effective recruiting for the twenty-first century. To highlight, the SORC commander presents knowledge-based recommendations to make SF recruiting more precise. He, in conjunction with other agencies involved in the process has identified the indicators and predictors of success in the SF training pipeline, and therefore proposes methods to target recruiting resources to a more precise market. In doing so, the reduction in the waste of said resources as provided by USASOC and USAREC are in order. Accomplishment of

the above would in turn increase the CMF 18 population to the program guidance (SORC commander, personal communication and *SORC Precision Recruiting Brief*, 15 March 2000).

As proposed by the SORC commander, use of a merit-quality point system warrants development and implementation. Such a merit-quality point recruiting system supports his theory, the theories as presented by ARI in the past (namely the article by Zazanis, Kilcullen, Sanders and Crocker titled *Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020*, *Special Warfare Magazine*, Vol. 12, No. 3) assists in prioritizing SF recruiting. Such a merit system would enhance the quality of the quantity SORC sends to SWCS to begin the road to SF. As proposed by the SORC commander (SORC commander, personal communication and *SORC Precision Recruiting Brief*, 15 March 2000), the best prioritization for SF recruiting is to:

1. Recruit by value to Special Forces.
2. Prioritize recruiting by a merit / quality point system.
3. Focus on high merit / quality point recruits.
4. Assign quality mission versus volume mission.

The SORC commander details the merit-quality point system in his proposal to recruit precisely and offers additional aspects to precision recruiting. The *SORC's Precision Special Forces Recruiting* brief is enclosed in appendix L.

In linking the study and research of recruiting to the awareness of the desired attributes SF is looking for, it is recommended that a mechanism to track these desired attributes be instituted in order to follow the progress of potential candidates from their first term enlistments. By leveraging technology and developing a database that

identifies candidates upon initial entry in the Army, the SORC could potentially identify a large population of desired recruits *prior* to them ever becoming available. As a value added feature to this database, psychological screening that is conducted in SFAS should be incorporated in the initial entry testing of all Army recruits, thereby indicating or denying potential for SF after the first term of enlistment. A similar attributes and psychological screening process should be implemented for officers upon graduation of West Point, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) programs in order to permit the SORC to identify potential officer candidates that become available after four years of service and selected for promotion to captain (O-3).

Final recommendations are based on the theory that SF recruiting depends on the teamwork of the entire SF community. This recommendation stems from many conversations with Colonel (retired) Roger Donlon, and the critical analysis as presented in the preceding chapter that supports the theory that teamwork is the key to overcoming any adversity or adversary. Success hinges on not only the teamwork of those as presented in the analysis, but also on teamwork resulting from the active participation of every SF qualified soldier and officer in the force. As quiet professionals, we all lead by example. The professionalism of the SF community sends a message to every potential candidate in the Army. The result of every SF qualified soldier and officer aggressively recruiting and leading one potential candidate to join SF would have an enormous impact on the future of the force. The force currently undergoes formal education processes to increase awareness of several Army and major command (MACOM) policies. One more to increase to the CMF 18 inventory could be implemented at little or no cost to the unit and with little effort on behalf of the individual. The education process of the active duty

SF soldiers and officers would be limited in its formalities and easily accomplished in its execution. The effort of every individual to educate one potential candidate on the opportunities for advanced training, real world missions, using more initiative, learning and speaking a foreign language while working with foreign nations, and simply getting more out of life in the Army would have a tremendous impact in building the force for the twenty-first century. Common misunderstandings, perceptions, attitudes, and cultural differences will inhibit the Special Forces' ability to recruit the future; however, the future is now, and educating the American society and the Army on the relevancy of Special Forces is the key to success. Do not bore potential candidates with monetary "bonuses," college tuition, or other things that the Army can do for them. Excite them, motivate them, and challenge them with opportunities and once-in-a-lifetime chances to make a difference in...literally, the world. After all, being the best and most powerful nation on earth, isn't that what being an American is all about? The history of the United States of America, the United States Army, and the Special Forces indicates so.

In conclusion, the author believes that there always exists an answer to every question, to every problem. Some questions and problems do not always present themselves as a challenge, but an opportunity. Study and research of the recruiting phenomenon has been an opportunity. A better knowledge and understanding of SF recruiting will undoubtedly benefit anyone who seeks to develop themselves as a professional of arms. There are several mentions of important areas of study and future research that could benefit the SF recruiting effort and the SF community as a whole. Although the analysis of the recruiting phenomenon presented relevant facts, findings, and recommendations, the author must remain committed to four basic truths. These


truths shall continue serve as a guide should any SF qualified soldier be requested to give the short answer on recruiting for the twenty-first century. The SOF Truths:

1. Humans are more important than hardware.
2. *Quality* is better than *quantity*.
3. SOF cannot be mass-produced.
4. SOF cannot be created after a crisis occurs.

The USSOCOM commanding general, General Peter J. Schoomaker provides the mission's intent in saying "They're simple, and we repeat them over and over, and we make it every commander's responsibility to make sure that his people understand them" (Cohen and Tichy, 1999, 4).

The commander's intent ultimately frees subordinates to seize the initiative when the situation does not support the task but allows the purpose to be achieved. The guidance is clear: recruit the *quality* of the SF soldiers demanded for the twenty-first century.

Special Mission Division – Organizational Diagram (1990)



Source: Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 4.

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6

Authorized Strength, Mission, SFQC Training Seats for CMF 18

	FY91	FY92	FY93
Authorized Strength	4110	4393	4583
USAREC Recruiting Mission	2035	2264 (1966)	2532 (2089)
Authorized SFQC Seats	1138	878	933
Mission / SMDR ratio	1.78	1.99	2.71

Source: PERSCOM DCSPLANS, February 1992

Source: Herd and Teplitzky 1992, 11

Figure 7

***Special Operations Proponency Office
FY 96 Cohort Study***

FROM SFAS RECRUITS TO SFQC GRADUATES: SUCCESS RATES For SFAS FY96 ACTIVE DUTY RECRUITS						
	Start SFAS	Selected SFAS	Attend SFQC	Graduate SFQC	Still In SFQC	SFAS-SFQC Grad Rate
Officers	257	175	164	121	1	47% = (121/256*)
Enlisted	1,274	478	439	339	9	27% = (339/1,265*)

The statistics above follow the SFAS FY96 active duty recruits as a group to their final SFQC outcome. The data source is Army Training Requirements & Resources System (ATRRS) Student Training Reservation Roster (RSROST) report, for the specified group, dated 2 JUL 99.

*Soldiers still in training were subtracted from the Start SFAS number before the Grad Rate was calculated.

Source: LTC Dan Adelstein, personal communication, Jan 2000

Figure 8A


Special Operations Proponency Office
FY 96 Cohort Study

COMPARISON OF SFQC ATTRITION RATES		
NOTE: THIS ATTRITION IS <u>ONLY FOR THE SFQC PORTION OF THE PIPELINE.</u>		
	Officers (18A)	Enlisted (18B, 18C, 18D, 18E)
SFAS FY96 Grads	26%	21%
Final SFQC Outcomes In FY97-FY98	38%	24%
ARI FY92-FY93	---	27%

Source: LTC Dan Adelstein, personal communication, January 2000

Figure 8B

**Special Operations Proponency Office
FY 96 Cohort Study**



Source: LTC Dan Adelstein, personal communication, January 2000

Figure 8C




Figure 9




Figure 10

Special Operations Recruiting Company Postcard



Figure 12A

*Special Operations Recruiting Company Postcard
(reverse side)*




Figure 12B

APPENDIX A

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CHRONOLOGY

27 Nov 90 - USASOC realigns its forces by function instead of component. 1st SOCOM and USAR SOC redesignated as U.S. Army Special Forces Command and U. S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command respectively.

29 Jun 90 - 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) activated at Fort Bragg, N.C.

16 May 90 - 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) formally activated at Fort Campbell. KY.

1 Dec 89 - U.S. Army Special Operations Command activated as the 16th major Army Command.

10 Jun 88 - HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) moved from Ft. Bragg, N.C. to Ft. Campbell, KY.

9 Apr 87 - Special Forces branch established for officers.

16 Oct 86 - Task Force 160 redesignated the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (Airborne)

17 Sep 86 - 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) formally activated at Fort Bragg, N.C.

15 Aug 86 - A battalion of 5th SF Group moved from Bragg to Fort Campbell, KY.

2 Jun 86 - 528th Support Battalion (Airborne) activated as the 13th Support Battalion at Fort Bragg.

16 Jan 85 - Task Force 160 transferred from 101st Airborne Division to 1st SOCOM.

19 Oct 84 - 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group activated at Torii Station Japan.

3 Oct 84 - 3rd Battalion, and Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 75th Ranger Regiment activated at Fort Benning, Ga.

1 Oct 84 - Special Forces established as a separate Army Career Field for enlisted soldiers (CMF 18).

18 Apr 84 - 1st SOCOM Augmentation Detachment activated to streamline peacetime command and control of USAR SOF units. Fort Lewis, Wash.

1 Oct 83 - 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) activated.

21 Jul 83 - U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance renamed U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

1 Oct 82 - 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) provisionally activated at Fort Bragg.

Dec 74 - 96th Civil Affairs Battalion constituted at Fort Bragg from assets of 95th Civil Affairs Group deactivated at Fort Lee, Va.

1 Oct 74 - 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment activated at Fort Lewis, Wash.

1 Jul 74 - 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment moves to Fort Stewart (Hunter Army Airfield), GA.

28 Jan 74 - 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment activated at Fort Benning, Ga.

15 Sep 71 - U. S. Army Civil Affairs School assigned to U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance and moves to Fort Bragg from Fort Gordon, Ga.

10 Jan 69 - U.S. Army Special Warfare School becomes the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance.

7 Nov 67 - Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 4th Psychological Operations Group constituted into the Regular Army.

1 Dec 67 - 4th Psychological Operations Group organized in Vietnam from elements of the 6th PSYOPS Battalion.

21 Sep 61- 5th Special Forces Group activated at Fort Bragg, N.C.

10 Dec 56 - U. S. Army Psychological Warfare Center renamed the U.S. Army Special Warfare School.

19 Jun 52 - 10th Special Forces Group founded at Fort Bragg, N.C. by Col. Aaron Bank.

10 Apr 52 - U. S. Army Psychological Warfare Center established at Fort Bragg, N. C.

26 Aug 45 - 96th Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, Military Government Group activated.

9 Jul 42 - 1st Special Service Force, a joint Canadian-American venture, formed at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana

APPENDIX B

THE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Question: Describe the 5 phases of the force development process and explain how each enables the Army to adapt its future force structure to address political and technological change.

The force development process is the foundation of the Life Cycle Model and gives purpose to all other functions. The development or production of combat-ready units starts here. If the Army is to fight and win wars on the modern battlefield, the force structure of the future must be carefully tailored to do so. Simply, today's modern battlefield is a battlefield of the past tomorrow. Tomorrow's battlefield requires defining the military capabilities of future combat-ready units, and translating ideas into tangibles based on a merger of doctrine, technologies, materiel, and manpower with limited resources.

Force development is a 5-phase process that can be looked at as a series of 'in' and 'out' boxes. Within each phase, key players are required to satisfy a requirement for approval in order to forward the product to the next phase's in-box. For the purpose of clarity, key players are referred to as the "whom." The in-box is the required input within each phase of the process. The out-box is the result of their effort, the product, that will be forwarded for approval. Upon approval, the product goes to the in-box of the next phase.

Phase I is the requirements determination process. The RDP begins with a vision and ends with requirements leading to solutions. These requirements are identified through TRADOC's refocused Requirements Determination Process. Under consideration are the constraints of the current force and evolving capabilities (for the future force) from the research, development, and acquisition process. A question frequently asked is, "Does doctrine drive technology or does technology drive doctrine?" The RDP answers, "yes" to both. RDP identifies and prioritizes the Army's warfighting requirements for doctrine (DLMP), training (SAT/TRAS), leader development (SAT/TRAS), organization (FDU), materiel (LCSMM), and soldiers (DTLOMS). Phase I emphasizes science and technology focused on the soldier.

Who: CINCs (top down, bottom up communication), MACOMs, Combat Developers; Battle Labs (warfighting experimentation), schools (creative / forward thinkers) and ICTs/ICPs (multi-disciplined, empowered group that develops a concept or determines capabilities / requirements).

In-box: Current Force Structure

Out-box: Required Capabilities. CG TRADOC vision, warfighting concepts, future operational capabilities and DTLOMS' requirements (mission need statements, unit reference sheet) translated into DTLOM solution sets.

Approval: TRADOC

Phase II is the means to design organizational models. As a reference, these models begin as branch or functional concepts. It gives a view of how we want to look in the future. The phase two in-box holds the DTLOMS' requirements (mission need statements, unit reference sheet mainly) that define the appropriate doctrine, training, organization, and equipment to employ a capability, the solution sets. This organizational model may not be a new concept, but simply an improved model of an old concept or design. TRADOC proponents develop new designs or correct deficiencies of old designs by developing the organizational issues, concepts, and unit reference sheets. A few years ago, GEN Hertzog, the TRADOC CG visited Fort Bragg to get a first hand look at a weapons system upgrade that he and his staff had worked. The upgrade impacted a Special Forces team's capabilities, limitations, and training strategy. He wanted input from the schoolhouse (JFK Special Warfare Center and School) on recent organizational concepts and issues.

Who: Force Design Directorate (manages the force design update process), PERSCOM, Materiel Developers, Combat Developers, Schools/Proponents, MACOMs

In-box: DTLOMS, Required Capabilities

Out-box: URS that highlights minimum requirements.

Approval: TRADOC

Phase III is the development of the organizational models. This is when the rules, standards, and guidance from USAFMSA and other MACOMs are applied to the doctrinally correct design. The design produces a model, a requirements document and the definition of an un-resourced TOE (in the form of an fully mission capable organization). This TOE is considered a 'living' TOE because it changes over time. The living TOE is referred to as the Incremental TOE system. Components of the system are visualized by considering a process of change as the model evolves from its least modernized form (Base TOE) to its height of potential, the Objective TOE. A tool used for planning the development of a model is the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). To highlight, this document lists 100 percent of the wartime requirements (materiel requirements) for a TOE and TDA in which a new or improved (corrected) item will be required. Normally, the URS placed in the phase III in-box portrays the organization in its most modernized version (the objective design). The most modernized system better portrays the enhanced capabilities or increase productivity with fewer personnel.

The bottom line for the completion of Phase III is identification of the bill. The key players essentially call "check, please." The bill for the organizational model includes the gratuity as well. All associated costs and expenditures are identified for approval.

Who: U.S. Army Force Support Management Agency (USAFMSA), USASOC, MEDCOM, and INSCOM

In-box: URS, BOIPFD/QQPRI, AR 611, SB 700-20, AR 570-2, AR 71-13, BOIP existing, and OPFAC

Out-box: Organizational requirements (TOE). This is a draft TOE. It is the requirement, not the authorization.

Approval: Department of the Army

Phase IV of the Force development process is the determination of organizational authorizations. Phase IV is literally, and figuratively, the “show me the money phase.” It determines and, if required verifies that the organizational model is affordable, supportable, and executable. Phase IV is when the organizational model is resourced. It competes in the ‘Special Olympics’ of the Total Army Analysis Games (new acronym for review: TAAG). The model must prove that it is worthy of funds by its capability to support the NMS as articulated in the Defense Planning Guidance. The Organizational integration team is assigned the task of the forwarding funded recommended authorized quantities. The OI team includes representatives who know the doctrine, design, structure, personnel, acquisition, equipping, resources, facilities, information management, and training activities that will impact a unit. They represent the interests of functionally similar, organizations and manage fielding and sustainment as integrated packages. The OI team takes the organizational requirements from the in-box and turns them into recommended authorized quantities.

Who: OI Team

In-box: Organizational requirements (TOE), TAA, FMIDB, TAEDP, TAV, PBG/MDEP, MACOMs

Out-box: Recommended authorized quantities


Approval: Department of the Army

Phase V, Documentation of the Organizational Authorizations, is the final phase of force development process. It reviews, approves and documents the quantities authorized. The emphasis of study, review and analysis through a scientific and technological means while focusing on the soldier comes to fruition. The recommended authorized quantities, recommendations to resource, organizational assessments, alternatives, and CINC integrated priority lists are accounted for in the in-box. The SAMAS records, maintains, and distributes the force structure data. The Army Master Force is the authoritative record of the HQDA automated force file. It is maintained by UIC codes at battalion level. The M-Force records the total force over time and contains the priority for mobilization and resources. The automated information system that develops and documents organizational personnel and equipment authorizations to accomplish a doctrinal mission is the Army Authorization Documents System-Redesigned (TAADS-R). The TOE that was the requirement becomes the authorization in the form of UIC specific documents, the MTOE.

Who: ADCSOPS-FD and USAFMSA

In-box: recommended authorized quantities, recommendation to resource, organizational assessments, alternatives, and CINC IPLs.

Out-box: UIC specific Authorization Document (MTOE/ TDA) and Master Force.



Source: CGSC, C400, Resource Planning and Management, Lesson 4, 1999.

APPENDIX C

TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS

Question: Explain the processes used in each TAA phase and stage, and how TAA links the PPBES planning and programming phases.

Total Army Analysis (TAA) is process that equates to looking in a crystal ball. It allows the Army to look at the force structure of the past and affords the ability to project the Army of the future. As the means of execution in the fourth phase of the Force Development process, TAA is the resource driven process that is used to develop a force structure to support joint, strategic, and operational planning as well as Army planning, programming, and budgeting.

The purpose of TAA is to define the required support forces- combat, CS, and CSS at echelons above division (EAD) and at echelons above corps (EAC). The aforementioned forces are “generating forces” necessary to support and sustain the specified divisions and nondivisional combat forces, the “operating forces”. Generating forces represent the TAA process as EAD/EAD (tactical support forces) and TDA units (general support forces). Operating forces are units that satisfy directives as outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance. The units include divisions, Special Forces groups, and separate brigades.

TAA is a force structuring process, and primarily, all components of the MTOE and TDA. It is a biennial event accomplished in a two phased force development process. Phase I is the requirements determination consisting of two separate actions. The first stage is force guidance and the second stage is a quantitative analysis. The DPG and TAP provide the NMS objectives, threat data, and resource assumptions and priorities that translate force guidance. The IPS provides DOD-directed scenarios called major theaters of war (MTWs) and small-scale contingencies (SSCs). DPGs/IPSs also specify the quantity and type of combat forces [divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments (ACRs), ranger battalions, and Special Forces (SF) groups for employment in each scenario. Quantitative Analysis is when the Concepts Analysis Agency takes the operating forces identified in the NMS scenarios for employment in the DPG scenarios and determines the generating force structure. Through computer modeling, CAA develops the EAD/EAC, Combat/CS/CSS forces required to support the deployed operating division and nondivisional force, given the SAG-approved assumptions and guidance. The CAA completes TAA modeling through a series of analytical efforts and associated computer simulations. In summary, Phase I is the validation and determination of requirements for MTOE and TDA organizations. Stages I and II of the first phase are objective based resolutions submitted for approval by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

Phase II is of the TAA process is the resource determination. This is where I have witnessed general officers all but scream “show me the money.” The senior leadership holds emotional, heavily debated, highly argumentative ‘negotiations’ in which the results of the meeting, or qualitative analysis (Stage I), impact on every aspect of the Army. The intent is to ensure that the best possible warfighting force structure is

developed. The process entails matching the process, a resourcing conference, and review of the force feasibility. The qualitative analysis is conducted to develop the initial POM force, within end strength guidance, to use in developing the POM. Stage II is the Leadership review. The force program review process initiates the leadership review after the resourcing conference general officer steering committee meets to resolve any contentious or outstanding issues. The VCSA chairs the FPR that resolves any issues forwarded from the resourcing conference forums. He reviews and approves the force that the CSA will present to the Secretary of the Army. The resulting TAA base force represents the force structure for POM development, capturing all components (Active, Reserve, host nation) and TDA requirements through the end of the POM years (M-Force). The POM force meets the projected mission requirements within anticipated ES and equipment levels. The final output should result in an executable POM force. The Army forwards the POM force to OSD with a recommendation for approval. Phase II of the TAA process differs greatly from the initial phase in that it is subjective and qualitative as opposed to objective in nature.

Upon completion, the TAA's principal products are: the Army's total warfighting requirements, the defined, required support forces (EAD/EAC), and the initial POM force.

The Defense Planning Guidance, as applied to the TAA process links the PPBES planning and programming phases. It considers and is influenced by the National Military Strategy, the Joint Planning Document, and the Chairman's Program Recommendations. The Secretary of Defense issues statements of policy, strategy, forces, resources, and fiscal guidance for the as a basis for the POM. Upon conclusion of the Defense Review Boards, the SECDEF (deputy) makes the final decisions and translates decisions to the services through PDMs. PDMs approve, or direct fixes with specific changes, the service POMs.

APPENDIX D

SF IN-SERVICE RECRUITING TEAMS ADVERTISING, CIRCA 1990



COME FACE TO FACE WITH THE CHALLENGE.

Ready to go anytime, anywhere. From frozen wastelands to tropical jungles, a Special Forces soldier knows what it takes to survive. And succeed.

To become a Special Forces soldier, you've got to be in the best physical and mental shape of your life. And then, we'll make you better.

You've got to make it through the most demanding, most intensive, most challenging training the Army can offer. You'll receive expert training in communica-

medicine, or weapons.

And when you've earned the right to wear the Special Forces Tab, you'll know you're not just a good soldier—you're one of the best.

If you think you've got the courage, the dedication, and the determination to make it in the Special Forces, call the Special Forces Recruiting Team at (919) 432-1818, or AUTOVON 239-1818.

We guarantee you a challenge that's beyond compare.

**ARMY SPECIAL FORCES.
BE ALL YOU CAN BE.**

SPECIAL FORCES BRIEFINGS

BRIEFINGS HELD EVERY WEDNESDAY

BUILDING D-3404 (NEXT MOON HALL)

1000 & 1400 & 1800 HOURS

E-4 THRU E-6 GT 110 AND ABOVE

PT & SWIM TEST EVERY THURSDAY 0800 HRS
TOWLE STADIUM BDU'S & RUNNING SHOES (PT)

BDU'S AND BOOTS (SWM) RAIN OR SHINE!!

CALL 919-432-1818 FOR MORE INFORMATION



WANTED



SPECIAL FORCES



VOLUNTEERS

What it takes to try for a "Green Beret"

- ☐ Must be male soldiers of rank specialist or sergeant first class.
- ☐ Must be high school graduate or have a GED.
- ☐ Must have a GT score of 110 or higher.
- ☐ Must be airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training.
- ☐ Must not be prior airborne or Special Forces voluntary trainee.
- ☐ Must be able to swim 50 meters wearing boots and fatigues.
- ☐ Must score a minimum of 206 points on the Army PT test with no less than 60 points on any event scored for age group 17-22.
- ☐ Must be able to meet medical fitness standards as outlined in AR 40-301, Special Forces Physical.
- ☐ Must not be under suspension of favorable personnel action.
- ☐ Must not have 30 days or more lost time under Title 10 USC 972 within current or preceding enlistment.
- ☐ Must not have been convicted by court-martial during current term of service.
- ☐ Must not be barred to re-enlistment.




BRIEFING

Special Forces

A recruiting team from the U.S. Army Forces, Fort Benning, Ga., will be recruiting Monday and Tuesday. Briefings will be at 10 a.m., 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. in Sanford Hall, ci 6. The briefing is open to all soldiers in Special Forces training. For more info contact Sgt. 1st Class Mark Robbins at 2

SPECIAL FORCES



Recruiters Take On a Special Mission

As the Army gets smaller in the 1990s, the need for "unconventional" soldiers—including Special Forces—is increasing. USAREC's mission reflects this. In FY 88, USAREC filled 1,346 Special Forces positions. The projected mission for FY 93 is 2,535. To help fill this increasing need, USAREC has re-energized Special Forces recruiting.

USAREC approved an expanded and decentralized Special Forces recruiting team in January 1990. With the new team, the number of Special Forces recruiters has more than doubled. Twenty-two recruiters hit the ground running June 1. Their recruiting offices are located at Fort Bragg, N.C.; Fort Lewis, Wash.; Fort Campbell, Ky.; Fort Benning, Ga.; and in Europe and Korea. Their leadership team is located at Headquarters, USAREC, currently at Fort Shandon, Ill.

"We felt recruiting would be more successful if recruiters were closer to soldiers who have a propensity to apply for Special Forces," said MAJ Kurt Peppel, Special Missions. The Special Forces units stationed at Forts Bragg, Lewis, Campbell and Benning should serve as "free advertising. Their presence alone should spark interest in the specialty," Peppel said.

Until now, Special Forces recruiters and their leadership team were located at Fort Bragg. Fort Bragg was a good main station because of its high concentration of Airborne soldiers and the home of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Special Forces recruiters and their leadership team worked from a central office and traveled to reach interested CONUS and overseas soldiers.

"We're going to do better overseas because we'll have Special Forces recruiters there all the time," Peppel said. In the past, overseas soldiers may have found it difficult to even contact Special Forces recruiters in the United States.

August 1990

7

The European team is composed of one station commander, three recruiters and one operations NCO stationed in Heidelberg, Germany. At Camp Cozier, Korea, the team has a station commander, a recruiter and an operations NCO.

Setting up a Special Forces recruiting office on a military installation was not an easy task for SFC Loren Simpson, station commander at Fort Campbell. But, with unfailing dedication, he took a "shack" and turned it into a "high-speed, fully functional recruiting station."

Simpson started working on the Special Forces station before June. While still a nurse recruiter in Nashville, Tenn., he spent his off hours remodeling the office, installing telephones and computers, getting mail routed, and locating furniture and office supplies. With more hard work after their opening, Simpson's station made their first mission in June.

The Special Forces recruiting mission is specific. Special Forces recruiters don't have individual missions. Instead, Special Forces recruiting stations have a mission of soldiers to be scheduled for the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Course. The SFAS is a prerequisite for the Special Forces Qualification Course.

According to Peppel, the 20 Special Forces recruiters were "carefully chosen" from a pool of about 80 applicants. "They're very qualified, highly motivated and professional recruiters."



SFC Charles Ginn at the new Special Forces Recruiting Station at Fort Campbell (Photo by SFC Loren Simpson)

Special Forces Recruiting Stations

Fort Bragg: SFC Lawrence Roush, Station Commander
Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-SP-R, Fort Bragg, NC 28307
AUTOVON 239-1818; Commercial 919-432-1818; FAX 919-432-1637

Fort Campbell: SFC Loren Simpson, Station Commander
Commander, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), ATTN: USARCRO-SM-SF-FC
Fort Campbell, KY 42223-5000
AUTOVON 635-9818; Commercial 502-439-4390; FAX 502-439-4392

Fort Lewis: SFC Eric McGrath, Station Commander
SFC McGrath, P.O. Box 33903 Fort Lewis, WA 98433-0903
Commercial 206-964-1001; FAX 206-964-1017

Fort Benning: SFC William Shiflett, Station Commander
Commander, USAIS ATTN: USARCRO-SMR Fort Benning, GA 31905-3483
Commercial 404-685-0977; FAX 404-682-0182

Korea: SFC Harry Harrell, Station Commander
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 8th Personnel Command
ATTN: Special Forces Recruiting Team, APO SF 96301-0089
011822 7914 5045/5047; In-country 724-5045/5047; FAX 724-6730

Europe: SFC David Prince, Station Commander
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel, APO NY 09403
AUTOVON 370-8890/8188; Commercial 011 49 6221 13188; FAX 011 49 6221 390838

Recruiter Jo

Peppel said. "They're self-starters who are able to operate autonomously."

The all-around professional soldiers chosen to be Special Forces recruiters have proven track records in recruiting and have achieved their gold badge, at minimum. Most have achieved their recruiter ring or are close.

"I wanted to help soldiers better themselves," Simpson said. "I saw Special Forces recruiting as the perfect opportunity to do this. We're dealing with high-quality soldiers who really want to make something out of themselves."

'A great challenge with great benefits'

Special Forces recruiters are offering a great challenge with great benefits," said MAJ Gary Koenig, chief, Special Missions. It's not only the personal challenge that makes Special Forces so attractive—it's the opportunities for career progression as well as high pay. "The opportunities for promotion in Special Forces are outstanding, especially for younger soldiers," Koenig said.

Although the specialty is attractive, Special Forces recruiters still have a tough job. The standards for Special Forces are high and the number of soldiers actually qualified is low. Out of the enlisted master file of 680,500 soldiers, only 187,000 are eligible for Special Forces. Added to that, many other factors make Special Forces recruiting a challenge. "It's a small market that carries high standards with it," Koenig said.

In addition to meeting the criteria, "Some younger soldiers may also have the misconception that all Special Forces soldiers are very experienced, high-ranking NCOs," Koenig said. "That's not the case anymore. It's a younger troop going to Special Forces."

Only a select few of the soldiers who attend SFAS will pass. One year ago graduation rates hovered around 30 percent although within the past six months rates averaged 50 percent.

According to Koenig, the most important factor determining their success is preparation. "SFAS requires a great amount of physical, mental and emotional stamina," he said. "Physical preparation is critical before and during Special Forces training. Special Forces recruiters will have to keep this in mind and give proper encouragement and information at their stations."

Initially, it was the physical challenge that attracted Simpson to Special Forces recruiting, along with the opportunity for career progression. He and another recruiter at Fort Campbell, SFC Charles Glen, have put a lot of emphasis on "looking the (Special Forces) part." "We conduct swimming and PT tests twice a week and, most of the time, we just do it right along with the soldiers," Simpson said. "In Special Forces recruiting, there's a lot of emphasis on a recruiter's physical fitness. We're across the street from the 5th Special Forces Group. If we're not up to their standards, someone's going to notice."

"I saw Special Forces recruiting as the 'elite' of recruiting," Simpson said. "It's the opportunity and challenge of a lifetime." Everything considered, Special Forces recruiting could just be the best of both worlds.

August 1990

What it takes to try for a "Green Beret"

- ☐ Must be male soldiers of rank specialist to sergeant first class.
- ☐ Must be high school graduate or have a GED.
- ☐ Must have a GT score of 110 or higher.
- ☐ Must be airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training.
- ☐ Must not be within 120 days of reporting to a new assignment or attending a school that will ultimately require a PCS at point of application approval.
- ☐ Must not be prior airborne or Special Forces voluntary terminée.
- ☐ Must be able to swim 50 meters wearing boots and fatigues.
- ☐ Must score a minimum of 206 points on the Army PT test with no less than 60 points on any event scored for age group 17-22.
- ☐ Must be able to meet medical fitness standards as outlined in AR 40-501, Special Forces Physical.
- ☐ Must not be under suspension of favorable personnel action.
- ☐ Must not have 30 days or more lost time under Title 10 USC 972 within current or preceding enlistment.
- ☐ Must not have been convicted by court-martial during current term of service.
- ☐ Must not be barred to re-enlistment.

Christine Parker, Assistant Editor

8

Source: Herd and Teplitzky 1992, D-2 thru D-6.

APPENDIX E

SF IN-SERVICE RECRUITING TEAM AUTOMATION CAPABILITIES, CIRCA 1990

ATSU-SF-R

SUBJECT: OFFICE AUTOMATION CAPABILITIES

GENERAL. The Special Forces Office Automation system has evolved from 3 years of automation evolution, market expansion, and SF Rct organizational growth. This automation has taken conversion data from 1.17 to 1.08 and taken the processing time for packet completion from 5 months to 74 days to 21 days. The main system located at Ft Bragg with over 350 programs to process applications and render needed reports.

APPLICATION PROCESSING CAPABILITIES.

System will QC all records in the processing data base to determine if packet is ready for classing and give Rct a print-out to cross check against packets.

If Station commander marks record for classing program will class soldier, copy all records for that weeks loading onto 2 floppy disks one for forwarding to Ft Bragg and one to HQ USAREC also program will Give two printouts of which packets are being forwarded and automatically enter the date that the packets are forwarded. It will store information by date shipped to HQ in an index for automatic recall of a list of all packets forwarded by date shipped when required.

Program will give station a weekly call in roster of soldier's pending an upcoming SFAS Class which will include all necessary Home and Duty Phone numbers, when application was received, the last time (by date) the soldier checked in with the office, and additional remarks section for additional data on the soldier.

Program gives a weekly Status report of each SFAS class and gives Mission/Accomplishment. PT & Swim info and percentages that the SF Rct are Swim and PT Testing. Each station inserts class that they are working, and the mission for the class, for the Headquarters element they are required to enter the Total Mission of the entire team, the program will then prompt them to enter the missions of each of the SF Rct Team substations. It will give the above information for each of the stations and total mission accomplishments for team.

Each station can query the computer for its Cumulative Counts and Stats. or its stats for the a given FY. This program will give a complete breakdown of all information in the Station database it tracks all records from application received to the time the soldier shows at Ft Bragg and goes through the SFAS

course to how the soldiers from that station have done in the course. It gives total numbers, percentages, and conversion data based on the team's mission. The headquarters element has the capability to get counts from each station individually or a combination of how the entire SF Recruiting element has done. Again these counts can be cumulative or by FY.

Each station can also get the above mentioned information by a specific post, by MOS's and Rank and by Recruiter. This is good information to have when visiting Post VIP's and conducting a target analysis of a particular post prior to a recruiting visit.

System will give each station a list of all Physicals and Applications which are over a year old, which will outdate themselves in the next 30, 60 and 90 days.

The Station can call up a list by date forwarded of all applications and waivers forwarded to HQ and to Ft Bragg, this list will be by the date the packet was forwarded, the computer assigns this data automatically when weekly packet to HQ program is run.

System will automatically back itself up and copy current processing data into a subdirectory named FAILSAFE and into a separate database called FAILSAFE.DBF

After SFAS system will update each station's database with information on how each of the soldier's from their station did in SFAS the stations will receive 2 Floppy disks from the Ft Bragg Station one that is received from the SFAS Committee which when inserted into floppy drive and SFAS Cleanup program is run it compares the Social Security Numbers of the Soldiers in both databases if they match it will then update the Station data with exactly how the soldier did in SFAS this information will come out on a final report and can be viewed individually with the TOTAL Screen. A second disk is sent to each station from the SFQC Class coordinator who is co-located with the Ft Bragg SF Rct this disk is also inserted and it will update all Station records with the SFQC Classing information for the soldiers.

The Stations also have the capability to run hard copy rosters of all packets in office. These Rosters are broken down according to the major ACTIVITY that the packet is in. These being a CLASS ROSTER, PROCESSING ROSTER, DISQUALIFIED ROSTER, A NO SHOW ROSTER, A GATED ROSTER (Soldiers who showed up for SFAS but did not get selected), A APATHETIC SOLDIER ROSTER (Soldiers' who lost interest in the program after they were classed and put on orders), A TERMINATED ROSTER (Packets Terminated by the SF Rct) and a LOST INTEREST ROSTER (Soldiers who lose interest while processing their packet)

Program will give Station Commander a printout of all packets that will require a WAIVER of any type who have not had a waiver letter done on them yet.

Program will also give Station Commander a Printout of all outstanding waivers (forwarded to Ft Bragg) that have not been classed yet.

Program Prints Waiver Request Letters for packets. Recruiter simply inserts type waiver, and soldiers' reason for waiver request.

Program will also type Readmission Requests along the same lines as a waiver request.

Programs Assist Recruiters in preparation for SF Team visits by printing the Station a Hitlist by Post of all of the soldiers still processing for SFAS but still missing documents. Program also gives recruiters a list of all soldiers who are Pending SFAS from that Post, along with a list of all soldiers how have completed SFAS and are waiting for the Special Forces Qualification Course (For referrals and assistance).

Program will loop into the LEADS DATABASE and print Labels for a mass mailout to the post recruiter enters the Zipcode of the Post and Labels are printed in Unit (UIC) order. This program can also compare both the Leads database and the Station database and delete records from the Leads database that the station has a record on so we do not send these soldiers letters saying they have been ID'ed by Percom and having what it takes to be SF etc.

Program has capability to mark each soldier that has attended a briefing with a "B" which will print a -> B <- in the bottom left hand corner of each label that prints out in the above mentioned program. This program requires the recruiter to maintain on a computer disk of database of all soldiers that attended briefing who were qualified and did not start an application (only information needed is Last Name and SSN) program functions much the same as the above mentioned and compares SSN's of both databases and places a "B" in the LTR field of the LEADS DATABASE. With this program a second type of post visit letter can be generated that states the soldier attended an SF briefing but did not start an application and we want to find out why or set up a personnel interview etc.

LETTER CAPABILITY

GENERAL: Each SF Recruiting Station has a wide variety of Letters which it can use, from notifying the soldier's chain of command to asking the soldier to try again in his quest towards becoming a Green Beret. A description of what type and where entries are needed can be found in the Letter SDF and description letter

attached to this document. Each letter is described below.
Applications Received Ltr: Letter sent to the soldier the day after his application is entered into the Station Computer. This letter tells him what SFAS Class he is shooting for, gives him a list of what documentation his application is missing and gives him a suspense date of 30 days from the date of the letter to send the rest of his documentation.

Application Received Ltr to Soldier's ISG: This letter is printed the day after the soldier's application is typed into the computer and gives the EM's ISG as early notification as possible that his soldier has applied for SFAS and gives him the class that his application is being processed for. It also gives him the same list of missing documents are still needed by the SF Rct office.

Packet Still Incomplete: Letter sent to Soldier telling him that his packet is still being processed for this SFAS class, but his application is still incomplete and gives him a list of documents that he is missing. This program is very useful in the event his physical is incomplete or more information is required. It scans his records and inserts in the letter what information is needed.

Waiver Forwarded Ltr to Soldier: This letter is sent to the soldier to keep him abreast of the status of his packet. It tells him the day his application was forwarded Fort Bragg.

Classed Ltr: Letter to the soldier telling him he has been classed for SFAS it gives him his class date and special instructions ie. Bring Medical records. Hand carry one uniform with you start calling the SF Rct Office once a week until his class date.

Classed Ltr to Soldier's ISG: Letter to the soldier's first sergeant that tells him that his soldier is classed and gives the class date. It asks for his assistance in help the soldier prepare the the course and gives him a copy of the PT program. It also asks him to give him the Swim and PT Test prior to letting the soldier depart TDY to his SFAS Class.

PRICK THE MARKET LETTERS:

Program will also scan records for the station commander to send a series of (Prick the Market Letters) which motivate the soldier to get complete his application and get in shape for the course these letters are outlined in the team SOP and below. This program forces the Station Commander or the Opns NCO to look at each record before the enter a letter to send the below mentioned letters.

Letter 1: First letter sent to soldier that serves to motivate him to complete his packet. This is a personal letter to the soldier from the station commander that states "I am processing your application for this SFAS Class and I want to make sure you

receive your orders in a timely manner, in order to do this I need the following items...etc.

Letter 2: Second letter sent to the soldier to further push him into completing his application it prompts the sender to enter the SFAS Class that he missed and the Class he is now shooting for.

Letter 3: Third letter in brick the market series. Again tries to motivate the soldier to complete his application. It includes a statement to the effect that "I believe in working with the soldier and want to know why he hasn't completed his application etc.

Termination Letter: A Termination of you application letter that tell the soldier when his application was received and how many days he has had to complete his application. He has demonstrated apathy and that is not the type of soldier we are looking for. It gives him 30 days from the date of the letter to contact the SF Recruiting office or his application will be terminated with no further notice.

GENERAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

CHECK THE STATUS OF PACKET, EDIT A PACKET OR ADD RECORDS

This program first shows the user a list of different screens to choose from the stores his selection to a memory variable. Then it gives the the Rct the option to Check or Edit records by Name, Social Security Number or Record Number. If Rct decides to add a record to the data base it will update all indexes.




SOP FOR PROGRAM LETTERS FOR SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITING

1. PURPOSE: The SF Rct office utilizes various letters sent to potential SF Applicants to "Prick the Market" inspire the soldiers to complete there SF applications.

PROGRAM NAME	COMMAND USED	PURPOSE OF LTR	WHERE TO MAKE ENTRIES
Received	Do Received	To inform the soldier that his packet has been received and give him a target date for SFAS Ctrs. Also gives list of what he is missing.	Type a "1" under EM field
App_rec2	Do App_rec2	To inform the soldier 1SG that we have an application on his soldier, & what he is missing & the class he is processing for.	Type a "1" under 1SG field
Still	Do Still	A follow-up ltr to soldier that his packet is still incomplete & give him a list of missing document	Type a "2" in ltr/date field
Missing	Do Missing	A ltr to soldier that his packet is being held in suspense until rest of documents are in	Type a "y" in ltr/date
Callme	Do Callme	To inform soldier of his classing & tell him to call SF Rct once a week.	Type a "2" under EM field
1SGLTR	Do 1SGLTR	To inform 1SG of his soldiers classing for SFAS	Type a "2" under 1SG field
Letter_1	Do Letter_1	To spark interest & motivate soldier to complete application	Type a "1" under LETTER field
Letter_2	Do Letter_2	A follow-up on letter_1 gives second chance to soldier to complete his application	Type a "2" under LETTER field
Letter_3	Do Letter_3	Third letter in series for mid 90 day to 6 month old packets & follow-up from letter_1 & 2	Type a "3" under LETTER field
Term_ltr	Do Term_ltr	Final letter sent to soldier who has not completed his application within a year	Type a "4" under LETTER field

APPENDIX F

SF RECRUITERS' TYPICAL CORRESPONDENCE CIRCA 1991

	<p>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000</p>	
<p>REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:</p>		
<p>RCRO-SMR</p>		
<p>2 AUGUST 1991</p>		
<p>Congratulations, you have been identified by PERSCOM as meeting the initial qualifications to become a member of the United States Army's Special Forces. We would like to meet with you and discuss this opportunity during our upcoming visit to EGLIN.</p>		
<p>Briefing will be conducted at the following locations:</p>		
<p>LOCATION: CLASS ROOM 1 DATE: 22 AUGUST 91 TIME: 1300 HRS</p>		
<p>PERSONNEL THAT ARE TRULY INTERESTED SHOULD BRING A CURRENT COPY OF THEIR 2A, 2-1 AND SCHEDULE YOURSELF FOR THE SPECIAL FORCES PHYSICAL WITH YOUR TMC OR HOSPITAL PHYSICAL EXAM SECTION, IMMEDIATELY.</p>		
<p>If you want a challenge and to be assigned to the Army's "Special Operations Force", the GREEN BERETS, come by and talk with us. Classes are available as early as NOVEMBER. Chain of command approval is not required to submit your application.</p>		
<p>POC THIS OFFICE: SFC SHIFLETT (404) 685-0977</p>		
<p> WILLIAM J. SHIFLETT SFC, USA SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITER</p>		

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

ATSU-SP-R

MEMORANDUM FOR SGT SMITH

SUBJECT: Special Forces Application

1. SGT Smith a short while ago I sent you a memorandum on attending SFAS 3-92 and I did not receive a reply, I am interested in finding out why you didn't respond and attend the 920108 class.

2. To attend the Special Forces Assessment and Selection course you lacked the following documentation:

Missing Special Forces Physical

Missing PT Card

3. I realize that a high caliber soldier can get caught in work, that happens often, but you need to look out for your future. Take a good look at where you are now and where you could be in Special Forces. Special Forces officer you advanced technical and language training and the fastest promotions in the Army. Additionally we receive extra pay for HALO, SCUBA, and Language proficiency along with Jump pay. Our enlistment bonus is \$20,000.00. Our warrant officers come from within our own teams. Ask yourself what your current position offers?

4. The next SFAS class I have opening for starts 920205. Will you be showing up at Ft. Bragg, NC with other physically fit and mentally tough soldiers or will you stay where you are?

5. Call me at ETS: 379-6430 or Commercial 06202-25825 with your decision.

6. ONLY THE BEST.

LOREN J. SIMPSON
SFC USA
NCOIC, SF Recruiting

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
EUROPEAN RECRUITING DETACHMENT, GERMANY 09081

ATSU-SP-R-GE

8 AUG 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL FORCES POTENTIAL MEMBER

SUBJECT: Special Forces Assessment and Selection

1. Potential SF Soldier, after reviewing the records we have found you to be the quality soldier in today's Army that we are looking for.

2. CMF 18 includes positions concerned with the deployment of highly specialized elements to accomplish specifically directed missions in times of peace and war. For this reason and others, it is a prerequisite that every prospective "Green Beret" successfully complete the three week SFAS Course.

3. Basic qualifications are to be an E4 thru E7, GT 110, PT Test score of more than 206 graded as a 19 year old, swim 50 meters, pass a Special Forces Physical IAW AR 40-501.

4. Meet the challenge and become a competent, confident, professional soldier in the Special Forces. Interested soldiers should attend a presentation at one of the following locations. Bring a copy of you DA 2A and 2-1. Spouses are encouraged to attend.

Event	Date	Location	Place	Time
SF Briefing	20 Aug 91	McNair Kaserne	5th Bn	0930 &
			Classroom	1330
SF Briefing	21 Aug 91	McNair Kaserne	5th Bn	0930
			Classroom	
Pt & SWIM TEST	21 Aug 91	Andrews Barracks	Yankee Stad.	1330

5. POC is SSG Judge at 332-9681 or SFC Gonzalez at 379-6558

DAVID L. GONZALEZ
SFC USA
SPECIAL FORCES RCT

15 October 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL QUALIFIED SOLDIERS

SUBJECT: SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITING TEAM VISIT

1. Congratulations, you have been identified by TAPA as meeting the initial qualifications to become a member of the United States Army's Special Forces. We look forward to meeting you to discuss this opportunity during our upcoming visit to Fulda.

2. Briefings will be conducted at:

THE POST THEATER ON DOWNS BARRACKS
11 OCTOBER 1991
10:30 AND 13:30 HOURS

3. Bring a copy of your DA Form 2A, 2-1, and your latest PT scorecard to the briefing. Also schedule yourself for a Special Forces physical PRIOR to our arrival.

4. If you have any problems or questions please contact your local POC or myself at:

LOCAL POC: SFC CAMPBELL

ETS: 321/3606/3763

SF POC: SFC SIMPSON

ETS: 379-6430/6558

5. If you want a challenge and to be assigned to the Army's "special Operations Force", The Green Berets, come by and talk with us. The next scheduled SFAS, Special Forces Assessment and Selection, will start on 8 JAN 92 and 5 FEB 92.

6. Chain of Command approval is not required to attend this course. Provided you meet the prerequisites you will be given the opportunity to attend the Selection and Assessment program.

7. Please post this letter on your unit bulletin board so that other soldiers may find out about this challenging and rewarding opportunity.

LOREN J. SIMPSON
SFC, USA
SPECIAL FORCES

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

ATSU-SP-R

MEMORANDUM FOR SGT SMITH

SUBJECT: Special Forces Application

1. SGT Smith your request for special Forces training was received and I am processing you for SFAS 3-92, which reports 8 January 1992.
2. It is imperative that you take your physical preparation for this course very seriously. Do not rely on your unit to give you time off to train.
3. You have made an important career decision which affects not only you, but the entire Special Operations Community. Do not take this commitment lightly. We are the best because only the top ten percent of the Army apply.
4. I want to ensure that you receive your orders in a timely manner. To do this, I need the following documents from you:
 - Missing Special Forces Physical
 - Missing PT Card
5. If the above mentioned documentation is not received or you do not contact the Special Forces Recruiting Office by 11 January 1992, your application will be terminated.
6. Notify your First Sergeant on the status of your application, and keep him informed throughout your processing.
7. Contact the SF Recruiting office upon receipt of this correspondence. Telephone numbers are ETS: 379-6430 or Comm. at 06202-25825.

LOREN J. SIMPSON
SFC USA
NCOIC, SF Recruiting

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

ATSU-SP-R

MEMORANDUM FOR FIRST SERGEANT CO D 5/15TH IN APO AE

SUBJECT: Special Forces Assessment and Selection

1. SGT Smith of your command, has applied to the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) Course. The SFAS course his application is being processed for his SFAS 3-92, which reports 8 January 1992.
2. We understand the unit missions you are faced with and the burden it will place on you by losing this soldier for 21 days. Special Forces is also facing serious real world missioning and manpower shortages. Though his date is tentative, we hope you can plan for his absence accordingly.
3. When the soldier is classed you will be notified immediately. The documentation he is missing is listed below:

MISSING DOCUMENTATION (IF ANY)

Missing Special forces Physical

Missing PT Card

4. Any assistance you can give your soldier with completing his application and preparing for SFAS is greatly appreciated. Enclosed is a recommended SFAS PT preparation program for your review. Adherence to this program directly affects his chances for selection.
5. Please contact the SF Recruiting office if we can assist you or your soldier in any way, telephone numbers are; ETS: 379-6430 Commercial at 06202-25825.

Encl

LOREN J. SIMPSON
SFC USA
NCOIC, SF Recruiting

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

ATSU-SP-R

MEMORANDUM FOR SGT SMITH

SUBJECT: Completion of SFAS Packet

1. SGT Smith I have reviewed your application and it was received on 6 June 1991. You have had 159 days to complete your application, and you have failed to submit all required documents.
2. I believe in working with each soldier to insure he is ready to succeed in Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). You have had the multiple opportunities to attend SFAS classes and you have still made no attempt to achieve your goals.
3. While you're working to complete your packet, I want you to know there are Special Forces teams looking for soldiers of your caliber. Missions are occurring every day, some make the press operations ranging from urban areas to the desert; from the jungle to the mountains (both classified and unclassified).
4. Finish your packet now by sending in:
 - Missing Special Forces Physical
 - Missing PT Card
5. If you require assistance call Comm 06202-25825 or ETS: 379-6430.
6. Meet the challenge and become a competent, confident, professional soldier in the Special Forces.

LOREN J. SIMPSON
SFC USA
NCOIC, SF Recruiting

Source: Herd and Teplitzky 1992, Appendix F-2 thru F-8.

APPENDIX G

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RECRUITING HOMEPAGE



SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
RECRUITING
COMPANY



SPECIAL
FORCES
SF
Recruiting
Prior
Service



RANGERS
75th
Infantry
Regiment



SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
AVIATION
REGIMENT
160th SOAR



You may view a short video by clicking on the links below:

Army
Rangers -
56k
Army
Rangers -
28k

Special
Forces -
56k
Special
Forces -
28k

160th SOAR
- 56k
160th SOAR
- 28k

Special Forces Officer Branch | Special Forces
Enlisted Branch
Army Recruiting | Email a Special Ops Recruiter

These videos require the Real G2 Player browser plug-in. If you need this plug-in, click here.

Source: <http://www.goarmy.com/job/branch/sorc/index.htm>



Special Operations Recruiting Company

S O R C

Home Page

WHAT IS "SORC"?

The Special Operations Recruiting Company is based at Fort Bragg, NC with teams located in 8 CONUS and 2 OCONUS locations. The Company falls under HQ, USAREC (United States Army Recruiting Command) with the responsibility of filling manning requirements for USASOC (United States Army Special Operations Command). The mission of SORC is to provide candidates for Special Forces, both Officer and Enlisted, and aviators for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). This mission is achieved through the various recruiting teams by briefing and assisting soldiers in putting their applications together and scheduling them to attend the class. The purpose of this web page is to provide general information on the programs and points of contact in the event you want to start an application.

TOPICS OF INTEREST

- Who are the "Green Berets?"
- Overview of SFAS and the "Q" Course
- Recruitment Criteria
- Recruiter Locations and POC's

MILITARY LINKS

- 1st BN 1st SWTG (A) - Special Forces Training Battalion
- MAJ Chuck Payne's Special Forces Page
- Other Army and Special Operations Links (Currently being reviewed)

This page is an unofficial document and does not represent information endorsed by the United States Government, the United States Special Operations Command or the United States Army Special Operations Command. However, most information is derived from those sources and has been checked for accuracy. Thanks and kudos to Chuck Payne, MAJ, SF for his reference and assistance in the constructing of this web page. Please provide comments and suggestions by clicking on the mail button below or sending mail to "sf-sord-rt@usarec.army.mil". Thanks

Source: <http://www.goarmy.com/job/branch/sorc/sorc.htm>



Special Operations Recruiting Company

Recruiter Locations

Special Forces Recruiting Team Locations

The Special Forces Recruiting Teams listed in the table below are provided to give you a local point of contact. Please contact your recruiter to find out how to apply and when they are scheduled to be at your military installation. If your installation is not listed, please contact the station nearest to you. If you are not sure which SF recruiting station to contact, please call the Special Operations Recruiting Company Operation Section, at Fort Bragg. We will be happy to assist you in locating the SFRT nearest you. Commercial: (910) 432-1643 (alt. 1641/1639), DSN: 239-1643.

RECRUITING STATION	AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
Special Forces Recruiting Detachment	Ft Belvoir
Commander,	Ft Bragg
USAFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-SP-R	Ft Eustis
Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000	Ft Detrick
DSN 239-1818	Ft Drum
Commercial (910) 432-1818	Ft Jackson
Fax (910) 432-1637	Ft Lee
SFBraggNCOIC@usarec.army.mil	Ft Meade
	Ft Myer
	Ft Monair

Source: <http://www.goarmy.com/job/branch/sorc/rctr.htm>



U.S. Army Special Forces

THE GREEN BERETS

SFAS and Q-Course Overview

Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS)

What is SFAS?

a. The career management field (CMF) 18 includes positions concerned with the employment of highly specialized elements to accomplish specifically directed missions in times of peace and war. Many of these missions are conducted at times when employment of conventional military forces is not feasible or is not considered in the best interest of the United States. Training for and participation in these missions are arduous, somewhat hazardous, and are often sensitive in nature. For these reasons it is a prerequisite that every prospective "Green Beret" successfully complete the 24-day SFAS program.

b. The SFAS program assesses and selects soldiers for attendance at the SFQC. This program allows SF an opportunity to assess each soldier's capabilities by testing his physical, emotional, and mental stamina. SFA also allows each soldier the opportunity to make a meaningful and educated decision about SF and his career plan.

c. All candidates participate in a variety of activities designed to place them under various forms of physical and mental stress. It assesses potential/qualities through behavioral observation, analysis-via performance measure, and recording data. All tasks are performed with limited information and ***NO PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK***.

SFAS OVERVIEW:

DAY 1-6	DAY 7-14	DAY 15-16	DAY 17-23	DAY 24
INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENT		LOW INTENSITY PHASE	TEAM ASSESSMENT	

Source: <http://goarmy.com/job/branch/sorc/sfas.htm>



Recruitment Criteria
THE GREEN BERETS
Officer and Enlisted

A Question of "Criteria"

The recruitment criteria listed below is valid as of the time of construction of this web page, but as in most cases, things sometimes change and some things are waivable. We are constantly working with the JFK Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWCS) on the ever-changing SF pipeline. So, for the most up to date information please contact the recruiting team nearest to your installation.

Recruitment criteria for selection to SFAS.

All prospective applicants must meet these selection criteria.

The following criteria is required for all applicants (officers and enlisted):

1. Must be an active duty male soldier.
2. Must be U.S. citizen (Not waivable).
3. Must be airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training.
4. Must be able to swim 50-meters wearing boots and battle dress uniform (BDU) prior to beginning the Special Forces Qualification Course. All soldiers will be given a swim test prior to SFAS to determine whether he is a swimmer or non-swimmer.
5. Must score a minimum of 206 points on the Army physical fitness test (APFT), with no less than 60 points on any event, using the standards for age group 17-21.
6. Must be able to meet medical fitness standards as outlined in AR40-501.
7. Must be eligible for a "SECRET" security clearance.
8. No soldier, regardless of MOS or basic branch will be recruited if he is unable to reclassify from his current MOS or basic branch into CMF 18.
9. Not currently serving in a restricted MOS or branch.

Source: <http://goarmy.com/job/branch/sorc/criteria.htm>



U.S. Army Special Forces: The Green Berets

The Quiet Professionals

A breed apart, a cut above the rest -

another kind of soldier. Unquestionably

the world's finest unconventional warfare experts.

Fighters of uncommon physical and mental caliber.

Mature, highly skilled, and superbly trained,

They are ready to serve anywhere at any time.

Deployed on every continent, operating in remote

areas under Spartan conditions, with a tenuous

radio link their only connection to higher

headquarters, small detachments of U.S. forces

are training their allies to defend themselves

against tyranny and oppression. They are the

Army's Special Forces, known popularly as the

Green Berets.

Often they are the sole American military presence

in a nation, every day making tough decisions

in unheard-of situations, with no one looking over

their shoulders. They volunteered for this duty

because they prefer the challenge of working in an

austere, uncertain and unstructured environment.

Specially selected and trained, they are America's

main weapon for waging unconventional warfare

HISTORY

[The Green Beret](#)

[Quick History](#)

[Detailed History](#)

[Insignia](#)

[Beret Flashes](#)

[Unit Patches](#)

SPECIAL OPS

[SF Missions](#)

[About Special Ops](#)

[Forces](#)

[Special Ops Primer](#)

[Special Ops Imperatives](#)

THE MEN

[The Soldiers](#)

[The Team Leader](#)

[The Team Sergeant](#)

[The Team Tech](#)

[SF Heroes](#)

[Medal of Honor -](#)

[Vietnam](#)

ORGANIZATION

[The "A" Team](#)

[Support Elements](#)

[Aviation](#)

<http://users.aol.com/armysof1/menu.html>

Source: <http://users.aol.com/armysof1/menu.html>

SFAS Application Procedures (Enlisted Soldier)

4-1. Documentation. The following lists all documentation necessary to be considered for attendance at SFAS. Reproduced copies must be clear and legible. **There is no requirement for a DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action) for this application.**

a. Volunteer statement. See figure 4-1, page 4-3 for enlisted volunteer statement.

b. A current copy of your DA Form 2A & 2-1 or ERB for enlisted applicants.

c. DA Form 873 (Certification of Clearance and/or Security Clearance Determination) or statement from S-2 if security clearance is not reflected on your DA Form 2A. See sample copy of memorandum for security clearance in appendix C-2. ***A security clearance is not a pre-requisite for SFAS attendance but if you are selected for SFQC training you must have at least an interim secret clearance prior to be scheduled for training.***

d. SF Physical. Original SF 88 (Report of Medical Examination) and SF 93 (Report of Medical History) along with all supporting documents. See physical checklist in appendix E.

e. Recruiter scored APFT. All applicants are required to score a minimum of 206, graded in the age group 17-21. The APFT uniform is BDU and running shoes.

f. 50 meter swim test. All soldiers must take a 50-meter swim test prior to attendance of SFAS. Successful completion of the 50-meter test is not a prerequisite for attendance to SFAS. Soldiers selected to attend the SFQC, who cannot swim, will be scheduled for swim training, prior to their SFQC date. All soldiers must pass the 50-meter swim test, with BDU's and boots, prior to the start of the SFQC.

A candidate may not touch the sides or bottom of the pool, doing so constitutes a failure to successfully complete the course.

g. If your DA 2a, 2-1 or ERB does not have all of your ASVAB scores, you must furnish an official document showing your ASVAB results.

4-2. Personnel records. All enlisted personnel should ensure your DA Form 2A, DA Form 2-1 and your ERB reflect all schools that you successfully completed or include copy of either the Service School Academic Record or Diploma.

4-3. Applications. Completed applications should be forwarded to the recruiting station responsible for servicing your designated area as listed in appendix B-1. Your application will be forwarded to the Special Operations

Recruiting Company's operations section for final review and formal scheduling for attendance to SFAS.

ENLISTED APPLICATION CHECKLIST

_____Attend a Special Forces Briefing.

_____Volunteer Statement. See figure 4-1, page 4-3.

_____Current copy of 2a or ERB (Less than 3 months from application date).

_____Current copy of 2-1 (Less than 3 months from application date).

_____Army Physical Fitness Test. An SF recruiter must administer the APFT. See figure 4-3, pg 4-5 for APFT memorandum.

_____Swim Test. An SF recruiter must administer the swim test. Some military installations may not have adequate swimming facilities available prior to your SFAS report date, which may require you to sign an affidavit. See figure 4-2, page 4-4.

_____Special Forces Physical SF 88 (Report of Medical Examination) & SF 93 (Report of Medical History). Submit original SF 88 & SF 93 plus other supporting documents. See physical checklist in appendix E-1. The SF physical is good for 2 years for SFAS. It must not expire prior to your completion of SFAS.

_____Airborne School Verification (If applicable, not required for SFAS attendance).

_____PLDC Verification (If applicable, not required for SFAS attendance).

_____Medical Records. You are required to bring these with you to SFAS. Sign them out early. See memo to medical record section in appendix C, C-7.

_____Preparatory PT Train-up Program. See chapter 6. Strongly encouraged that you follow this program. Many of the soldiers that were selected stated that they followed the train-up program.

Strongly Recommended Items (Optional)

_____Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). Your education center can assist you with this requirement. See memorandum in appendix C-3.

_____Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). If you can speak a foreign language you are encouraged to take the DLPT. This exam will show your proficiency in that specific language. Successful ratings may shorten your training time in the SFQC.

_____The ability to perform minimum 6 pull-ups from a dead hang.

_____TABE A

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
AND SCHOOL
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000**

AOJK-SP-R

DATE_____

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander USAJFKSWCS, Attn: AOJK-SP-R, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000

SUBJECT: Special Forces Volunteer Statement (Enlisted)

1. I hereby volunteer for Special Forces (SF) training under the provisions of AR 614-200, Chap 5 and PERSCOM message. If not already airborne qualified, I volunteer for airborne training and understand that failure to successfully complete airborne training will disqualify me from SF training and duty.

2. I have met all criteria listed in AR 614-200, Chap 5 and PERSCOM message.

3. Upon successful completion of Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and prior to my departure from my losing command, I agree to reenlist or extend my enlistment to meet the 36 month remaining service obligation as listed in AR 614-200, Chap 5 and PERSCOM retention message.

4. Are you currently on assignment or have you received notification of assignment? Yes _____ No _____
If yes, when is your PCS date? _____ Where are you PCS'ng to? _____
Soldiers on assignment **may not** be allowed to attend SFAS without their branch's prior approval (DA Fm 4187). Soldiers who volunteer for SFAS prior to receiving assignment notification will be deferred to allow SFAS attendance. For SFAS graduates, assignment to the SFQC will take precedence over any assignment conflict. Stabilization of current drill sergeants and detailed recruiters will not be broken.

5. Have you been convicted by a court-martial or have disciplinary action under UCMJ (article 15) in your Official Military Personnel File (OMPF)? Yes _____
No _____ if so, why/when did you receive the article 15?

6. Soldiers that have disciplinary action noted in their official military personnel file **may not apply**. This provision can only be waived by the Commanding General, United States Army Special Warfare Center and School on a case by case basis.

7. I am aware that, if so determined by the appropriate SF commander, I may be declared unsuitable for further SF training. _____ (Initials)

8. Have you ever applied for and/or attended SFAS or the SFQC? Yes ____
No _____. If so, list date(s) attended and final outcome?
_____ How many times have you attended SFAS? _____

9. Have you attended a Special Forces briefing? Yes____ No ____ If so,
when/where? _____

10. Which SFAS Class do you wish to attend? _____

11. Upon successful completion of SFAS, I request reclassification from my
present PMOS of _____
to PMOS: 18B- Weapons; 18C- Engineer; 18D- Medic; 18E- Communications
(list in preference order) 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ (All must be
listed) My GT Score is: _____

Last Name _____ First
Name _____ MI _____
Signature _____ SSN _____
Rank _____

Unit, Post, and Zip Code _____

Duty Phone:() _____ Home Phone:() _____
Beeper/CellPh: _____

****DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974****

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC 3013; PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To serve as application for Special Forces Training;
ROUTINE USES: To provide a record of the individual's Special Forces application; MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: Voluntary; failure to disclose
requested information will have a negative impact on individual's application for Special Forces training.

Figure 4-1. Enlisted Volunteer Statement

DATE _____

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-SP-R, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000

SUBJECT: Special Forces Swim Test Statement (Enlisted)

I certify that _____ successfully completed the 50-meter swim test with BDU's and boots as prescribed in Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-5 AR 614-200.

SIGNATURE

TYPE OR PRINT FULL NAME & RANK

(UNIT / ADDRESS)

NOTE: AFFIDAVIT CAN ONLY BE USED IF APPLICANT CAN SWIM BUT THERE IS NO POOL AVAILABLE.

50 Meter Swim Affidavit

I certify that I, _____ can successfully complete the 50-meter swim test with BDU's and boots as prescribed in Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-5 AR 614-200.

SIGNATURE

TYPE OR PRINT FULL NAME & RANK

UNIT / ADDRESS

Figure 4-2. Swim Test Statement/Affidavit for Enlisted Applicants

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

AOJK-SP-R

Date_____

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander

SUBJECT: Request for Support

1. The following soldier, _____,
SSN _____,
has been scheduled for the APFT and swim test on _____: at
_____, in order to meet the prerequisites for Special Forces
Assessment and Selection (SFAS). He must report to
_____, which has been scheduled as the
PT area for this test.
2. The soldier cannot complete his application for SFAS without a recruiter
administered APFT and swim test. Our recruiting team is only TDY to this
installation 2-3 times a year. Your full support is requested in releasing the
soldier to attend on the above date and time.
3. Point of contact at your installation is the Post Retention Office. For
additional information, please contact the Special Forces Recruiting Team at
_____.

Name

Rank

Title

Figure 4-3. APFT Memorandum.

SFAS Application Procedures
(Officers)

5.1 Documentation. The following lists all documentation necessary to be considered for selection by the Special Forces Branch-PERSCOM.

- a. Volunteer statement. See figure 5-1, page 5-3 for officer volunteer statement.
- b. A current copy of your Officer Record Brief (ORB).
- c. Resume. See figure 5-2, page 5-4 for example.
- d. DA Form 873 (Certification of Clearance and/or Security Clearance Determination) or statement from S-2 if security clearance is not annotated on your ORB. See sample security clearance memorandum in appendix C-2.
- e. SF physical. Original SF 88 (Report of Medical Examination) and SF 93 (Report of Medical History) along with all supporting documents. See physical checklist in appendix E-1.
- f. Current APFT (within 6 months of application date). All applicants are required to score a minimum of 206, scored in the age group 17-21. The APFT uniform is BDU and running shoes.
- g. 50 meter swim test. All soldiers must take a 50-meter swim test prior to attendance of SFAS. Successful completion of the 50-meter test is not a prerequisite for attendance to SFAS. Soldiers selected to attend the SFQC will be scheduled for swim training prior to their OSFQC date. All soldiers must pass the 50-meter swim test, with BDU's and boots, prior to the start of the OSFQC. See swim statement in figure 5-3.
- h. Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). You must score a minimum of 85 on the DLAB. See sample memorandum in appendix C-2. If you do not attain a minimum score of 85, this may be waivable for selection consideration and SFAS attendance.

5-2. Personnel records. All officer applicants should ensure your ORB reflect the listed selection criteria or include a copy of either the Service School Academic Record or Diploma.

5-3. Applications. Completed applications should be forwarded to the recruiting station responsible for servicing your designated area as listed in appendix B-1. Your application will be forwarded to the Special Operations Recruiting Company's operations section for review and then forwarded to the OSFQC coordinator for final review and submission to DA PERSCOM.

5-4. Target Year Group. Current target year group officers are **strongly** encouraged to apply early, usually prior to June in the FY in which you will be considered for SF Assessment, training, and duty. Target year group selection boards are usually held in September of each FY.

5-5. Out of Year Group. Officers not in the target year group may apply at any time for immediate consideration for SF assessment, training, and duty.

OFFICER APPLICATION CHECKLIST

_____ Volunteer Statement. Figure 5-1, page 5-3.

_____ Current ORB with all completed courses or appropriate academic service record/diploma.

_____ Security Clearance Verification. Usually listed on the ORB. If not listed on the ORB, get a memorandum from your S-2 stating your level of clearance. See appendix C-2.

_____ Resume. See figure 5-2, page 5-4 for example.

_____ DLAB Results. If you have taken the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and scored at least a 1/1 you may submit this in lieu of the DLAB. See memorandum in appendix C-3.

_____ Army Physical Fitness Test. Scored in the 17-21 year old age group. Officers are encouraged to take the APFT with the Special Forces recruiters.

_____ Swim Test Statement. See figure 5-3, page 5-5 for example.

_____ SF physical. SF 88 (Report of Medical Examination) & SF 93 (Report of Medical History) . Submit original SF 88 & SF 93 plus other supporting documents. See physical checklist in appendix E-1. The physical is good for 2 years and must carry you through the completion of SFAS.

_____ Medical Records. You **must** bring your medical records with you when reporting in for SFAS.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

AOJK-SP-R

DATE_____

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-SP-R, FORT BRAGG, NC 28307-5000

SUBJECT: Special Forces Volunteer Statement (Officer)

1. I hereby volunteer for Special Forces (SF) training under the provisions of AR 614-162. If not already airborne qualified, I volunteer for airborne training and understand that failure to successfully complete airborne training will disqualify me from SF training and duty.

2. I have met all criteria listed in AR 614-162.

3. Have you ever received any Field Grade Article 15's or have ever been convicted by a court martial during your enlistment? Yes _____ No_____, If so, when and what type of disciplinary action?

4. Soldiers that have disciplinary action noted in their official military personnel file **may not apply**. This provision can only be waived by the Commanding General, United States Army Special Warfare Center and School on a case by case basis.

5. I am aware that, if so determined by the appropriate SF commander, I may be declared unsuitable for further SF training. _____ (Initials)

6. Have you ever applied for and/or attended SFAS or the SFQC? Yes_____ No_____. If so, when? _____. How many times have you attended SFAS? _____

7. Have you attended a Special Forces briefing? Yes_____ No _____. If so, When/where?_____

8. Upon successful completion of SFAS, I request branch transfer from _____ to Special Forces Branch upon graduation from the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course.

Last Name_____ First
Name_____ Rank_____

SSN_____ Year Group _____
Branch_____ BD_____

Unit, Post, and Zip Code

Duty Phone: ()_____ Home Phone: ()_____
Beeper/Cell Ph:_____

Home
address_____

Signature_____

******DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974******

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC 3013; **PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To serve as application for Special Forces Training;
ROUTINE USES: To provide a record of the individual's Special Forces application; **MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY**
DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: Voluntary; failure to disclose
requested information will have a negative impact on individual's application for Special Forces training.

Figure 5-1. Officer Volunteer Statement

EXAMPLE FORMAT FOR RESUME

Unit Address RANK/NAME HOME ADDRESS

Duty Telephone SSN PHONE

DSN/Commercial

OBJECTIVE: Why SF?

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS: Do not repeat information from ORB. Expound on unique assignments and/or duties.

ENLISTED EXPERIENCE: If applicable.

LANGUAGE TRAINING/PROFICIENCY:

FOREIGN TRAVEL:

ATHLETICS:

SAMPLE FORM

EDUCATION:

CURRENT PROJECTS:

HOBBIES/INTERESTS:

KEEP IN MIND THAT THIS IS JUST A SAMPLE FORMAT. USE WHAT IS APPLICABLE TO YOU AND TAILOR ACCORDINGLY.

Figure 5-2. Sample Resume Format for Officer Applicants

DATE _____

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-SP-R, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000

SUBJECT: Special Forces Swim Test Statement

I certify that _____ successfully completed the 50-meter swim test with BDU's and boots as prescribed in Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-5 AR 614-200.

—

SIGNATURE

—

TYPE OR PRINT FULL NAME & RANK

—

(UNIT / ADDRESS)

NOTE: AFFIDAVIT CAN ONLY BE USED IF APPLICANT CAN SWIM BUT THERE IS NO POOL AVAILABLE.

50 Meter Swim Affidavit

I certify that I, _____ can successfully complete the 50-meter swim test with BDU's and boots as prescribed in Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-5 AR 614-200.

—

SIGNATURE

—

TYPE OR PRINT FULL NAME & RANK

—

UNIT / ADDRESS

Figure 5-3. Swim Test Statement/Affidavit for Officer Applicants

Source: <http://www.goarmy.com/job/branch/sorc/criteria.htm>,
and USARECPAM 601-25, pp 4-1 thru 4-5 and 5-1 thru 5-5.

SF RECRUITING DETACHMENT 02 TDY SCHEDULE



USAREC
Secretariat America's Future Force

DECEMBER 99

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THUR	FRI	SAT
		1 FT KNOX	2 FT KNOX	3 FT KNOX	4 FT KNOX	5 FT KNOX
		6 FT KNOX	7 FT KNOX	8 FT KNOX	9 FT KNOX	10 FT KNOX
		11 FT KNOX	12 FT KNOX	13 FT KNOX	14 FT KNOX	15 FT KNOX
		16 FT KNOX	17 FT KNOX	18 FT KNOX	19 FT KNOX	20 FT KNOX
		21 FT KNOX	22 FT KNOX	23 FT KNOX	24 FT KNOX	25 FT KNOX
		26 FT KNOX	27 FT KNOX	28 FT KNOX	29 FT KNOX	30 FT KNOX
		31 FT KNOX				

JANUARY 00

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THUR	FRI	SAT
						1 FT KNOX
						2 FT KNOX
						3 FT KNOX
						4 FT KNOX
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						31 FT KNOX



25 OCT 99



FEBRUARY 00

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THUR	FRI	SAT
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29				

MARCH 00

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THUR	FRI	SAT
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		



USAREC
Securing America's Future Force



25 OCT 99




SORC HARD DATA

SORC MISSION SUMMARY
-FY00-


* SF ENLISTED MISSION			
MSN	1,800 / MC	509	28%
* SF OFFICER MISSION			
MSN	344 / MC	116	34%

As of November 29 1999

FY00 SFAS PRODUCTION AD ENLISTED (SF)



*FY 00 PRODUCTION
AD OFFICER (SF)*



SORC MISSION HISTORY


FY94 to FY99

	SF ENLISTED			SF OFFICER		
	<u>MSN</u>	<u>ACH</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>MSN</u>	<u>ACH</u>	<u>%</u>
FY99	1500	1512	100%	300	301	100%
FY98	1500	1368	91%	300	300	100%
FY97	1500	1470	98%	280	280	100%
FY96	1250	1274	101%	335	335	100%
FY95	752	768	102%	296	303	102%
FY94	661	714	108%	312	452	144%


Source: SORC Command Brief, 29 November 1999

APPENDIX J

USASFC (A) TIGER TEAM ODA ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN



USASFC(A) TIGER TEAM ODA ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN




IN-PROGRESS - REVIEW

7 JUL 99

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


ACoFS G7 Force Integration



PURPOSE

To provide the USASOC BOD an IPR on the USASFC(A) ODA Organizational Design Tiger Team analysis.


ACoFS G7 Force Integration



OUTLINE

- Background/Commander's Guidance
- Tiger Team
 - Organization
 - Objectives
 - Milestones
 - COAs
- Consideration of SFG Recommendations
- Trend Analysis of Resources
- DOTLMS Analysis of COAs
- Conclusions

ACoFS G7 Force Integration



BACKGROUND


OCT 98 - USASFC(A) COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE, Ft Bragg, NC

- SFG Cdrs identified manpower shortfalls at Co, Bn and SFG levels
- CG tasked all SFG Cdrs to provide FS redesign recommendations

JAN 99 - USASFC(A) COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE, Ft Carson, CO

- 1st, 3d, and 7th SFGs recommended reducing ODAs from 6 to 4 per Co
- 1st and 7th SFGs recommended a 15-man ODA; varying in MOS comp
- 3d SFG recommended a 12-man ODA with organic SOT-A capabilities by creating two new CMF 18 MOSs (18G and 18H) (18B, 18C, and 18F E7 are billpayers)

ACoFS G7 Force Integration



BACKGROUND

JAN 99 -


- 5th, 10th, 19th and 20th SFGs recommended Status Quo at ODA level (12-man 6 per Co)
- 19th SFG recommended conversion of 180A to 18A LT
- 20th SFG recommended upgrade of ODA Cdr to MAJ
- Due to varied recommendations - CG directed G7 organize a Tiger Team to further analyze the structure/capabilities of the 12-man ODA

MAR 99 - G7 organized Tiger Team to conduct a DOTLMS analysis of the ODA

- CG directed 1st, 3d and 7th SFG(A)s implement experimental programs

APR 99 - USASOC CG directed USASFC(A) CG to study SF ODA structure

ACoFS G7 Force Integration



TIGER TEAM ORGANIZATION

AGENCY	REPRESENTATIVES
USASFC(A) ACoFS, G7 - LEAD	Ms. Taylor/Mr. Torres
USASFC(A) ACoFS, G1 (Ret Div)	MSG Palmer
USASFC(A) ACoFS, G3	CW3 Soto
USASFC(A) ARNG ADVISOR	MAJ Dietrich
USASOC DCSFDI (SI)	Mr. Putnam
USASOC DCSFDI (FM)	Mr. Moore
USAJFKSWCS DOTD	CW3 Ivosevic
USAJFKSWCS SOPO	CW4 Edwards/MSG Bennett

ACoFS G7 Force Integration

TIGER TEAM OBJECTIVES	
-	Conduct "Bottom Up" structure review - begin w/ODA
-	Consider SFG input and develop COAs to evaluate
-	Conduct a DOTLMS analysis of each COA
-	Present analysis at Jul 99 Commander's Conference

ACoFS G7 Force Integration

TIGER TEAM MILESTONES	
11 MAR 99	- Organize
7 APR 99	- Develop COAs
24 APR 99	- USASFC(A) CG approved COAs
6 MAY 99	- Deliverables due
19 MAY 99	- Analysis of input
3 JUN 99	- Develop IPR
8 JUN 99	- IPR to USASFC(A) CG

ACoFS G7 Force Integration

TIGER TEAM MILESTONES	
15 JUN 99	- Brief USASFC(A) DCO Council
25 JUN 99	- IPR to USASOC CG
15 JUL 99	- IPR at USASFC(A) Cdr's Conf
20 JUL 99	- Move into Phase II of study; Co, Bn, SFG structure requirements
? AUG 99	- IPR to USASFC(A) and USASOC CGs
30 SEP 99	- IPR to USASFC(A) and USASOC CGs

ACoFS G7 Force Integration

TIGER TEAM COURSES OF ACTION (COAs)	
COA.1 - 12-man ODA, 6 per Co (54 per SFG) (Status Quo)	
COA.2 - 12-man ODA, 5 per Co (45 per SFG)	
COA.3 - 12-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG)	
COA.4 - 16-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG) *	
03 18A	W2 180A
E7 18D	E7 18D
E7 18E	E7 18C
E6 18C	E6 18E
E8 18Z	E7 18F
E7 18B	E7 18E
E6 18E	E6 18B
E6 18D	E6 18D

*Encompasses 1st and 7th SFGs recommendations for larger ODA

ACoFS G7 Force Integration

CONSIDERATION OF SFG RECOMMENDATIONS	
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ACoFS G7 Force Integration

SUMMARY OF SFG RECOMMENDATIONS

TITLE	MOS	GR	1ST SFG	3D SFG	6TH SFG	7TH SFG	10TH SFG	16TH SFG	20TH SFG
CDR	1840	CPT	1	1	1	1	1	1	MAJ
ASST DET CDR	1840	MAJ	1	1	1	2	1	1	LT
OPS NCO	1820	E8	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
SRWINS NCO	1840	E7	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
SRBINS NCO	1840	E7	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
SRMED NCO	1840	E7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SRCOMM NCO	185A	E7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CRSINTEL SGT	1840	E7	2	0	1	2	1	1	1
OPERATOR	1840	E7	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
SENSOR SPEC	1840	E7	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
WINS NCO	183V	E8	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
BINS NCO	183D	E8	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
MED NCO	1820	E8	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
COMM NCO	183V	E8	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
ODA STRUCTURE			16	12	12	16	12	12	12
ODA PER CO			4	4	6	4	6	6	6

ACofS G7 Force Integration

ACoFS G7 Force Integration

ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW CMF 18 MOSs

- 3d SFG recommended establishment of 18G and 18H as ODA SIGINT positions
 - Divergent and non-compatible career development paths
 - No growth environment
 - Cost prohibitive for USAJFKSWCS
 - Market MOSs (98G/H) are shortage in Army

ACofS G7 Force Integration


ORGANIZATION OF 15-MAN ODA

- 1st and 7th SFGs recommended a variation of a 15-man ODA

1st SFG	7th SFG
E7 18F	WO 180A
E6 18D	E8 18Z
E6 18E	E7 18F
- Dramatic departure from autonomous split team concept
- Splits into three 5-man teams mandating additive:
 - equipment
 - sustainment
 - infil
- Requires growth in senior (WO/E8) positions
- Elements of 1st SFG recommendations incorporated into COA #4
- 7th SFG(A) Sr grade recommendations deferred to ODB study

ACofS G7 Force Integration

TREND ANALYSIS OF RESOURCES




ACofS G7 Force Integration

AMERICA'S ARMY

- Active Army has been reduced
 - From 18 Combat Divisions in FY 89
 - To Today's 10 Combat Divisions
- Active Army has changed:
 - From a Forward-deployed force
 - to a CONUS based Power Projection force
- America's Total Army Team:
 - Active component *Forms nucleus of initial combat forces*
 - Reserve component *Reinforces/augments active forces*
 - Civilian component *Provides critical support and sustainment*
- 54% of today's Total Army Team is in the USAR and ARNG







ACofS G7 Force Integration









CMF 18 TREND ANALYSIS

- CMF 18
 - Retention Rates
 - Attrition Rates
 - Recruitment and SFAS Graduation Rates
 - Projected Personnel Inventory Rates
 - ODA Personnel Fill levels
- SOF Resource Trends

ACofS G7 Force Integration





LEADER DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS

COA#1 12-man ODA, 6 per Co (34 per SFG) (Status Quo)

- Maintains current Cdr, Asst Cdr, and Team SGT positions
- Promotion pyramid established

SYSTEMIC TO COA# 2-4

- Reduced leader positions will impact promotions and retention

COA#2 12-man ODA, 5 per Co (45 per SFG)

- Provides nine O3, WO, and E8 positions per SFG for potential reallocation

COA#3 12-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG)

- Provides eighteen O3, WO, and E8 positions per SFG for potential reallocation

COA#4 16-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG)

- Increases O3, WO, and E8 personnel fill and readiness levels
- Adds upward mobility positions for NCOs
- Provides eighteen O3, WO, and E8 positions per SFG for potential reallocation
- Creates significant imbalance in CMF 18 career path if senior positions are not realigned to ODB/ODC

ACofS G7 Force Integration

MATERIEL ANALYSIS

COA#1 12-man ODA, 6 per Co (34 per SFG)

- MTOE equip cost per ODA = \$344K (Total per SFG \$51m)
- Many ODA SOF acquisition programs resourced below required levels
- O&M sustainment resources declining while costs are increasing
- Equipment readiness declining

SYSTEMIC TO COA# 2-4

- Increase ODA equipment fill and readiness levels
- Reduces SF Co facility requirements (cost avoidance in MILCON)

COA#2 12-man ODA, 5 per Co (45 per SFG)

- Reduces SOF materiel acquisition costs by \$1.7m
- Reduces annual O&M materiel sustainment costs by \$5.1K/mobility sustainment by 156K
- Reduces MTOE auth equipment by \$9m per SFG

COA#3 12-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG)

- Reduces SOF materiel acquisition costs by \$3.1M
- Reduces annual O&M materiel sustainment costs by \$11.1K/mobility sustainment by \$309K
- Reduces MTOE auth equipment by \$17m per SFG

COA#4 16-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG)

- Reduces SOF materiel acquisition costs by \$1.4M
- Reduces annual O&M materiel sustainment costs by \$42K/mobility sustainment by 156K
- Reduces MTOE auth equipment by \$17m per SFG
- Increases ODA platform requirements (platform dependent)

ACofS G7 Force Integration

SOLDIER DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS

COA#1 12-man ODA, 6 per Co (34 per SFG) (Status Quo)

- Provides for CMF 18 career progression

COA#2 12-man ODA, 5 per Co (45 per SFG)

- Potential to ease recruitment requirements

COA#3 12-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG)

- Potential to ease recruitment requirements
- Reduced senior positions degrades progression pyramid

COA#4 16-man ODA, 4 per Co (36 per SFG)

- Potential to ease recruitment requirements for all MOS other than 18D/E
- Reduced senior positions degrades progression pyramid

ACofS G7 Force Integration


CONCLUSIONS

- Reducing the number of ODAs per Co will:
 - + Increase personnel/equip fill and readiness levels
 - + Reduce SOF materiel acquisition/sustainment costs
 - + Reduce MTOE equipment costs
 - + Provide force structure for growth of SF Co, Bn, and SFG(A) HQs
 - + Reduce company level MILCON requirements
- Further study of emerging mission areas of Information Operations and WMD/CP is required to define ODA "niches"
- Further study is required to identify additive structure requirements at Co, Bn, and SFG HQs. SFG SUSPENSE TO G7: 28 Jun 99

ACofS G7 Force Integration

APPENDIX K

SF CONCEPT PLAN TO INCREASE CMF 18 INVENTORY



Special Forces
Concept Plan
to
Increase CMF18 Inventory
NOV 89
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

PURPOSE

To provide
information on a
Three-Part Strategic Concept Plan
designed to increase
production of CMF18 personnel

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

Why Do We Need a CMF 18 Concept Plan?

- Active Army end-strength has been reduced from 770k in FY 89 to 480k in FY 01 - dramatically impacting the CMF 18 recruitment base
- CMF18 Recruitment mission was 1250 in FY96 and has grown to 1800 for FY00
- SFG(A) personnel readiness levels are declining
 - Three SFG(A)s have reported below 90% on personnel fill
 - Most ODAs are filled with 9 or fewer personnel
- CMF18 production rates are inadequate to offset losses to the force (ETS and Retirements)

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

Why Do We Need a CMF 18 Concept Plan?

- SF training requirements are steadily increasing
- USAJFKSWCS was reduced in manpower authorizations, which has impacted their SFAS/SFQC training capabilities
- SFG(A)s use ODA personnel to PAD the Co, Bn, and SFG(A) HQs to support all requirements
- A "get well" plan is required to increase CMF18 production


US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

Three Part CMF18 Concept Plan



US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)


PART I




US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)


HQDA APPROVED CMF18 RECRUITMENT INITIATIVES

- USAREC mission for FY00 has been increased from 1500 to 1800 for CMF18
- Pilot Program approved to recruit 150 qualified E-3s
 - Pilot Program will assess the potential to recruit E3s into SF
- Recruitment of 150 E3s is in addition to the 1800 USAREC mission (Total FY00 recruitment mission=1950)




PART II






SFAS REDESIGN

- GOALS:
 - Improve SFAS reliability and reduce SFQC attrition
 - Properly prepare soldiers, especially those from non-combat arms, and improve SFQC production
 - Create opportunities for SFQC curriculum expansion
 - Reduce HQDA PCS costs and soldier/family turbulence



SFAS REDESIGN


- CHANGES:
 - Train Field Soldier Skills (Land Nav and Small Unit Tactics (dismounted patrolling))
 - Assist all candidates to become Combat Arms Soldiers (Emphasize Field and Tactical Skills while being assessed and evaluated)




SFAS REDESIGN


PROJECTED ENDSTATE:

- SFAS attrition increases but overall SFQC attrition will decrease
- Instruction quality/safety increases
- Cadre confidence in students improves
- Soldiers attrit while in TDY status
- **BOTTOM LINE:** Improved SFQC graduation rate



PART III





CMF18 Concept Plan

MTOE Documentation

- Reduce MTOE manpower requirements (not authorizations) from 6 to 5 ODAs per SF Company in all companies except OCONUS units (1/1st, 3/7th, and 1/10th)
- Realign Manpower Requirements to USAJFKSWCS TDA; Total Structure - 360 ODAs/432 Requirements (36 OFF, 36 WO, 360 ENL)
- SWCS ODA Training Augmentation - a total of nine ODAs will be dedicated as augmentation to SFAS and SFQC
- SFG(A) ODA Staff Augmentation - Remaining ODAs will augment their parent SFG(A) as follows: 1st SFG(A)=5, 3rd SFG(A)=7, 5th SFG(A)=7, 7th SFG(A)=4, 10th SFG(A)=4
- MTOE exception every three years to be reassessed for potential termination/continuation

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

CMF18 Concept Plan

MTOE Documentation (cont)

- No change to SFG MTOE equipment requirements; equipment for "missing" ODAs will be retained at company level
- MTOE EDATE 16 Oct 00 (FY01). Updated FY01 MTOEs will be distributed as soon as possible
 - Several MTOE equipment corrections, unrelated to this Concept, are currently being analyzed
 - Best Case: New FY01 MTOEs by Feb for Mar USR
 - Worst Case: New FY01 MTOEs by Apr for May USR

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

CMF18 Concept Plan

Personnel Management

- Personnel Fill Priorities:
 - 1 - SFG(A) ODAs (until all ODAs are manned with at least 11 personnel) P1 Readiness
 - 2 - USAJFKSWCS Training Augmentation ODAs.
 - 3 - SFG(A) Augmentation ODAs. Personnel assigned will be used to augment their parent SFG(A) at Co, Bn, SFG(A) level
- When production rates exceed attrition and force inventory meets required readiness levels - ODAs will be cascaded back to their parent SFG(A)

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

CMF18 Concept Plan

Personnel Management (cont)

- Personnel will be assigned to USAJFKSWCS
- Personnel will not serve more than one three-year tour on a USAJFKSWCS Training Augmentation ODA
- Recent CMF18 graduates will not be assigned to USAJFKSWCS Training Augmentation ODAs
- Experienced personnel will be selected for USAJFKSWCS Training Augmentation ODAs
- PCS moves for SFG(A)s located off Ft. Bragg will be IAW established HQDA DCSPER regulatory guidelines

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

SUMMARY

- An Innovative Strategic Concept Plan is required to increase the CMF18 personnel inventory
- We must invest today to ensure our future tomorrow!


" DE OPPRESSO LIBER "

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)


APPENDIX L


PRECISION SF RECRUITING

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS
RECRUITING COMPANY**




**PRECISION SPECIAL FORCES
RECRUITING**

 AS OF 15 MAR 00




CURRENT SOLUTION

- * RECRUIT MORE VOLUME
- * RECRUIT PFCs
- * IMPROVE RETENTION
- * REDUCE CMF 18 PARTICIPATION OUTSIDE USASOC
- * INCENTIVES FOR 18 D / 18 E
- * INCENTIVES TO STAY PAST 20

 AS OF 15 MAR 00


RIGHT ANSWER / SOLUTION

- * MAKE SF RECRUITING MORE PRECISE
- * ID INDICATORS / PREDICTORS OF GRADUATES OF TNG BASE
- * TARGET RECRUITING RESOURCES TO PRECISE MARKET
- * REDUCE WASTE OF RESOURCES FOR USASOC / USAREC
- * INCREASE CMF 18 POPULATION TO PROGRAM GUIDANCE

 AS OF 15 MAR 00


**PREDICTING SF TRAINING
PERFORMANCE**

- * ARI, PAD, AND USAJFKSWCS HAVE WORKED FOR MANY YEARS TO IDENTIFY PREDICTORS OF SF TRAINING PERFORMANCE
- * PREDICTORS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED
- * ARI TECHNICAL REPORT 1094, PRESCREENING METHODS FOR SPECIAL FORCES ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION

 AS OF 15 MAR 00

**IDENTIFIED PREDICTORS OF
SF TRAINING PERFORMANCE**

- * GT / FA ASVAB SCORES
- * PT SCORE
- * YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE
- * AIRBORNE QUALIFICATION
- * RANGER QUALIFICATION
- * BRANCH TYPE
- * TABE GRADE LEVELS
- * PULL-UPS
- * ARI BIODATA SFDEL SCORES

 AS OF 15 MAR 00

EXAMPLE OF MERIT/QUALITY SCORES

- * USAJFKSWCS RESEARCH DATABASE
- * FY96 AND 97 SPAS GRADUATES
- * 0-18 POINTS POSSIBLE
- * QT OR FA SCORE
- * PT SCORE
- * YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE
- * AIRBORNE QUALIFIED
- * RANGER QUALIFIED
- * MOS 11B

USAREC AS OF 15 MAR 90

SF RECRUIT MERIT/QUALITY SCORE

1. QT SCORE or FA (use the higher of the two) QT/FA ☐

QT/FA less than 112 = 1 pt
QT/FA 112 to 120 = 2 pts
QT/FA 121+ = 3 pts

2. PT SCORE PT ☐

PT score less than 228 = 1 pt
PT score 228 to 245 = 2 pts
PT score 246+ = 3 pts

3. Years of Military Service Ten Service ☐

Years served four plus = 1 pt
Years served equal three = 2 pts
Years served less than three = 3 pts

4. Airborne Qualification AIR ☐

NOT Airborne qualified = 1 pt
IS Airborne qualified = 3 pts

5. Ranger Qualification RANGER ☐

NOT Ranger qualified = 1 pt
IS Ranger qualified = 3 pts

6. MOS 11B MOS 11B ☐

NOT an 11B = 1 pt
IS an 11B = 3 pts

ADD SCORES FOR TOTAL POINTS TOTAL PTS ☐

USAREC AS OF 15 MAR 90

EXAMPLE 1

- * RECRUIT HAS FOUR YEARS IN THE ARMY
- * QT SCORE IS 118
- * FA SCORE IS 116
- * PHYSICAL FITNESS SCORE IS 240
- * AIRBORNE QUALIFIED
- * IS NOT RANGER QUALIFIED
- * PMOS = 11B

USAREC AS OF 15 MAR 90

SF RECRUIT MERIT/QUALITY SCORE

1. QT SCORE or FA (use the higher of the two) QT/FA ☒

QT/FA less than 112 = 1 pt
QT/FA 112 to 120 = 2 pts
QT/FA 121+ = 3 pts

2. PT SCORE PT ☒

PT score less than 228 = 1 pt
PT score 228 to 245 = 2 pts
PT score 246+ = 3 pts

3. Years of Military Service Ten Service ☒

Years served four plus = 1 pt
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4. Airborne Qualification AIR ☒

NOT Airborne qualified = 1 pt
IS Airborne qualified = 3 pts

5. Ranger Qualification RANGER ☒

NOT Ranger qualified = 1 pt
IS Ranger qualified = 3 pts

6. MOS 11B MOS 11B ☒

NOT an 11B = 1 pt
IS an 11B = 3 pts

ADD SCORES FOR TOTAL POINTS TOTAL PTS ☒

USAREC AS OF 15 MAR 90

HISTORICAL MERIT/QUALITY SCORES / SFQC OUTCOME SPAS FY96 AD, ENL GRADS AS OF 6 OCT 99

Pos	Start SPAS	End SPAS	Start SFQC	End SFQC	Rolls /Score	Null in Signs	% SFQC Mean
6	13	2	2	0	2	0	0%
7	35	9	7	1	1	0	13%
8	120	24	14	7	1	13-140	13%
9	181	43	40	24	16	0	13%
10	221	61	57	38	18	1	17-220
11	155	70	62	41	19	2	11-225
12	175	75	70	57	12	1	33%
13	107	39	35	43	9	0	42%
14	69	28	26	44	11	1	40-51%
15	54	40	35	33	2	0	61%
16	24	10	19	19	1	0	60%
17	8	3	3	3	0	0	60%
18	2	2	1	1	0	0	50%
TOTAL	1,243	448	430	327	97	4	25-27%

USAREC AS OF 15 MAR 90

HISTORICAL MERIT/QUALITY SCORES AND SFQC OUTCOME SPAS FY97 AD, ENL GRADS AS OF 6 OCT 99

Pos	Start SPAS	End SPAS	Start SFQC	End SFQC	Rolls /Score	Null in Signs	% SFQC Mean
6	28	3	3	1	2	0	28
7	103	20	19	6	11	1	6-78
8	188	40	34	20	12	4	11-124
9	229	73	60	25	18	12	15-214
10	244	78	70	47	24	7	15-224
11	172	76	72	45	20	7	24-304
12	150	74	69	58	20	11	24-314
13	94	45	44	49	9	4	30-344
14	56	41	33	22	12	8	37-434
15	25	40	38	24	2	0	40-424
16	30	37	36	27	3	6	24-464
17	5	2	4	4	0	0	604
18	4	4	3	2	1	0	204
TOTAL	1,428	462	513	323	124	44	25-27%

USAREC AS OF 15 MAR 90

QUALITY POINTS RECRUITED AD, ENL


	No. of Recruits*	Total No. Merit Pts	Average Pts	SFQC Grad Average Pts
FY99	1,495	15,718	10.5	
FY98	1,340	13,642	10.2	
FY97	1,438	15,123	10.5	11.8
FY96	1,243	13,491	10.9	12.1
FY95	725	7,878	10.9	

* These are only the recruits which had all the data needed to calculate the merit/quality points.



AS OF 15 MAR 99

PROPOSED SF RECRUIT MERIT/QUALITY POINTS NUMBERS OF RECRUITS* AD, ENL FY96 THRU FY99




* Shown here are only those recruits with all six data items used to compute merit/quality points. The number of AD, ENL recruits was slightly higher.



AS OF 15 MAR 99

NUMBERS OF LOW SCORERS (6-8 Pts) vs HIGH SCORERS (14+ Pts) AD, ENL FY96 THRU FY99



AS OF 15 MAR 99

SFAS FY 97 RECRUITS MERIT/QUALITY POINTS LOW SCORERS vs HIGH SCORERS

	LOW (6-8 Pts)	HIGH (14+ Pts)
AD, ENL RECRUITS	194	224
AD, ENL RECRUITS	8-100	87-224
AVERAGE MERIT/QUALITY POINTS	6	8
AVERAGE MERIT/QUALITY POINTS	26.5	26.5
AVERAGE MERIT/QUALITY POINTS	110	110
AVERAGE MERIT/QUALITY POINTS (478 waived)	109	109
AVERAGE MERIT/QUALITY POINTS	225	225
AD, ENL RECRUITS	194	224
AD, ENL RECRUITS	194	224
AD, ENL RECRUITS	70 qualified	87 qualified



AS OF 15 MAR 99

BEST PRIORITIZATION FOR SF RECRUITING

- * RECRUIT BY VALUE TO SPECIAL FORCES
- * PRIORITIZE RECRUITING BY MERIT/QUALITY POINTS
- * FOCUS ON HIGH MERIT/QUALITY POINT RECRUITS
- * ASSIGN QUALITY MISSION vs VOLUME MISSION



AS OF 15 MAR 99

ACTION REQUIRED

- * BUILD-IN SF RECRUIT MERIT/QUALITY SCORE AS PART OF ARMY RECRUITING INFORMATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (ARISS)
- * USE HAND-SCORED SHEETS UNTIL ARISS DOES IT AUTOMATICALLY
- * REDUCE SF ENLISTED RECRUITING MISSION TO 1,250



AS OF 15 MAR 99

VALUE ADDED

- * MORE FREQUENT PHONE CONTACT WITH TOP QUALITY RECRUITS
- * FOCUS MORE ADVERTISING ON TOP QUALITY RECRUITS
- * SEND SF REPS TO PERSONALLY VISIT VERY HIGHEST SCORERS (MENTOR)
- * OFFER AIRBORNE TRAINING SEATS/FUNDING FOR MEDIUM AND HIGH SCORERS



AS OF 15 MAR 90

SUMMARY "THE RIGHT ANSWER"

- * MAKE SF RECRUITING MORE PRECISE
- * ID INDICATORS / PREDICTORS OF GRADUATES OF TNG BASE
- * TARGET RECRUITING RESOURCES TO PRECISE MARKET
- * REDUCE WASTE OF RESOURCES FOR USASOC / USAREC
- * INCREASE CMF 18 POPULATION TO PROGRAM GUIDANCE



AS OF 15 MAR 90

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